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Abstract  
The application of “majority rule” within the company has the potential to lead to unfair results 
either for the minority shareholders or for the company itself, hence, it is the task of the 
legislature to provide minority shareholders with a matrix of rules that seek to protect them 
from misguided managerial behaviour. In that regard, this thesis set out to examine to what 
extent the Libyan shareholder protection regime offers equivalent protection to that found in 
the English and Moroccan corporate law regimes. It evaluates the current level of protection 
that is offered to minority shareholders in Libya in comparison with that available in England 
and Morocco in order to participate in a reform programme aimed at establishing a sufficient 
system of corporate governance in Libya via enhancing the rules that protect the minority 
shareholder. The reliance on a comparative study in this thesis is based on an assumption that 
law should be assessed from a wide perspective and the experience of other jurisdictions should 
be taken into account in order to reform the current law by establishing a high standard level 
of protection for the minority shareholders. Such reform would grant shareholders a degree of 
confidence which is considered a necessary step to attract investments and develop the 
economic strength of the whole country.  
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The conclusion of this work reveals several weaknesses and serious shortcoming in the Libyan 
corporate law regime, thereby it provides a basis for suggestions on how to improve minority 
shareholder protection in Libya based on the English and Moroccan experience. In that process, 
some suggestions and recommendations are provided which is the purpose of this work and the 
hope is that they will be taken on board in any proposal for reform in Libya. The study 
recommends a reform in the existing rules of minority shareholder protection in order to create 
an effective system of safeguards for the minority shareholders. Such reforms promise 
domestic and foreign investors that all companies under Libyan laws are managed, directed 
and controlled by upright, truthful, honest and efficient managers. This work will also pave the 
way for further studies that might be conducted in order to further enhance a robust system of 
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Chapter 1   Introduction   
 1.1 Setting the scene  
It is logical for those who contribute the majority capital to the company and spend more time 
and effort in relation to its affairs to have greater authority and power that enable them to favour 
their interests and rights in the company’s decisions.1 However, it is irrational and against the 
principles of fairness and justice for those who are in actual control, and more involved in the 
decisions and affairs of the company to utilize their position to maximise their benefits with no 
regard to the interests of other shareholders, who are powerless to prevent these kinds of actions 
as a result of the application of the doctrine of majority rule.2 In other words, though, the law 
of majority rule is considered a fundamental democratic principle in the governing and running 
of companies,3  its mechanical implementation, without any constraint grants the majority 
shareholders a wide authority and significant power that may affect the overall direction of the 
company which leads to negative consequences not only for the minority shareholders but also 
for the company and the whole national economy.4 The application of majority rule grants 
majority shareholders a power to issue decisions that misuse the interests of other shareholders 
and prevents multiplicity of suits against the controllers of such companies.5 Via this power 
the majority shareholders would breach the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders 
within the company thereby placing them in a powerless position where he or she would not 
be able to protect his own interests. 
                                                 
1  K Kim, J Nofsinger and P Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, ‘Large Shareholders, Board Independence, and 
Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe’ (2007) 13(5) Journal of Corporate Finance 859, at 862. 
2 The majority rule principle is the system of giving the largest group in a particular place or area the power to 
make decisions for everyone. See Cambridge Dictionaries Online 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/majority-rule accessed 13/10/2015. 
3  H Rajak, Sourcebook of Company Law (2nd edn, Jordans, Bristol 1995), at 529.  
4 Such an application would in particular affect the small business enterprises which are usually encouraged by 
the policy of the law in order to enhance the role of private sector. 
5  H Rajak, Sourcebook of Company Law (2nd edn, Jordans, Bristol 1995), at 531. 
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Based on this fact, corporate law has to provide a matrix of rules that seek to protect minority 
shareholders from the abusive conduct of the controllers (majority shareholders and directors) 
of the company.6 Such rules should force the controllers of a company to take into account the 
interests of remaining shareholders in all actions and decisions of the company.7 Moreover, 
policy makers and legislatures have to give consideration to the effective devices that prevent 
the majority shareholder from such kind of actions and which ensure that the minority 
shareholders are granted a right to commence litigation in order to obtain an appropriate 
remedy.8  In this regard, Sealy and Worthington, claim that the law should not allow the 
majority shareholders to hold complete and ultimate power without corresponding 
accountability, in addition, the law should furnish remedies for the minority shareholders in 
cases whenever their rights and interests have been violated.9 In line with this view, Goddard 
has emphasized that as long as the principle of majority rule remains fundamental to the 
operation of company law, the minority shareholders are vulnerable, then, statutes and 
contractual self-help must offer effective rules which protect them from the exploitation by the 
majority shareholders.10  Most importantly, the long-time success of the company would not 
be achieved unless some sort of balance between the majority power and the minority right to 
participate in the company’s management and to have their interests considered was adopted. 
Such a balance would grant the minority shareholders sufficient tools by which the wide 
authority of majority shareholders can be restricted.11 
                                                 
6 D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 2. 
7 See for example; T Lazarides, ‘Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment’ 
(2010) 7(1/2) Journal of Corporate and Securities Law 7.  
8  Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), ‘OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ [2004] http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. Accessed 
09/11/2013, at 40. 
9 L Sealy and S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2013), at 636-637. 
10 R Goddard, ‘Enforcing the Hypothetical Bargain: Sections 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985’ (1999) 20(3) 
Company Lawyer 66, at 70. 
11 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 92. 
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 Based on these considerations, this study will focus on the protection of minority shareholders 
to examine to what extent the Libyan shareholder protection regime offers equal level of 
protection to that found in English and Moroccan laws. 
1.2 Research objective and importance   
After the establishing of United Kingdom of Libya in 1953 until the earlier part of Gaddafi 
Regime (1970s) the contribution of private sector to investment exceeded 30% of the 
investment. 12  However, as the latter regime adopted the socialist policy, the Libyan 
government from the late 1970s until the beginning of 2000s became the major controller of 
the Libyan economic system.13 However, it was obviously seen in the last decade of the 
Gaddafi era that the Libyan economic system was being transitioned into a free-market 
economy. In so doing, many privatisation policies were adopted during the 2000s to encourage 
such transition.14 After the fall of the Gaddafi Regime in August 2011, a comprehensive 
revision of economic legislation became a key task for the Libyan legislature so as to adopt 
effective rules that may contribute to the development of the commercial environment in Libya. 
The relevant rules need to be adjusted to boost the role of private sector in the economy via 
attracting both domestic and foreign investors.  
Such a business environment has to provide a robust system that offers a degree of confidence 
to all investors who wish to set up their business in Libya. One group of investors who require 
such protection are minority shareholders. This is a result of the application of the majority rule 
principle wherein the majority shareholders might extract private benefits at the expense of the 
                                                 
12 S Ganous, Libyan Revolution in 30 Years, Political, Economic and Social Transformations, 1969-1999 (1st edn, 
Dar Al Jamahiriya for Publication, Distribution and Advertising, Libya 1999), at 225. 
13 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 93. 
14 4845 companies were privatised under this policy see H Shernanna and S Elfergani, ‘Privatisation and Broaden 
Ownership Base “A Step towards the Application of the People’s Socialist’ [2006] International Centre for Studies 
and Research 4, at 7. 
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minority shareholders. In that process, the Libyan legislature needs to reform the current 
relevant laws in order to offer a sufficient system of protection to the minority shareholders so 
that this reform would contribute to the growth of national economy. Such rules promise 
domestic and foreign investors that the companies incorporated under Libyan law are managed 
and controlled by honest and efficient managers.15 Furthermore, these rules not only serve the 
interests and rights of minority shareholders, but also offer a comprehensive system of benefits 
for all related parties who are dealing with the company.16  
In so doing, the Libyan Ministry of Economic Affairs in the interim government that was 
formed by the General National Congress17 has issued a decision to form a committee to amend 
the Business Activities Act 2010 which regulates companies and partnerships and the whole 
range of business activities in Libya. 18  The above committee has suggested a separate 
Companies Act such as that available in the UK and it is expressly stated that new Act would 
follow the Anglo American route for corporate law. Furthermore, a draft of that Bill was posted 
to me to make some suggestions regarding some topics.19 However, as this Bill has not became 
an Act by the date of submitting this thesis, the focus of this study will be on the current  
provisions in the Business Activities Act 2010 and other relevant laws such as the Civil Codes 
1953.20  
To participate in this developing scenario this thesis is targeted at examining the level of 
minority shareholder protection that is provided by the Libyan corporate law system in 
                                                 
15 See for example; K Raja, ‘Corporate Governance and Minority Shareholders' Rights and Interests in Pakistan: 
a Case for Reform’ (2012) 23(10) International Company and Commercial Law Review 347. 
16 That includes; employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, community etc. 
17 The first elected legislature after 2011 revolution which was elected by popular vote on 7 July 2012.  
18 The above Act issued on 21/08/2010, Act No 23, 2010. Referred to hereinafter as the Business Activities Act 
2010. 
19 On December 2014 I received a phone call from Muhammed Abbadwai and Alhabeeb Ajboda, Professors of 
Private Law at Tripoli University who are members of the above committee, they posted to me a draft of that bill 
to make some suggestions regarding some topics. 
20 The Libyan Civil Code which was issued on 23/11/1953. 
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comparison with that existing in other comparable jurisdictions (English and Moroccan 
systems).21 It discusses how the English and Moroccan laws deal with the issue and what 
lessons can be taken up by Libyan policy makers in order to find ways to enhance minority 
shareholder protection in Libya. In dealing with such questions, the thesis has to tackle other 
important tools of protection that are available in other comparable jurisdictions, such as 
Tunisia and Egypt. This analysis will reveal several weaknesses in Libyan corporate law, 
thereby providing a basis for suggestions on how to improve minority shareholder protection 
in Libya based on the English and Moroccan experience. Furthermore, the variation between 
Morocco and England, as civil and common law systems, would enhance the study as it shows 
how the two various legal systems deal with the issues and it provides a valuable model for  
upcoming reform of Libyan minority shareholder protection regime.   
The protection of minority shareholders is widely and reasonably argued to be the starting-
point of having a blameless corporate governance system.22 Therefore, the significance of 
undertaking such research is apparent in jurisdiction such as Libya where the economic system 
is moving towards the free market economy. As the adoption of sufficient tools of protection 
to the minority shareholders would enhance the level of confidence so that domestic and, most 
importantly, external investors become more interested to set up their business under this 
jurisdiction. Giving minority shareholders sufficient methods of protection via robust systems 
of corporate governance would help a country such as Libya to develop its infancy free market 
economy. Therefore, the intrinsic purpose of this work is to participate in establishing a 
sufficient system of corporate governance in Libya via enhancing the rules that protect the 
minority shareholder. Furthermore, it is fairly argued that giving the minority shareholders such 
kind of effective roles within the company does not only decrease the power of majority 
                                                 
21 The reasons behind choosing these two jurisdictions are explained on page 15.  
22 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
Thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 1997), at 376-393. 
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shareholders, but also the majority shareholders will be more active and more cautious toward 
taking of decisions that aim to promote the interests of the company as a whole.23 
Theoretically, as there is a lack of research on Libyan minority shareholder protection and 
corporate governance in general, thus, discussing the protection of minority shareholders in 
Libya under this thesis would contribute to the limited literature in this area. Moreover, this 
work would help other researchers with any future argument of other corporate governance 
issues such as directors’ duties and their enforcement, the majority power, creditors’ protection 
and so on. What adds to the importance of examining the protection of minority shareholders 
under Libyan law in comparison with English and Moroccan laws is the fact that such work is 
the first effort that deals with the protection of minority shareholders in Closed Joint Stock 
Companies under Libya laws in a comparison with these two jurisdictions therefore it fills a 
notable gap in the literature.24 
1.3 The scope of this research   
Since the Libyan Stock Market was established in 200625 and the Act of Market was issued in 
2010 26  there are only 13 companies listed in this market, 27  therefore, non-listed small 
companies form the overwhelming majority of companies in Libya and most of these 
                                                 
23 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
Thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 1997), at 376-393. 
24 A different model of minority shareholder protection was adopted by M Abdou, in his Ph.D thesis which is the 
self- enforcing model as an alternative tool to the judicial solution to deal with the majority-minority shareholders 
problem. This system is based on the adoption of the voting mechanism and transitional rights (the rule of one 
share one vote, confidential voting, etc.) which may reduce the abusive conduct of majority shareholders. See; M 
Abdou, ‘Towards a New Solution of Minority Shareholder Protection in Libya: Letting the Minority Shareholders 
Have a Voice’ (Ph.D thesis, University of Glasgow 2015). 
25 Decision No. (134) of the General People's Committee. In this regard the Authority of Stock Market has issued 
the Libyan Corporate Governance Code in 2007, however its provisions are not mandatory and not applicable to 
non-listed companies, see s. 2 (a) (b) of the Libyan Corporate Governance Code, 2007. 
26 Libyan Stock Market Act, 2010. 
27 In 2006 there were only three listed companies in the banking and insurance sectors, however this number 
increased to 6 in 2007. In 2008, there were 8 companies listed in the Market. Then, in 2009, the number of 
companies increased to 10 on the main list, and 14 on the sub-list of the market. In 2010, the number of listed 
companies increased to 12 on the main list and 13 on the sub-list of the market. In 2013, the companies decreased 
to 10 companies on the main list and 10 companies on the sub-list of the market. See available reports of Libyan 
Stock Market, available at http://www.lsm.ly/Arabic/Media/Pages/PeriodicReports.aspx. Accesses 03/08/2015. 
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companies are Joint Stock Companies. To that regard, this thesis will examine the protection 
of minority shareholders in Closed Joint Stock Companies with only some references to Public 
Joint Stock Companies. In this manner, our interests under the English law focus on Private 
Companies with only some passing reference to Public Companies. In Closed Joint Stock 
Companies a shareholder expects an active participatory role in the company usually through 
employment and a meaningful role in management,28 whereas in traditional public companies 
a shareholder is normally a passive investor who neither participates in the management nor 
contributes labour to it. In both kind of companies, majority shareholders have power to elect 
the managers and control the affairs of the company, therefore minority shareholders are 
particularly vulnerable if there is a falling out with the majority. By such power the minority 
shareholders may be excluded from participating in the management, contributing to the 
company with labour and prevented from having any dividends. However, in public companies 
minority shareholders can escape abusive majority conduct by selling their shares onto the 
market by correspondingly recovering the value of their investment as there is a ready market 
for their shares. 29  On the other hand, the minority shareholders in Closed Joint Stock 
Companies can be locked into their investment, as there is no ready market for their shares,30  
the only buyer that may find is the majority shareholder which in most cases is willing to offer 
a discounted price.31 So the minority shareholders in Closed Joint Stock Companies can simply 
be “locked-in” to the company, yet “frozen-out” from any business returns.32   
Based on these considerations, this work examines the protection of minority shareholders in 
the closed joint stock company in Libya as compared with the level of protection that is offered 
                                                 
28 D Moll ‘Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What it Used to Be’ 
(2008) 9(1) Houston Business and Tax Journal 33, at 34. 
29 Ibid, at 38. 
30 E Rock and M Wachter, ‘Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in the 
Close Corporation’ (1999) 24(4) Journal of Corporation Law 913.   
31 L Sealy and S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2013). 
32 D Moll ‘Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What it Used to Be’ 
(2008) 9(1) Houston Business and Tax Journal 33, at 39. 
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by the selected comparative jurisdictions. The Libyan Law was chosen since the central goal 
of this thesis is to establish an adequate system of minority shareholders protection in Libya 
which is the home country of the researcher. While English law was chosen for many reasons, 
first and foremost, having said that it is expressly stated by members of the committee that 
formed to reform the companies laws in Libya that the new proposed Act would follow the 
Anglo American route for corporate law. To that regard, the English system with its early 
experience of minority protection would offer various tools of protection to the minority 
shareholders. However, as some of the Anglo American rules might not be applicable in Libya 
due to the limitations of transplanting foreign rules into domestic law, 33  the Moroccan 
jurisdiction was used to provide another style of protection and overcome the limitation of the 
legal transplantation theory taking into account the fact that a country such as Morocco may be 
a rival for inward investment. Moreover, both countries, Libya and Morocco, have a Civil Law 
system which is influenced by Islamic law, so that they share similar cultural, political, 
economic and legal background. Most importantly, it appears to the researcher that the 
Moroccan system of corporate law is the most developed corporate law system in the MENA34 
region with its significant changes in that last fifteen years. In addition to the above selected 
jurisdictions (English and Moroccan systems), there will be some references to other MENA 
Jurisdictions (Egypt and Tunisia) in some cases wherein it seems that they might offer a better 
solution to see what lessons Libya can take from their experience. 
 Finally, it has to be pointed out that creating an efficient system of protection for the minority 
shareholder emanates from several sources, such as the ethics of shareholders and directors, 
the provisions of the law, the judicial system, internal control systems, and voluntary adoption 
                                                 
33 Under the concept of legal transplantation, the cultural, political, economic and legal background have to be 
considered whenever new ideas are being taken from foreign jurisdictions, see for example M Siems, Comparative 
Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014), at 4-23. 




of effectual codes of corporate governance.35 However, due to the limitation of this work as a 
Ph.D thesis, it would not be possible to cover all the above factors, therefore, it only focuses 
on the present legal provisions that deal with the minority shareholder protection with a 
proposal to reform these provisions, leaving the other issues to other following up studies. 
 1.4 Research methodology 
Methodology has been described as a route to follow in order to achieve a result,36 therefore, 
this study will embark on a comparative route to examine to what extent the Libyan shareholder 
protection regime offers a sufficient level of protection similar to that found in the selected 
comparative jurisdictions. However, it should be borne in mind that the researcher is not 
writing a traditional comparative law thesis which aims to show the similarities and differences 
that existing between these legal systems,37  rather than using a comparative approach to 
evaluate the current level of minority shareholder protection that the Libyan corporate law 
system is offering and to propose a law reform based on the lessons that are taken from those 
jurisdictions. In this manner, Legrand describes a comparative law as presenting a new 
perspective which will allow one critically illuminate a legal system.38  
This thesis will use the comparative methodology to provide the Libyan legislator with a model 
of how well different sets of legal rules work in addressing a particular problem or in pursuing 
a particular policy. 39  The reliance on a comparative study in this work is based on an 
assumption that law should be assessed from a wide perspective, and the experience of other 
jurisdictions should be taken into account in order to develop the current law. This in line with 
                                                 
35 T Lazarides, ‘Minority Shareholder Choices and Rights in the New Market Environment’ (2010) 7(1/2) Journal 
of Corporate and Securities Law 7.  
36 G Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014), at 2. 
37 R Sacco, ‘La Comparasion Juridique au Service de la Connaissance du Droit’ (1991a) (Economica), cited in G 
Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014), at 45.  
38 P Legrand, ‘Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory’ (1995) 58(2) Modern Law Review 263, 
at 364. 
39 M Siems, Comparative Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014), at 4. 
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the opinion that one cannot understand a place without seeing how it varies from others.40 Thus 
adopting such a comparative methodology gives the researcher a chance to understand the 
problem and see how other jurisdictions (English and Moroccan laws) deal and solve such kind 
of legal issues. Nevertheless, as the foreign laws will not always be suitable to be translated 
into different socio- economic context, the suggested law reform in this thesis would consider 
the limitations of transplanting foreign rules into domestic law.41 That is to say, this study 
would take into account the concept of legal transplantation wherein the cultural, political, 
economic and legal backgrounds have to be considered whenever new ideas are being taken 
from foreign jurisdictions.42  In this regard, it has to be pointed out that in modern company 
law a global model of robust system of corporate governance has emerged that countries are 
expected to follow.43 For instance, the rules on derivative actions, independent directors and 
audit committees have been popular transplants between various jurisdictions.44 Therefore, it 
is said that in the area of company law countries have converged in number of dominant legal 
policies, thus the legal transplants in this area of law are now more often voluntary than in the 
past.45 
Due to the current difficult circumstances in Libya the researcher was not able to carry out an 
empirical study, therefore: this thesis uses doctrinal research to achieve its goals 46. In so doing 
an examination of literature on the subject will be considered to reach the result. This literature 
                                                 
40  F Lawson, Selected Essays, the Comparison, (volume II Amsterdam, 1997), at 73. Cited in M Siems, 
Comparative Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014), at 97. 
41 M Siems, Comparative Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014), at 4-23. 
42 See for example, A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd end, University of 
Georgia Press, Athens 1993), at 111. Those who challenge the transplantation between one legal system to another 
often work within a cultural paradigm which consider legal knowledge as being rooted and defined merely by the 
cultural in which it operates, while the proponents of such legal transplantation see law like any other science or 
human activity is cable of being transferred from culture to another. See G Samuel, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart Publishing 2014), at 176-177. 
43 M Siems, Comparative Law (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014), at 235. 
44 Ibid, at 236.  
45 Ibid, at 220. 
46 Under such doctrine one of the main activities of the researcher is interpreting texts and arguing about a choice 
among diverging interpretations. See for example; M McConville and W Chui, Research Methods for Law 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2007), at 4. 
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includes primary sources such as Laws, cases (judicial opinions) and Regulations in Libya, 
England and Morocco. In addition to the primary sources, secondary sources such as books, 
journals and law reviews are examined to evaluate the position in those jurisdictions. In that 
process the author has made research trips to Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt to collect such 
sources and make certain that all relevant materials are considered.47 That is to say, this study 
will use the “law in books” doctrine which is different from law in action; in law in books the 
researcher focuses on legal rules rather than the application of these rules in practice.48 Such a 
method of research has many advantages, including the exploration of interesting 
jurisprudential questions allowing law makers to sharpen and deepen their understanding of 
legal topics.49 On the other hand, in law in action doctrine, law forms only one part among 
many of indeterminate relevant factors varying by factual, economic, social, and legal contexts, 
therefore, examining any legal issues would very much depend on legal practice, empirical 
research and social science theory.50 Based on the fact that law in action is often different to 
law in books, as Pound made clear in 1910, 51  this thesis will conduct a comparative 
methodology via a doctrine based research model in order to suggest reform in the substantive 
law on minority shareholder protection, taking into account that the current governance 
problems in the Libyan state would negatively affect the application of these rules, as it is 
                                                 
47 My research trip to Morocco was from January 1st to February 6th 2014. Whereas I have visited Tunisia twice, 
in August 2014 and February 2015. Also prior to starting my Ph.D I visited some Egyptian universities in 2012 
and I collected some data from there. Moreover, as a part of my active research I have attended two conferences 
in the UK and participated in one conference in Libya. These conferences are; 1- Comparative Research in 
Commercial Law: Challenges and Opportunities, Durham Law School, Durham University, 25th June 2013. 2- 
How to get a PhD in Law: What Legal Research Skills Will I Need? Literature Reviews, Qualitative and 
Quantitative Research and Comparative Legal Research. Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, School of 
Advanced Study, University of London, 07 March 2015. 3- Improving the Company Law in Libya; Providing a 
Flexible Framework that Allows Companies to Compete and Grow. Law School, Sabha University, 08 April 2013. 
In that conference I presented a paper which is titled; The Weak Position of Minority Shareholder under Libyan 
Company Law.   
48 See R Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 
49 J Halperin, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change’ (2011) 64(1) Maine Law Review 
45. 
50 Ibid. For more details in a law in action in the context of corporate governance see P Lawton ‘Berle and Means, 
Corporate Governance and Chinese Family Firm’ (1996) 6 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 348. 




critical for the legal institutions (such as the legislature and the courts) to operate effectively 
under these circumstances. Therefore this work will provide suggestions to law makers to 
reform the substantive law leaving the application issues to other empirical studies that might 
be carried out in the future when the Libyan state’s governance problems are sorted out.52   
Although this study adopts the doctrine approach method, however it also promises to be a 
critical study and would not restrict itself to a kind of descriptive approach. Therefore, it shall 
critically examine the compatibility of the Libyan laws against the selected comparable 
jurisdictions. Lastly, it has to be mentioned here that due to the lack of sources in the area of 
minority shareholders protection and the corporate governance in general in the Libyan 
jurisdiction, the focus of the Libyan side in this thesis will be mainly on the current Act (the 
Business Activities Act 2010) with references to the relevant materials whenever they existed.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
Being conducted in this manner, the thesis should be able to reach its conclusions regarding 
the examination of the current Libyan system of minority shareholder protection and provide a 
proposal of reform which is based on lessons that are taken from the selected comparable 
jurisdictions. In so doing, the thesis is designed in a way that should enable it to achieve its 
objectives, it is divided into four main chapters preceded by an introduction and followed by a 
conclusion. To embark on this kind of study chapter one expands on this introduction by 
explaining how the majority shareholders’ power can be abused wherein such majority further 
their own interests with no consideration to the interests of minority shareholders and the 
company as a whole. It also explains the importance of protecting the minority shareholders 
                                                 
52 On December 17th, 2015 and after more than a year long national dialogue sponsored by the UN, the world 
witnessed the signing of a Libyan Political Agreement that has established a government of national accord 
(GNA). Wisely, the GNA has announced that its three priorities are: security, economy and national reconciliation. 
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and the effects of this protection on the whole economic sector. The last section of the first 
chapter illustrates two main ways of protecting minority shareholders.  
Since the main purpose of this thesis is to participate in a reform programme aimed at 
enhancing the level of minority shareholder protection in Libya, the examination of the Libya 
system is left to be discussed separately in Chapter five, where the extrapolated lessons that are 
taken from the English system (Chapter three) and the Morocco system (Chapter four) are 
being recommended for the law makers in Libya. To that regard, chapter three examines and 
assesses the English style of minority shareholder protection. It aims to demonstrate the 
different tools of protection under this system and what changes were introduced by the 
Companies Act 2006. As the English system heavily relies on the judicial authority (the 
remedial approach) the English chapter, after a brief mention to certain statutory rights which 
offer a type of precautionary protection to the minority shareholder, will examine in turn the 
personal action, derivative claim, the unfair prejudice remedy and the winding up solution.  
Chapter four focuses on the minority shareholders under Moroccan law. Since this study is 
mainly focused on the protection of minority shareholders in the private company (Closed Joint 
Stock Company) the protection of minority shareholders are examined under the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1996 and its amendment in 2008. In the first section of this chapter, a general 
introduction is introduced which summarises the history of company law in Morocco and 
presents kind of companies and partnerships that exist under Moroccan laws. The second 
section is allocated to discuss relevant rights and supervision tools which enable minority 
shareholders to participate in the management of the company and practice a sort of supervision 
over the majority shareholders (the preventative mechanisms). The third section of chapter four 
is about shareholders’ actions against the controllers of the company (the remedial route). In 
the last section a conclusion and comparative view is provided which compares and evaluates 
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the English and Moroccan means of minority protection in order to take lessons for the Libyan 
system of minority shareholders protection. 
Chapter five examines the protection of minority shareholders under Libyan law. It attempts to 
achieve two aims; an examination of the current rules in addition it provides a basis for 
suggestions on how to improve minority shareholder protection in Libya based on the English 
and Moroccan experience. This chapter starts with a brief introduction to the company law in 
Libya which also illustrates the type of companies and partnerships that are available under 
Libyan law. The second section discusses rights and instruments that are offered by Libyan 
Laws to prevent or reduce the possibility of abusive conduct of the company’s controllers. 
Section three is allocated to assess the function of judicial authority to protect the minority 
shareholder in Libyan. In the final section a conclusion is drawn and comparative lessons are 
suggested to reform the current law.  
Chapter six represents the conclusion of this study. It summarises the main arguments and the 
outcome of each chapter of the thesis. It concludes that the Libyan system suffers from serious 
shortcoming and weakness and it does not provide a sufficient level of protection to the 
minority shareholders. In that process, legislative changes become indispensable to amend the 
current system, therefore, some suggestions and recommendations are provided which is the 
purpose of this work and the hope is that they will be taken on board in any proposal for reform 
in Libya. Last but not least, areas of further studies are suggested in order to further enhance a 







Chapter 2   Theoretical issues concerning minority shareholder 
protection: comparative insights 
2.1 Introduction  
A minority shareholder is an equity holder who does not have voting control in his or her 
company, that is an individual shareholders or group of shareholders who hold less than a 50% 
voting interest in a company.53 Under such circumstances, minority shareholders would not be 
able to control the affairs of the company either by voting alone or in coalition with others,54 
and they are dependent to a certain extent on the wishes and the actions of majority 
shareholders.55 On the other hand, majority shareholders with their control of more than half 
of the votes exercise a significant power within the company, consequently they are able to 
control the board of directors and the general meetings which manage the business of the 
company. This substantial power can be used to benefit the majority shareholders and cause a 
detriment to minority shareholders.56 In other words, the power of the majority shareholders 
can be used to further their own interests with no regard to the interests of the other 
stakeholders, which include; employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and the minority 
shareholders. Furthermore the abusive conduct of majority shareholders would negatively 
                                                 
53 Z Sharar, ‘Minority Shareholders' Remedies in Public Shareholding Companies: Comparing the State of Qatar 
and Australia’ [2010] Corporate Governance eJournal 3. 
54 See M Almadani, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Private Companies in Saudi Arabia and Dubai, Does 
the UK Company Law 2006 Offer a Way Forward?  (1st edn, Dar Almadani, Jeddah 2012). 
55 D Szentkuti, Minority Shareholder Protection in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom: A Comparative 
Overview (VDM Verlag Dr, Germany 2008), at 8. It should be noted here that there are different types of minority 
shareholders. For instance, if A is a minority shareholder with 26% of shares, he or she actually is in a good 
position, as he or she can prevent any change in the constitution of the company: this is often referred to as 
negative control. On the other hand, if B is a minority shareholder with 8% he or she is in fact in a very weak 
position, as a company’s decisions are normally taken by majority vote, and the minority shareholder is usually 
bound by the decisions of majority shareholders. 
56 A Rahmani, ‘Majority Rule and Minority Shareholder Protection in Joint Stock Companies in England and 
Iran’ (Ph.D Thesis, University of Glasgow, UK 2007).  
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affect the interests of the company and the whole economy.57 To that regard, on the one hand, 
a comprehensive system for the protection of minority shareholders needs to establish a legal 
framework which guarantees that the controlling shareholders of the company do not misuse 
their corporate powers, on the other hand, that legal framework should always provide the 
minority shareholders with a means to gain sufficient remedy whenever it is warranted.58  
Based on these considerations, this chapter is designed to demonstrate the following theoretical 
issues regarding the protection of minority shareholders. The first section explains how the 
application of “majority rule” within the company has the potential to lead to unfair conduct 
either for the minority shareholders or for the company itself. In so doing, it illustrates how the 
unrestricted power of majority shareholders can be misused to harm the interests and rights of 
non-controlling shareholders59 which puts the minority shareholder in an exposed position and 
prevents them from taking any action on behalf of the company against the directors or the 
majority shareholders.60 The second section discusses the economic considerations of minority 
shareholder protection where it is shown that having an adequate system of minority 
shareholder protection would not only benefit the minority shareholders but also it contributes 
to the development of an efficient and well commercial environment. Last, but not least, the 
third section will discuss the two main approaches of protecting the minority shareholder. 
2.2 The law of majority shareholder power; use and misuse  
As a consequence of applying voting procedures and corporate democracy, majority 
shareholders legitimately have the power to control the company, and consequently ignore the 
interests and rights of the minority shareholders via lawful democratic decisions either through 
                                                 
57 See A Almosawi, ‘The Protection for the Minority from the Abuse Resolutions in Iraqi Company Law’ (2011) 
26(1) Journal of Science for Law 101, at 101. 
58 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014), at 351-356. 
59 L Miles and M He, ‘Protecting the Rights and Interest of Minority Shareholders in Listed Companies in China: 
Challenges for the Future’ (2005) 16(7) International Company and Commercial Law Review 275. 
60 See for instance s. 184 of the Business Activities Act, 2010.  
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of the board of directors or through decisions in shareholder meetings. 61  It is within the 
majority shareholders’ power via general meetings to appoint members of the board of 
directors,62 therefore the minority shareholders normally will not be on the board of directors, 
and if they are on the board, they will be very much in a vulnerable position, as they do not 
have voting control.63 By this power the majority shareholders are able to appoint the directors 
who they prefer to work with, and determine how the company performs its business 
operations.  In addition to that, the majority shareholders, when they have the intention to abuse 
the minority shareholder, they will select the directors whom they believe may have the same 
way of thinking and they know that he or she will assist them in any kind of mistreatment or 
unfairness they want to commit.64 Furthermore, by such power the majority shareholders may 
replace the board with other members who are more compliant to their wishes. 65  Most 
importantly, the majority shareholders by their ultimate power and their control of the board of 
directors are able to prevent the minority from starting any legal action that aims to redress the 
wrongdoings which may have been committed by the controller of the company,66  since in 
most cases the minority shareholders cannot get the required quorum that is necessary to obtain 
the permission to start the proceedings.67   
Under these circumstances, the majority shareholders by means of their influence, and 
collaboration with the board of directors they can exploit the financial resources of the 
                                                 
61 L Miles and M He, ‘Protecting the Rights and Interest of Minority Shareholders in Listed Companies in China: 
Challenges for the Future’ (2005) 16(7) International Company and Commercial Law Review 275. 
62 See for example s. 173 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 which provides that it’s the right of the 
general meeting to appoint the board members if they were not appointed by the memorandum of association. 
63 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag 
Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 210. 
64  K Kim, J Nofsinger and P Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, ‘Large Shareholders, Board Independence, and 
Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence from Europe’ (2007) 13(5) Journal of Corporate Finance 859, at 861.  
65 H Rajak, Sourcebook of Company Law (2nd edn, Jordans, Bristol 1995), at 529. 
66 D French, S Mayson & C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (32th edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2015-2016). 
67 See for example; A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (1st edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), at 76.  
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company to their own benefit.68 Thus, the resolutions issued by the majority shareholders must 
be accepted by the minority shareholders, and they must also acknowledge, as a fact of business 
life, that the power is lawfully enjoyed by those holding more shares.69 On the other hand, the 
minority shareholders by their individual vote will not be able to carry sufficient weight to 
influence decisions, and accordingly they are unable by themselves, to block certain decisions 
and actions.70 That is due to the fact that, for an ordinary resolution to be passed, only a simple 
majority of the vote is required (i.e 50.01%),71 whereas a special resolution needs a higher 
percentage (usually 75.01%). For that reason, the majority shareholders will control the 
ordinary resolution, moreover, in some cases when the majority hold 75% or more they control 
the special resolution as well.72 Accordingly, the minority shareholders have no power to 
impose their wish,73 unless the minority shareholders formulate a coalition of shareholders in 
the situation where a controlling shareholder who has a high proportion of the shares holds less 
than 50% overall.74 
Furthermore, such directors usually seek to satisfy the majority without regard of the minority’s 
interests, as the only votes that count to create an ordinary resolution to remove a director are 
effectively in the hands of the majority shareholders.75 In this context, it is provided under s. 
168(1) of the Companies Act 2006 that “A company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting 
remove a director before the expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any 
agreement between it and him”. However, it should be noted that the ability to remove directors 
                                                 
68 L Miles and M He, ‘Protecting the Rights and Interest of Minority Shareholders in Listed Companies in China: 
Challenges for the Future’ (2005) 16(7) International Company and Commercial Law Review 275. 
69 A Hicks and S Goo, Cases and Materials on Company Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011). 
70 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014), at 351. 
71 See s. 164 of The Business Activities Act, 2010. 
72  A Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Option for Shareholders’ [2007] Journal of 
Business Law 656, at 664. 
73 M Bennedsen and D Wolfenzon, ‘The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations’ (2000) 58(1) Journal of 
Financial Economics 113, at114. 
74  A Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Option for Shareholders’ [2007] Journal of 
Business Law 656, at 664.  
75 D Schlimm, L Mezzettiand B Sharfman, ‘Corporate Governance and the Impact of Controlling Shareholder’ 
(2010) 18(1) Corporate Governance Advisor 1, at 3.   
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by ordinary resolution which is provided by s. 168 can be avoided by inserting in the articles a 
provision usually known as a "Bushell v Faith clause ". Such a provision confers enhanced 
voting rights on the director who is going to be removed, as it was established in Bushell v 
Faith that a clause which provides enhanced for voting rights on such a resolution for the 
director whose removal is sought will be effective.76 However, this clause can only protect a 
director who is also a shareholder in the company. In contrast, s. 174 of the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 provides that a director can be dismissed before the expiration of the period 
of appointment once an ordinary resolution is passed by the majority shareholders, such a 
resolution might remove all the board members or some of them. The above mentioned 
exception which is known as a "Bushell v Faith clause" is not available under Libyan law so 
that shareholders would not able to restrict the power of the general meeting regarding 
removing the board members. 
As the directors are monitored by the controlling majority shareholders, the controlling 
shareholders with the help and support of the directors can divert resources from the company 
to pursue private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.77 As a result of such 
conduct the company certainly has the potential of reaching the most awful scenario, where the 
majority shareholders simply see the company as a mere extension of their interests, and use 
every opportunity to abuse their power and authority to impose their will on the corporation in 
order to achieve their own goals with no regard of the other stakeholders’ interests.78 On this 
point, La Porta and others pointed out that the protection of minority shareholders is important, 
hence the expropriation of minority shareholder by the controlling shareholders is widespread. 
This expropriation may have different forms; for example the controlling shareholders might 
                                                 
76 [1970] AC 1099. This decision is not applicable to listed companies, since the London Stock Exchange would 
refuse listing if restrictions existed on removing the board of directors. 
77 A Cesari, ‘Expropriation of Minority Shareholders and Pay-out Policy’ [2012] British Accounting Review 207. 
78 D Schlimm, L Mezzetti and B Sharfman, ‘Corporate Governance and the Impact of Controlling Shareholder’ 
(2010) 18(1) Corporate Governance Advisor 1, at 5.  
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just take the profits alone, or selling additional shares in the company to another corporation 
they own at below market prices, or they may derive corporate opportunities to another 
company which they control or in which they have substantial interests.79 Similarly, it was 
stated by Lord Davey in Burland v Earle80 that the majority shareholders abused their power 
when they endeavour directly or indirectly to appropriate to themselves money, property or 
advantages which belong to the company or in which other shareholders are entitled to 
participate.81 To this regard, s. 76 of the Egyptian Companies Act 1981 provides that abusive 
conduct might take one of the following forms; a resolution which furthers the interests of 
specific group of shareholders; a decision which harms the interests of other shareholders, and 
finally a resolution which only benefits the member of the board of directors. In the same way, 
s. 290 of the Tunisian Companies Act 2000 providers that any resolution may further the 
interests of a shareholder or group of shareholders or harm the interests of the company is 
considered an abusive and could be nullified.82 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, as the minority 
shareholders’ ability to access information may be denied, and their involvement in the 
company’s management is usually undermined, the majority shareholders can make false 
report which appears less than the actual profits the company earned, so that they can distribute 
a smaller amount of those sums.83 In this context, s. 224 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 
2010 does not give minority shareholder a right to ask for the financial statements of the 
company nor the minutes of the board of directors. Such a section would make it easier for the 
controllers of the company to make false financial statements and not distribute dividends. 
                                                 
79 R La Porta, and Others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58(1-2) Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, at 4. 
80 [1902] AC 83, 93. 
81 In this context see also Rolled Steel Products Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1985] 2 WLR 908 (CA). 
82 See A Alwarfaly, Law of Commercial Companies (2nd edn, Matbahat Alatrash leeallketab Almoktas, Tunis 
2010), at 276-277. 
83  C Leuz, D Nanda and P Wysocki, ‘Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International 
Comparison’ (2002) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 505.  
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Following the foregoing introduction on the majority shareholders’ power, it clearly appears 
that the majority shareholders via their entire power can simply harm the interests and rights 
of the minority shareholder, as well as the company’ interests. Therefore, the next sub-sections 
of this chapter will discuss how the majority shareholder use their power in ways that harm the 
interests of minority shareholders and the company as a whole.  
2.2.1 Majority shareholders may exercise their power in ways that disadvantage the 
minority shareholders’ interests  
The oppression of minority shareholders highlights one of the possible situations where the 
company’s controllers take advantage of their corporate power in order to achieve their own 
interests.84 Such an oppression or unfair prejudice relates to the way by which a company is 
run, where that way of running leads to unfair consequences for the minority shareholders 
rather than for the company.85 In these circumstances there is no wrongdoing that has been 
perpetrated by the majority towards the company, rather than the personal rights and interests 
of the minority shareholders have been unfairly prejudiced by the majority shareholders, thus 
the minority shareholders should be allowed to litigate the majority in order to remedy the 
unfair conduct.86 For instance, minority shareholders should have a right to sue the controllers 
of the company where they prevent distributing dividends to those shareholders with no logical 
reasons or they restrict their priority right to buy new shares. 
To that regard, s. 353 of the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco allows a shareholder or group of 
minority shareholders to go to the court to protect their own rights and interests whenever they 
realise that controllers of the company act in ways that further the interests of some 
shareholders with no regard to the interests of other shareholders. Moreover s. 166 the same 
                                                 
84 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014), at 549. 
85 M Almadani, Protecting Minority Shareholders in Private Companies in Saudi Arabia and Dubai, Does the 
UK Company Law 2006 Offer a Way Forward? (1st edn, Dar Almadani, Jeddah 2012).  
86 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014), at 685- 688. 
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Act provides that it is also the job of the statutory auditor to ascertain that all shareholders are 
treated equally and any resolution that breach this rule has to be nullified. In the UK, this type 
of unfair action was regulated in s. 210 of Companies Act 1948, under the term of 
“oppression”.87 However this term was replaced by another expression in the Companies Act 
1980 which is “unfair prejudice”. Under this new term, the minority shareholders have a right 
to bring an action whenever the company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner which is 
unfairly prejudicial to members’ interests.88 In the implementation of this expression the House 
of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips,89 established that shareholders have the right to complain when:   
“…some breach of the terms on which are members agreed that the affairs of the company should be 
conducted; or some use of the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith i.e 
cases in which equitable considerations make it unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company 
to rely upon their strict legal power “.90  
In general, it is said that whenever the majority shareholders violated the minority 
shareholder’s interests and rights the minority shareholders are entitled to complain, yet, there 
are different types of misconduct which may cause unfairness and oppression. For example, 
majority shareholders through the board of directors might increase the company’s capital in 
order to enhance their power without giving the minority a chance to buy new shares, therefore, 
minority shareholder is entitled to complain to the court and nullify such conduct.91 It is also 
considered as abusive conduct wherein the majority shareholders sold their controlling 
shareholding to a third party without giving the minority shareholder any chance to participate 
in or to object to the decision to sell.92 In this context, although the court in the case of 
                                                 
87 The UK Companies Act, 1948. 
88 See s. 994 of the UK Companies Act, 2006. 
89 [1999] 2 BCLC 1.  
90 [1999] 2 BCLC1. 
91 A Almosawi, ‘The Protection for the Minority from the Abuse Resolutions in Iraqi Company Law’ (2011) 26(1) 
Journal of Science for Law 101, at 125. 
92 Ibid.  
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Weinberger v UOP, Inc93 did not consider this conduct as minority oppression, however it 
ordered the acquirer of the shares to give the minority shareholders the opportunity to sell their 
shares at the same price as the majority did.94  In contrast, there is no such restriction under s. 
135 of the Business Activities Act 2010 or s. 771 of the Companies Act 2006, therefore, shares 
are presumed to be capable of transfer, even in a private company, unless the company’s article 
or the shareholder agreement contains some restrictions on the transfer of shares.95 Another 
form of abusive conduct might be perpetrated by the company controllers where they reject the 
declaration of dividends over a period of time without real justifications.96 In this regard, the 
Supreme Court of Morocco has nullified the general assembly’s resolution which delayed 
distribution of dividends to shareholders without justified reasons.97  Similarly, in Re Sam 
Weller & Sons Ltd98 the court regarded that the failure to pay proper dividends to shareholders, 
over a long period of time without explanation an unfairly prejudicial act, and accordingly the 
minority shareholder was entitled to bring an action and they were successful for relief. In 
Patton v Nicholas,99 the minority claimed the majority shareholders had refused to declare a 
dividend, the court found that the majority shareholders without a doubt had wrongfully 
controlled the board as to prevent the declaration of dividends, moreover the court found that 
the majority shareholders did that in order to prevent the minority shareholder from sharing in 
the profits. The court ordered a mandatory injunction requiring the majority shareholder to pay 
reasonable dividends at the earliest practical date, as well as in future years. An example of this 
situation of oppression was also found in the Texas case of Pinnacle Data Services, Inc v 
                                                 
93 457 A2d 701 (Del 1983) 1641. 
94 R Szudoczky, Takeover Regulation and Protection of Minority Shareholders: A Comparison Between The 
European and US Approach (Lambert Academic Publishing, Koln 2009), at 16. 
95 See s. 771 of the UK Companies Act, 2006, and The Companies (Model Articles) Regulation 2008, Art 26. 
96 Patton v Nicholas 279 SW 2d 848 (Tex 1955). 
97 The Supreme Court of Morocco, file No 209/03/2003, issued on 07/06/2006, (2008) 68, Journal of Supreme 
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Gillen, 100 where the majority shareholder had engaged in oppression by withholding profit 
distribution, terminating employment and paying for individual legal fees with corporate funds. 
However, their claim was refused as there was not enough evidence which supported the 
minority shareholder’s claim. Such conduct, which oppresses the minority shareholders usually 
lead them to either hold on their shares without any expected profits or sell these shares for 
whatever the majority, or the market (in the case of public company) is willing to offer.101 
The abusive conduct of majority shareholders may take another form where such majority 
shareholder via their control of the board of directors prevents the minority shareholders from 
obtaining any important information regarding the company’s management. 102   By such 
information minority shareholders would be able to practice some sort of supervision during 
the meetings of the general assembly and give their vote with full knowledge of facts. 
Furthermore, the minority shareholders in their claims either against the company or the 
majority shareholder, would need to obtain some information as supporting evidence in order 
to get success in their claim, otherwise the claim may fail. To that regard, the Commercial 
Court of Appeal of Casablanca has annulled the minutes of a shareholders’ meeting and its 
decisions which were taken without giving the minority shareholders a right to see documents 
that relate to some resolutions in that meeting.103 To restrict this kind of conduct, a legislature 
would adopt some provisions which obligate either the board of directors and the general 
meeting to grant minority shareholders easy access to documents related to shareholders 
meetings, inventory, financial statements, consolidated accounts, reports of the board of 
                                                 
100 104 SW 3d 188 191 92 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003 no pet). 
101 D Moll, ‘Shareholder Oppression & 'Fair Value': Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close 
Corporation’ (2004) 54(2) Duke Law Journal 8.  
102 Ibid. 
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directors, the draft resolution submitted to the general assembly and related subjects. 104 
However, as will be discussed later in much detail, ss. 223-224 of the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 has not given sufficient effect to this right, so that under s. 224 of this Act 
minority shareholders are only able to access the register of the shareholders and the minutes 
of the shareholders’ meetings and their decisions. The Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 
does not allow those shareholders to ask for the financial statements nor the minutes of the 
board of directors and its decisions, also it is not allowed for those shareholders to see the 
minutes of the supervisors’ committees.105  
What is more, particularly in Closed Joint Stock Companies as this research focuses, although 
most of what is agreed upon between shareholders goes into the articles of association or the 
shareholder agreement, there are always some matters of understanding which result from 
discussions and have not been stated formally in their agreement. 106  These unstated 
understandings might contain the reasonable expectations which each shareholders may have. 
For example reasonable expectations can be found when each shareholder who has subscribed 
to the company’s capital expects that he or she will be allowed to be involved in the company’s 
management and receive a return on his/her investment partly or totally in the form of salary 
rather than dividends.107 If the majority shareholders have ignored the legitimate expectations 
of the minority shareholders, or they acted in a way which is contrary to it, the minority have 
the right to make a claim, as this form of conduct has been classified as oppressive conduct.108 
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It was stated in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc109 that legitimate expectations often arise out 
of a fundamental understanding between the shareholders which formed the basis of their 
association, but which was not put into contractual form. In this case the minority shareholder 
claimed that directors had acted in a way which contrary to the minority shareholder’s 
legitimate expectations by not acting in the best interests of the company in deciding whether 
to pay dividends and how much to pay.110  
The concept of reasonable expectations, which was created to recognise wider application of 
minority shareholders’ interests, has been adopted by the UK law. As s. 994 of Companies Act 
2006, which replaced s. 459 of CA 1985, states that a: a member …. may apply to the court…. 
for an order on the ground that the company’ affairs are being …unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of its members or at least himself. It appears from the provision that the legislature 
has used the word “interests” instead of “rights”, and it is agreed that the word “interests” is 
wider than “rights”, therefore it offers extra advantages to shareholders. In other words, rights 
of shareholders come exclusively from the statute or the shareholders’ agreement or articles, 
while the word interests might include other unstated legitimate expectations even if there is 
no explicit terms agreed between the shareholders.111  In this manner, the court in Re BC&G 
Care Homes Ltd: Crowley v Bessell112 held that the exclusion from management of a one- third 
shareholder without a reasonable offer to buy the petitioner out in circumstances where there 
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is legitimate expectation of participation in management is generally regarded as one example 
of unfairly prejudicial conduct.113 
In Libya there is no mention to the concept of reasonable expectations in the relevant Acts and 
regulations, however, there is nothing prevents the courts from accepting an actions which are 
based on breaching the legitimate expectations of some shareholders. Identifying the legitimate 
expectations is matter of fact which differs from case to case, therefore, the court when deciding 
whether any or all of those expectations should be honoured, needs to take into account the 
parties’ actual understanding, whether at the time of investment or as they might evolve. In this 
sense, the court in R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd114 had found that the minority 
shareholder had a legitimate expectation to be involved in the company’s management as long 
as he remained a significant shareholder of the company. When the majority prevented him 
from this participation, the court ordered the majority shareholder to buy the minority’ shares 
and repay as soon as possible the loans made to the company by the minority shareholder. That 
is to say, violating the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder is another form of 
misconduct which the majority shareholder might perpetrate, therefore whenever this violation 
takes place the minority shareholder have the right to bring a legal action to seek a relief.  
In brief, the majority shareholders via their voting power, can approve self-interested 
transactions, direct managers of the company, refuse to declare dividends, force the purchase 
of the shares of minority shareholders below their value and breach the reasonable expectations 
of the minority shareholder.115 Moreover, by this power not only the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders would be affected but also the whole the interests of the company. 
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Therefore, the next sub-section will illustrate how the majority shareholders can use their 
power to abuse the company’s interests when they merely favour their own interests.    
2.2.2 Majority shareholders may exercise their power to disadvantage the interests of the 
company as a whole. 
The unrestricted power of the majority shareholders allows them to commit all kind of 
wrongdoings to the detriment of the company and consequently vote to prevent the company 
or the minority shareholder from taking any legal action to gain a remedy. This kind of vote 
usually takes place at board meetings or in the general assembly, wherein the majority 
shareholders are able directly or indirectly to control voting.116 The majority shareholders in 
most cases are free to manage the company in a way that they prefer, and by their controlling 
authority they can prevent minority shareholder from starting this litigation. In this regard, 
under s. 184 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 an individual shareholder or group of 
minority shareholders are not allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company 
against the wrongdoer directors if the company itself via its general meeting has not passed 
such a resolution. 
Furthermore, the courts in some jurisdictions would refrain from interference in the internal 
affairs of the company as long as the majority are acting within their legitimate power.117 In 
this sense it was stated by Lord Eldon in Carlen v Drury118 that “the court is not required on 
every occasion to take over the management of every playhouse and brew house in the 
kingdom”. Therefore, courts became hesitant to get involved in the company’s management, 
instead leaving the majority shareholder to manage the company as they prefer. These 
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restrictions which prevent minority shareholders from starting liability actions as courts are 
most often reluctant to interfere in the internal management of the company. This often allows 
the majority to act to obtain their own advantage with little or no regard to the company’s 
interests.  
The utilisation of the controlling authority by the majority shareholder can take many different 
forms, for instance, the majority shareholders can simply utilise the concept of ratification to 
restrict the scope of any litigation by the minority shareholders.119 The unrestricted authority 
for the majority shareholders allows them to engage in wrongdoings, and vote to get ratification 
of that kind of misconduct they perpetrated, subsequently prevent any potential action which 
can be taken by the court as a legal entity against them.120 In this context, Vinelott J stated in 
Taylor v National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area)121 that “….it is open to a majority 
of the members, if they think it is right in the interests of the corporate body to do so, to resolve 
that no action should be taken to remedy the wrong done to the corporate body and such a 
resolution will bind the minority”. Therefore, it is stated that the majority shareholder is 
authorised by the law to engage in wrongdoings and detriment the interests of the company and 
eventually the minority shareholders.122  
Moreover, the board members either majority shareholders or other directors who represent the 
majority shareholder, have the power to modify or increase their remuneration to gain personal 
benefits at the expense of the company,123 therefore, they can misuse their dominance to obtain 
higher remuneration to the detriment of the shareholders and consequently the company as a 
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whole.124 To restrict such kind of abusive conduct s. 162 of the Jordanian Companies Act 1997 
provides that remuneration of the chairman of the board of directors and its members shall not 
exceed a rate of 10% of the net profit which can be distributed as dividends to shareholders, 
after deducting all taxes and reserves therefrom.125 
Another example of the utilisation of the controlling authority is found in Cook v Deeks126 
where the company (A) had built up considerable goodwill with the Canadian Railway 
Company as a result of the satisfactory performance of contracts. Nevertheless, when the two 
parties reached the final step of negotiations, they majority shareholder of the company (A) 
passed a resolution to the effect that their company had not interests in the contract. And they 
granted the contact to another company which they had incorporated rather that company (A), 
the Privy Council held that the resolution was unfair, and the majority shareholder were not 
allowed to abuse their voting power to advance their own business and ultimately gain from 
this for themselves.127 
The risk of abusing the interests of the company becomes higher where the company has only 
two shareholders, one a majority and one a minority; in this case if the majority shareholder is 
also the directors there is a possibility that fiduciary duty will be breached.128 Moreover, in this 
circumstances the fiduciary duty will be directly owed to the minority shareholder. For 
example, in Redmon v Griffith129 there were two shareholders in the company and the majority 
had preached the fiduciary duty since he used the corporate funds to pay personal expenses. 
The minority’s claim was successful as the court found out that the majority’ conduct was 
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oppressive. In contrast with this decision, it was established in English Law in Percival v 
Wright that directors only owe duties to the company, and not to shareholders individually 
(s.170 Companies Act 2006).130 More recently Nugee J in Sharp v Blank131  has confirmed that 
directors as a general rule do not owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders. However, 
exceptional circumstances resulting from a special relationship are required for fiduciary duties 
to be owed by directors to individual shareholders.132 
In short, the unlimited power of the majority shareholder if not constrained can harm both the 
interests of the minority shareholder and the company as whole, therefore, the minority 
shareholder as investors should have more effective means to protect their rights. This 
protection gives shareholders a degree of confidence which is considered a necessary step to 
attract investments and develop the economic strength of the whole country, therefore, it is the 
job of next section to look into the effect of the protection of minority shareholders on the 
whole economic system.    
2.3 Having a robust system of minority shareholders protection would benefit the 
economic sector as a whole.  
Having said that Libya is moving toward a free market economy following the change from 
socialism to capitalism in the early of 2000s, there was a marked trend towards a free market 
policy that requires a move towards a new corporate system. Therefore, adopting an effective 
rule of minority shareholders protection would give domestic and foreign investors a degree of 
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confidence which considers a necessary step to attract investments and advance the Libyan 
economic system. Based on these considerations, the abusing of majority shareholders’ 
position in the company would have a negative impact on the proper functioning of market 
economy and consequently for the economic growth as whole.  In today’ world companies play 
a crucial role in our economies as each company provides mutual benefits for different group 
of stakeholders, and we increasingly rely on private sector institutions to manage personal 
savings and secure retirement incomes.133 A well-functioning company serves not only the 
interests of the owners, either as a group or individually, it also serves the interests of the public, 
as, it provides services for people and employment opportunity for its employee also, it creates 
tax income for central redistribution in society.134 Consequently, the abuse of the advantageous 
position of majority shareholders or directors leads in many cases to destroy the company, 
which means losing a functioning economic unit from the economy.135 Having an improved 
control over the management of the company, which respects all rights and interests of all 
shareholders, will not only benefits the minority shareholders, rather it benefits the company 
via monitoring and rectifying the breaches of duties by this management,136  as well as it 
strengthen the economic growth in the company by creating an attractive atmosphere for local 
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and foreign investors.137 For these reasons, the topic of protection of minority shareholders has 
become a central issue of analysis not only for lawyers but also for economists. 
Based on these considerations, it is the function of the policy makers and legislature to impose 
some rules which compel the controller of the company to preserve a balance among the 
conflicts arising out of the dissension of shareholders.138 It follows that countries have become 
more interested in creating rules which protect the different interests group within a company, 
as they found that this protection is considered to be an important element in underpinning the 
stability of economic growth.139 In other words, effective protection rules for the minority 
shareholders are essential, as these rules maintain the balance between the conflicting interests 
under which a company was created, further, such rules will encourage foreign investors to 
carry out business activity in these countries, as they believe that there are effective rules which 
protect their interests and prohibit the majority shareholders or main investors from abusing 
their economic power to the minority investor’s detriment. 140 
In line with this notion, it is claimed that the applicability of effective rules which protect the 
minority shareholders is a sign of having a complete and strong economic system where the 
interests of all related parties are fully considered (majority shareholders, minority 
shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, and, foremost, the interests of the company as 
whole). 141  Such a high level of protection will increase confidence of investors and 
transparency level within the company, therefore, managers and majority shareholder are 
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obliged to act in way which benefits the company and economic as whole.142 On the other hand, 
it is stated that having no protective rules for the minority shareholders or adopting a low 
standard of minority protection makes the majority shareholders more careless toward their 
duties and obligations, which negatively affects the interests of the minority shareholders and 
the whole economy.143 Moreover, having a comprehensive system which protects the minority 
shareholders encourages the development of financial markets and make small investors more 
interested in buying shares of stock companies,144 as foreign investors and small shareholders 
tend to put their investment into a system where there they feel that there is a high level of 
protection from any kind of expropriations and they are away from other misconduct actions. 
Indeed, it is rational for those who contributed to the capital of the company to be treated fairly 
as investors, and to avoid being in a weak position in a company. Also it is reasonable for them 
to expect a pro rata return for their contribution, regardless of the amount of contribution. This 
is to say, foreign investors are interested in investing into a system where there are minority 
protection rules which increase the possibility of reaching the largest possible benefits with the 
smallest possible risk, and which ensure to these categories that their rights and interests are 
fully protected. 145 
A number of studies have confirmed that reaching a specific stage of confidence which 
provides at least the minimum level of minority shareholders protection is a necessary step to 
improve the economic strength of companies and for the proper functioning of a market 
economy.146 For instance, Enriques stated that, as the UK and the USA are applying effective 
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rules for minority shareholders, consequently their accounting rules and standards are stronger 
than those in Continental European countries which suffer more manipulation of accounts as a 
result of having a weak level of minority shareholder protection.147 Also La Porta and others 
have claimed that the minority shareholder protection rules influence economic growth in three 
ways, firstly, it enhances saving, and this saving will be transferred into real investment, and 
finally it promotes more productive uses of capital, and thereby improves the efficiency of 
money.148   Therefore, those countries which protect the minority shareholders have more 
valuable stock markets, large numbers of listed shares and higher rates of capital demands in 
the market. On the other hand, countries with no or with weak minority shareholder protection 
lack to financial stability certainty, trust and confidence in their markets.149 Moreover they 
found that countries with poor investor protection, particularly with regard to private 
companies, have significantly less liquidity and smaller markets.150 However, this study (La 
Porta & others) which reveals that there is a positive relationship between dispersed ownership 
and good legal minority shareholder protection and consequently strong securities market, has 
not escaped heavy criticism, as the latest empirical studies have partly overruled such a 
presumption. For instance the empirical study of corporate political connection as a 
determinant of corporate governance in Hong Kong,151 has shown that other countries such as 
Hong Kong which remained an economy of very concentrated ownership has very effective 
system of minority shareholder protection.152 Moreover, other study has found that there is no 
real relationship between shareholder protection and stock market development as La Porta has 
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claimed.153 Abdulwahab Almarini, claims that giving the minority shareholders such kind or 
effective roles within the company does not only decrease the power of majority shareholders, 
rather than making the company’s controllers more active so that companies would provide 
better service to all stakeholders and the whole economic system.154 
To conclude, companies are organised in order to provide mutual benefits for the different 
groups of interests, therefore it is necessary in order to maintain a balance between these 
interests to have effective rules for the protection of the minority shareholders.155 These rules 
would offer a much higher level of stabilisation in the commercial environment, as these rules 
restrict the actual control position of majority shareholders and limit the possibility of 
manipulating the company’s affairs to use it exclusively in their favour. Furthermore, these 
rules guarantee that any kind of misconduct or unfairness which has been committed by the 
controller of the company toward the minority shareholders is the subject of effective redress. 
Based on the above considerations, adopting a sufficient level of minority shareholders 
protection in Libya would increase the level of confidence, trust and consequently the standards 
of investment, which contribute to the development of an efficient and healthy economy. 
To enhance the level of protection given to minority shareholders countries rely on two main 
approaches (the remedial route and the preventative approach). Under the remedial approach 
minority shareholders are granted wide grounds to ask courts to interfere and bring justice. 
Whereas under the preventative route minority shareholders are granted specific rights which 
enable each shareholder to participate in the management of the company and practice a sort 
of supervision over the majority shareholders. In addition to these rights, supervisory organs 
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are created inside the company in order to reduce the abusive conduct of majority shareholder 
and ensure that all shareholders are treated equally. Therefore, the last section of this chapter 
will discuss these two main approaches of minority shareholders protection.  
2.4 Two main ways of protecting the minority shareholders  
Countries differ in their own setting, history, social and political culture, and local traditions, 
such a variation plays major role in the task of shaping any minority shareholder protection 
system (Path dependency theory).156 Therefore, a country’s model of minority shareholder 
protection at any point in time depends to some extent on the pattern it had previously.157 
Moreover, the early pattern of ownership structures have an influence on the chosen legal rules 
to protect these shareholders.158 However, having pointed out in the previous chapter that in 
the area of company law countries have converged in number of dominant legal policy,159 
therefore, in modern company law a global model of healthy system of corporate governance 
has emerged that countries are expected to follow.160 In this regard, most of these different 
systems of minority shareholder protection are sharing the same goal which is creating a system 
which ensures that all shareholders are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of the size of 
their shareholding.161 Under such a system the board of directors and seniors managers would 
be accountable to all stakeholders, in particular the minority shareholders.162  
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 A functional protective system should empower the minority shareholder to approach and 
participate in the management of the company, and distribute accountabilities and 
responsibilities among all shareholders.163 Furthermore, this system must clarify rights and 
interests of minority shareholders and guarantee that minority shareholders are treated fairly.164 
In addition, in the case of wrongdoing or oppression such a system must make clear that there 
are effective procedures and mechanisms by which minority shareholders can obtain their 
appropriate remedies such as ensuring that the minority shareholders have right to sell their 
shares for a fair value whenever they want to leave the company.165 In other words, an effective 
system of minority shareholder protection requires that the interests and rights of all 
stakeholders, particularly minority shareholders are fully considered (the preventative 
mechanism). Additionally, there is an obligation on legislature, policymakers and courts to 
furnish legal mechanisms to remedy any wrongdoing or unfairness that has been committed by 
the controllers of the company (the remedial approach). Consequently, this section explores in 
turn the two mechanisms which work together to put forward a high standard level of protection 
for the minority shareholders, the preventive mechanism will be examined firstly, while the 
second sub-section will discuss the remedial approach where minority shareholders are granted 
a right to commence litigation in order to obtain an appropriate remedy. 
2.4.1 The preventative mechanism 
The protection of minority shareholders is defined as the procedures that are being been taken 
to administer the company in a way which considers the interests of all shareholders.166 In so 
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doing minority shareholders are granted legal rights and tools that enable them to impose 
effective supervision over the controllers of the company. Such rights and means would make 
a necessary balance that reduce the abusive misconduct of majority shareholders. In general, a 
shareholder is an investor who pays a sum of money into a company with hope of earning 
return,167 therefore, the amount of money that has been paid by this shareholder is turned into 
a financial interest in the company itself, 168 which belong to the company as a separate legal 
entity.169 Thus the shareholder’s contribution to the capital of the company will be swapped for 
rights, interests and power that can be exercised in relation to the company’s capital and affairs. 
Nevertheless, the issue that arises in this area is what are these rights and interests that are 
attached to each share attained by shareholders including a minority shareholder. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its report which is 
entitled Principles on Corporate Governance, 170 listed the basic shareholder rights as follows:  
“(1) secure methods of ownership registration; 2) to convey or transfer shares; 3) to obtain relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) to participate and vote in 
general shareholder meetings; 5) to elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share in the profits 
of the corporation.”171 
Although these rights and interests are connected automatically with each share, it is important 
to make sure that there are no contrary provisions either in the article of association or in the 
memorandum of association when the shares are issued. In addition, it is within the power of a 
                                                 
167 E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (1st edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999), at 315. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Salomon v Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
170  Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), ‘OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ [2004] http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. Accessed 
07/08/2013, at 19.  
171 It also stated in this report that minority shareholders have a right to litigate majority shareholders or directors 
for any suspected expropriation against the shareholder or the company, and should have effective means of 
redress, as well as in the worst circumstances the minority shareholder must have a clear mechanism to leave the 
company at fair price, such right will be discussed in the next sup section under the remedial approach. See 
Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), ‘OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance’ [2004] http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf. Accessed 
12/09/2013 at 20.  
47 
 
company to issues share with alternative rights and interests, unless there is a contrary provision 
in its memorandum or article of association.172 On the other hand, although, there are some173 
who support the view that there are some rights, such as the right to access to company’s 
information, which need to be controlled, or should be left to the court to decide whether this 
information should be restricted or not. However this claim cannot be accepted as it will restrain 
the minority shareholder’s ability to exercise their other rights.174 Moreover, these kind of 
restrictions will prevent the minority shareholders from exercising their rights as any 
shareholder within the company. Accordingly, such rights should not be ignored or left to the 
majority or even to the court, and must be provided for in the statute, so that such rights allow 
the minority shareholders to have the required information on regular basis.175 Additionally, an 
absence of effective and reserved rights and interests could motivate majority shareholders and 
directors to advance their own interests on the expense of the rights and interests of minority 
shareholders.176 
In fact, the reservation of the rights and interests of minority shareholders in statutory list will 
simplify the process of protection,177 as they would have a better understanding of what kind 
of remedy to seek if one of these rights was breached. This classification makes a shareholder 
aware of his rights and interests, and consequently takes out the practical difficulties and 
confusion that face the minority shareholders in determining that conduct maybe considered as 
against the personal interests of the minority shareholder or against the company as whole. 
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For instance, in the case of Clark v Cutland and Others,178 where the majority shareholders had 
misappropriated funds and taken remuneration from the company when they were not 
authorised to do so, it was not easy for the minority shareholder to determine whether the rights 
that were breached were personal rights or corporate rights, consequently, it was unclear 
whether he should seek to enforce personal interests or corporate interests. This confusion 
forced the minority shareholder to start two claims, as it was ambiguous whether the acts 
complained of were to be considered a violation of the personal interests of the shareholder or 
to be regarded as a breach of the company’ interests, so they left that to the court to decide. 
Similarly, the minority shareholder in Anderson v Hogg179 made a claim to seek a remedy on 
the ground of the violations of the personal interests of the minority shareholder, however, the 
Lord Ordinary dismissed the claim on the basis that there was not enough evidence which 
confirmed that there was unfairness under s. 459 of the Companies Act 1985. What is more, 
the same judge confirmed that the action would have succeeded if it was brought on behalf of 
the company itself.180 However in the appeal the Inner House held that there was violation of 
the personal interests of the minority shareholder as well as the company’s interests, therefore, 
the judge was wrong in dismissing the claim.181 
It seems that the principle of no reflective loss which judicially originated in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd182 has been applied in the above case, under this 
principle if a shareholder suffers loss in respect of a wrong done to the company due to a breach 
of duty owed to it, such loss is considered to be a reflective loss, and has to be recovered by 
the company itself, as a shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. 183  Therefore, a 
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shareholder can only bring a derivative action for losses of the company, even if the 
shareholder can show that the wrongdoer has affected his personal rights.184 In other words, a 
shareholder in a personal claim will not be able to recover loss that is reflective of the loss 
suffered by the company.185 In this regard, it was stated in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co that the 
no reflective loss principle is based on the need to prevent double recovery and to protect the 
creditors of the company.186 
It should be borne in mind here that although the rights and interests of each shareholder cannot 
be listed exhaustively in the statute, a non-exhaustive list of shareholders’ rights and interests 
should be introduced which contain the most important ones, so that each shareholder can 
clearly understand his or her main rights and in what circumstances he or she will be able to 
start litigation. Moreover, such a list would provide the courts with the minimum level of 
knowledge that make judges aware of types of rights and interests of each shareholder so that 
judges can be more qualified to bring justice in such kind of actions. In this regard ss. 140-141 
of the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco provide that it is a right of each shareholder to have all the 
required information from the day of calling the meeting or at least in fifteen days before the 
next schedule meeting. Section 141 listed the information that need to be obtained by each 
shareholders such as; the agenda of the next meeting and the reasons for having such agenda, 
the financial statements, the members of board of directors and the supervisory board and the 
candidate shareholders to the board, the reports of the statutory auditors, the supervisory board 
and so on.187 In this manner also, ss. 223-224 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 allow 
a shareholder to see the register of the shareholders and the minutes of the shareholders’ 
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meetings and their decisions. However as will be discussed later the above sections do not give 
a shareholder a right to ask for the financial statements nor the minutes of the board of directors 
and its decisions, also a shareholders is not allowed to see the minutes of the supervisors’ 
committees.188 Likewise, a shareholder under the Companies Act 2006 has a right to receive 
notice of general meeting (s.310), and right to inspect minutes of general meetings (ss. 248, 
355 and 358), furthermore, s. 431 entitles any shareholder to demand a copy of the company's 
last annual accounts and directors' report and a copy of the audit report. 
Therefore, laws should  clarify to the shareholders all rights related to the share, including the 
rights of shareholders concerning the general meeting, voting rights, facilitate the exercise of 
shareholder rights and access to information, and restrict the majority shareholders and 
directors’ power by holding them accountable for their oppression or misconduct.189  
In this context, it stated in the Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development 
(OECD) in its Principles of Corporate Governance, (2004) that it is the fundamental principle 
for corporate governance to provide a framework which protects and facilitates the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights. What is more, having explicit provisions in the corporate governance code 
which confirm the rights and interests of minority shareholders gives the court the power to 
apply them and bring justice, therefore, in the case of Wheeler v Pullman Iron & Steel Co, 190 
the court avoided ordering winding up of the company on the ground that this order must be 
organised statutorily before the court can deliver such remedy.191 Moreover, as it has been 
mention earlier in this chapter the concept of legitimate reasonable expectations should be 
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considered in addition to the expressed rights and interests of each shareholders. Namely, there 
are several rights and interests which are not listed either in the statute or in the company’s 
constitutions (memorandum of association & articles of association), therefore, legislature and 
judges should recognise and respect the reasonable expectations of each shareholder.192  
In addition to illustrating minority shareholders’ rights the precautionary approach relies on 
adopting a sufficient system of corporate governance which creates internal and external organs 
which imply a sufficiently robust supervision over the company. However, as this study focuses 
on the Private Companies, our concern in this part is on the internal institutions inside the 
company, which provide appropriate supervision over the company. In this regard, a 
sufficiently protective system should provide various regulations, laws, institutions and 
enforcement tools as defensive methods to ensure that a company as a productive organisation 
is managed effectively in pursuit of its objective.193 Such a system should adopt good model 
of corporate governance where the interests of all related parties are considered.  
Although there is no consensus about the definition of this term “corporate governance”, as 
researchers and academics view this term from various perspectives (legal, political, financial 
and managerial),194  however, the corporate governance concept generally means the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled, (paragraph 2.5 of the Cadbury Committee 
1992), 195  this definition is also adopted in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014). 
Furthermore, it is defined as the concept that refers to the rules and processes by which firms 
are regulated and controlled, and which ensures that the board and management act in the best 
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interests of the company.196 A more appropriate and comprehensive definition has been offered 
by Du Plessis, which attempts to include all aspects and functions of corporate governance: 
“It is the process of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the interests of all 
internal stakeholders and other parties…. who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct in order to 
ensure responsible behaviour by the corporation and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and 
profitability for the corporation”.197 
It seems from the definition that the central feature of an efficient corporate governance 
framework is the appropriate protection, and respect for, the rights and interests of 
shareholders, especially those of minority shareholders.198 Thus, one of the most important 
principles in corporate governance is the protection of minority shareholders, those who are 
unable to exercise any significant form of control within the company as a result of applying the 
majority rule principle by taking a company’s decision via majority vote. This framework 
would provide those shareholders with some exclusive rights, create supervision tools inside 
the company which ensures that reports and financial information are regularly published, and 
that all shareholders are treated equally, fairly and equitably.199 These rights and supervision 
tools increase the degree of transparency and disclosure within the company which 
consequently compels the directors of the company to respect the legal rights of creditors, 
employees, customers, and most importantly, minority shareholders.200 In Morocco the JSC 
Act 1996 creates a new system of management where there are two types of Joint Stock 
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Companies; first the joint stock company which is managed by one board of directors (ss. 39 
to 76). Second, the joint stock company that is managed by two different boards (ss. 77- 106 
based on the German model which in turn was taken from France). In the second type there are 
two boards, the executive board formed by natural persons (maximum of 5 or 7 if the company 
is listed) which principally in charge of the management of the company, and the Supervisory 
Board201 (minimum 3 persons) which is principally in charge of the supervision and control of 
the executive board’s management.202 The aim of having such an organ is to impose a sort of 
supervision over the board of directors, however as the members of the supervisory board are 
usually appointed and isolated by the general meeting203 they become under the control of the 
majority shareholders. In this regard, Rabia Gait claimed that this innovation has not worked 
well in Morocco as most of the joint stock companies are owned by small numbers of 
shareholders, therefore the members of the supervisory board are themselves the members of 
other institutions.204 In Morocco as well, s. 166 of the JSC Act provides that it is the job of the 
statutory auditors to observe on a permanent basis the accounting documents of the company 
and check the accuracy of the information contained in the company’s financial reports and so 
on. Moreover, it clearly stated by this section that it is also the job of the statutory auditor to 
ascertain that all shareholders are treated equally. In line with this, s. 200 of the Libyan 
Business Activities Act 2010 establishes that the supervisors’ committee has to monitor the 
controllers of the company and make certain that there is no breach to the memorandum of 
association. Furthermore, it is the function of this committee to fulfil an important financial 
and technical control over the company to assure that the controllers of the company act in 
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accordance with their authorised power.  
The above mentioned organs would prevent to some extent the majority shareholders and 
directors of the company from expropriation and abuse of rights and interests of the minority 
shareholders, as well as providing the minority shareholders with the necessary resources to 
supersede the desires of the controller of the company.205 Furthermore, as minority shareholder 
protection is a fundamental issue in corporate governance, an effectual system of corporate 
governance should provide sufficient mechanisms which prevent the controlling shareholders 
from using their authority to transfer the resources of the company to themselves or harm the 
company’s business. 206  These preventative rules should grant the minority shareholders 
sufficient rights and means which preclude the majority shareholder or the directors of the 
company from diverting the company’s assets and its profits to themselves. 207  Once the 
majority shareholders realise that laws grant the minority shareholders rights and legal devices 
that allow them to sue any wrongdoer or oppressor they will avoid to engage in any kind of 
misconduct and they will be more likely to comply with the law. 208 Moreover, it is stated that 
when a corporate system provides the minority shareholders with the required rights and 
mechanisms that offer clear litigation remedies in the case of wrongdoing or oppression, the 
likelihood that the majority shareholders could relieve offender directors from liability on some 
personal and self-interested grounds at the expense of the company and its minority 
shareholders will be reduced.209  However, it should always be borne in mind that such rights 
and means should not curb the long term success of the company and should not empower the 
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minority to make decisions for the corporation or to vest in them the controlling position, 
consequently, this framework should aims to make a proper balance between the adequate 
protection of minority shareholders and interests and rights and of majority shareholders and 
the company as a whole. In this regard, this system must prevent the vexatious interference 
from the minority shareholders which may have harmful consequences either for the company 
or other shareholders.210  
There is no doubt that the adoption of precautionary means would reduce the possibility of 
having oppressive conduct against the minority shareholders, nonetheless, this system would 
not reach the required level of protection, Therefore, it is necessary to have statutory provisions 
that allow the judicial authority to interfere in the affairs of the company upon the request of 
the minority shareholders and grant the appropriate remedy.   
2.4.2 The role of the judicial authority to protect minority shareholders (the remedial 
approach) 
 The logical consequences of applying the principle of majority rule via corporate democracy 
is that the majority shareholders hold unlimited power and authority to run the company,211 so 
that they have the ability to oppress the minority shareholders and the company as a whole. 
Under such circumstances, it becomes obligatory for legislation to provide the minority 
shareholders with external effective means under which the minority shareholders can take 
legal actions against the majority shareholders and the directors in the case of the abuse of their 
interests and rights. By these means either courts (or the other chosen body in the case of 
arbitration) should be granted a wider authority and power to deal with such kind of actions 
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and disputes. Such kind of provisions may in theory prevent the controller of the company from 
acting without having regard to the interests and rights of minority shareholders.  
Via the remedial approach, courts are required to interfere and exercise their discretion to 
consider whether the claim of the minority shareholders is justified or not.212 To obtain this 
goal, courts and judges should have the discretionary power to investigate the conduct of the 
controllers of the company and to consider to what extent if any the minority shareholders have 
been expropriated. In this regard, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters, the 
subject jurisdictions (Libya, Morocco and England) allow the minority shareholders to ask the 
judicial authority to interfere and enforce some rights. In England for instance, s. 306 of the 
Companies Act 2006 grants a shareholder a right to ask the court to call a general meeting. 
Similarly, s. 155 of the Business Activities Act 2010 provides that if neither the board of 
director nor the supervisors ‘committee have called the general meeting to take place the 
president of the primary court upon a request from shareholders owning not less than 10% of 
the company’s capital will convene the general meeting to be held and the court in its order has 
to determine the chairman of that meeting. In Morocco, s. 116 of JSC Act 1996 enables a 
shareholder or groups of shareholders who hold at least 10% of the shares or less than this 
percentage in the case of urgency to go to the court to appoint a judicial proxy to invite the 
general meeting to be convened.213  
Furthermore, minority shareholders are given several grounds under which they can start 
proceedings against either the majority shareholders or directors. For instance, it is well known 
that each shareholder has what are so-called personal rights, so that these provisions should 
allow the minority shareholder to bring a personal claim whenever one of these rights is 
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infringed.214 As a result, minority shareholders can bring a personal claim if the majority 
shareholders have altered the articles of association in a manner which might be considered 
oppressive to the personal interest of minority shareholders.215  However, some jurisdictions 
adopt the personal action in their laws with difficult procedures which restrict this way of 
protection. For instance, although s. 186 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 allows an 
individual shareholder or group of shareholders to bring a personal action against the board 
members to remedy damages that affected the personal interests of those shareholders. Yet 
claimant shareholders have to prove that the conduct of the board members of the company has 
directly harmed the interests of such shareholder. This is in addition to proving that such 
damages were a result of fraud or negligence of the board members.  
In some circumstances the minority shareholders might find themselves affected by a wrong 
done to the company even thought their personals rights and interests have not been violated, 
thus, an effective system should allow them to start claims of behalf of the company.  In other 
words, statutes should allow the minority to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the company 
against the controllers of the company either a majority shareholder or directors in respect of a 
wide range of misconduct and wrongdoing.216 Under s. 353 of the Moroccan JSC Act 1996, 
each shareholder or group of shareholders has a right to start a derivative claim217 against; the 
controller of the company, the general director of the company and the delegated general 
director or the member of the tow tier boards in order to get a remedy.218 In England, as will 
be discussed in more details in the next chapter minority shareholder is allowed to litigate on 
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behalf of his company whenever it seems that the interests of his company are affected by the 
conduct of its controllers (ss. 260-264 of Companies Act 2006). Moreover, minority 
shareholder under s. 994 of Companies Act 2006 has a right to not be unfairly prejudiced, 
wherein a shareholder may apply to the court by petition on the ground that the company’s 
affairs are being or have been conducted in manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the 
member’s interests. In these circumstances courts are usually requested to make an order of 
purchase by other members or by the company itself, or in some cases to require the company 
to refrain from such kind of misconduct.219  
However, in some cases the above mentioned forms of court interference would not offer 
enough protection to minority shareholders, in particular where there is breakdown in the 
shareholders’ relationship and the minority shareholders realise that their trust and confidence 
is lost. Under such conditions many jurisdictions grant minority shareholders right to have the 
company wound up. An implementation of such remedy is available in England under s.  122 
(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 where a shareholder has a right to go to the court to request 
an order to wind up the company if it appears to the court that it is just and equitable to wind 
up the subject company. In Libya also, s. 30 of the Business Activities Act 2010 grants a 
shareholder a right to go to the court and ask for winding up its company in the cases; where 
the other shareholders breach their duties, there are continues disagreements between the 
shareholders or where the court finds serious reasons justifying such dissolution. 
Briefly, protecting the minority shareholders via external institutions such as courts necessitate 
that these institutions should be given the discretionary power to guide, monitor, direct, resolve, 
enforce the law to grant the minority shareholders the entitled remedies. Also, since such kind 
of disputes are usually related to commercial and business activity, certain criteria should be 
introduced to the courts which enhance the judge’s ability to make fair judgments. 
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2.5   Conclusion  
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that minority shareholders are facing various forms of 
abusive conduct by both the directors and majority shareholders, therefore, the law must 
provide sufficient mechanisms and means to protect them. This protection not only brings 
benefits to shareholders themselves but also to the company and the state’s economy as well. 
However, this system of protection should not curb the long term success of the company. In 
this regard, a successful protection regime should adopt an effective system which start with 
preventative tools that clearly present the rights and interests of all shareholders, in addition to 
adopting internal and external organs which apply appropriate supervision over the company’s 
controllers. Yet, in the case where the minority shareholders are being, or have been, subject 
to mistreatment and oppression, this system should allow such aggrieved shareholders to bring 
an action in order to obtain their entitled remedies.  
Having stated that this thesis is using the comparative approach to provide the Libyan 
legislature with lessons that can be used to establish sufficient system of minority shareholders 
protection. Therefore, it is the task of the next chapter to examine the level of minority 
shareholders protection under English law in order to find ways to enhance minority 






Chapter 3   Protection of minority shareholders under English law 
3.1 Introduction and general background 
The historical development of minority shareholders’ remedies in English law shows that both 
the common law rules and statutes have participated in providing a system that offered redress 
to the minority shareholder in the case of abuse. Derivative claims which were governed by the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle220 and its exceptions were not providing adequate protection to the 
minority shareholders, therefore, aggrieved minority shareholders were not able to get their 
supposed remedies under these rules. Under these circumstances, it was necessary to offer other 
tools that provide minority shareholders with safeguards against possible abuse of power by 
the controllers of the company and to fill the gap left by common law rules. In that process, 
another two statutory remedies had been introduced and developed for the minority shareholder 
in English law which are the oppression concept (s. 9 of the Companies Act 1947) (and later 
the unfair prejudice remedy) which was developed through many legislative reforms,221 and 
the winding up option under s. 122 (1) (g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986).222  
As stated above, the derivative claim in England was left for a period of time to the common 
law rules, particularly the rule of Foss v Harbottle and the development of its exceptions. The 
main principle of the rule of Foss v Harbottle is that “a wrong done to the company must be 
redressed by the company itself, as the company is the proper plaintiff. 223 Therefore, an 
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individual shareholder or group of minority shareholders do not have the right to commence a 
legal action on behalf of the company without its permission. Under such rules minority 
shareholders were not allowed to use the derivative claim to remedy a wrong done to the 
company or to complain of irregularities regarding its internal affairs as the proper plaintiff is 
the company itself.224 The Foss v Harbottle rule was divided into two main principles: “the 
proper claimant principle” and the internal irregularity principle.225 The former principle is 
based on the separate legal personality of the company, as a result, the company itself is the 
proper plaintiff to litigate for a wrong done to it and no other individual shareholder or group 
of minority shareholders can represent the company in such actions, unless there was a previous 
consent.226 Whilst, the second principle the “internal irregularity” considers that the majority 
shareholders are in a better position than the court to choose what the company should do, 
consequently, matters of internal management are conclusively settled by majority decision 
and court should stand away from the companies’ day to day business.227 Under such kind of 
rules the minority shareholders were not able to complain of internal irregularity for various 
reasons, first and foremost, there was unrestricted power offered to the controllers of the 
company via the Foss v Harbottle rule, which granted them the ability to ratify their conduct.228 
Secondly, it was difficult for the shareholder to start a derivative claim since of the rules 
governing such procedural are too complex, incoherent and restrictive.229 In addition to that, 
the court was extremely reluctant to become involved in disputes over the internal affairs of 
the company’s business as they consider such kind of disagreement as internal affairs which 
                                                 
224 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, 25. 
225 See Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, see also Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83. 
226 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
227 Mozley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790. 
228 K Wedderburn, ‘Shareholder Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ [1957] Cambridge Law Journal 194, 
the acts of the controllers of company can be validated if the company’s general meeting decided that such conduct 
is ratified either by an ordinary resolution which needs more than 50% of the votes or by a special majority by 
more than 75% of the votes. 
229 D Kershaw, ‘The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is Dead: Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ [2015] Journal of 
Business Law 274, at 274. 
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should be solved inside the company.230 Although Foss v Harbottle aimed to prevent the 
minority shareholder from bringing vexatious actions in respect of wrongs done to the 
company; however, it enhanced the majority shareholders with a full power of decision making 
over the company’s affairs, which entitled them to ratify their conduct even that type of 
behaviour that clearly harmed the interests of the minority shareholder. 
In these circumstances, there were significant demands which required adjustment of the 
common law rule in Foss v Harbottle. These demands led to certain exceptions to Foss v 
Harbottle as were set out by the Court of Appeal in Edwards v Halliwell231  in order to curb 
the majority shareholders’ power and allow the minority shareholder to use the derivative claim 
and litigate on behalf of the company in certain situations. These exceptions are; First: the 
individual shareholder can bring a derivative claim when the company was engaged in or about 
to carry on an ultra vires232 or illegal act.233 Second: where it was alleged that so –called the 
personal rights234 of the shareholder have been infringed. Third: when the act complained of 
did not have the sanction of a required special or extraordinary resolution (usually more than 
75%).235 As in such cases it is not enough for directors to obtain ratification by virtue of an 
ordinary resolution. Fourth: when the controllers of the company were committing fraud on 
                                                 
230 See Carlen v Drury [1812] 1 Ves & B 154. 
231 [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
232 The act is considered as an ultra vires; where it is beyond the company purposes as set out in its constitutions, 
where such act was in a way prohibited by statue and where the act was through the agency of someone who lacks 
the requisite authority. See H Rajak ‘Judicial Control: Corporations and the Decline of Ultra Vires’ (1995) 26 The 
Cambrian Law Review 9, at 9. 
233  Illegal include all kind of acts which plainly illegal as the abuse of power by the director (Australian 
Agricultural Co v Oatmont Pty Ltd [1992] 8 ACSR 225 CA) or the other acts which contrary to company law or 
general law, see A Boyle, J Birds and others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th  edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014). 
234 Although, there is no exhaustive or non-exhaustive list of personal rights, however, such kind of rights derive 
from the statutory legislations or by the company’s constitutions. For instance, the shareholder’s right to share of 
the company’s profits, or to receive a copy of the company’s annual account and his right of being a member of 
a company which is run lawfully, therefore, a shareholder is allowed to sue the controllers of the company if his 
personal right to attend general meeting and vote or to receive dividends was infringed.  
235 See also Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
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minority shareholders. In this case the majority could not justify the minority being the victim 
of fraud, therefore, majority shareholders are not entitled to ratify their conduct.236  
However, this rule and its exceptions have been criticised over many years for its limitations, 
uncertainty and the procedures involved were very complicated,237 therefore it led to a low 
level of protection for minority shareholders. For instance, in the case of fraud on a minority 
which is regarded as the most important exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, the aggrieved 
shareholder was obliged to prove that the wrongdoers were themselves in actual control of the 
company and perpetrated fraud.238 In addition a shareholder has to show prima facie case that 
the company was entitled to the relief sought in order to get permission to start a derivative 
action. Moreover, minority shareholders were facing difficulty in proving fraud as the meaning 
of fraud was very restrictive and there was no clear definition to the concept of wrongdoer 
control.239 Additionally, there was a problematic doctrine in the issue of ratification, since it 
was not possible for a shareholder to bring a derivative claim against the wrongdoers if such 
acts were ratified or capable of ratification,240  and it was never clear at common law which 
kinds of conduct were capable of being ratified and which acts were not ratifiable. In this 
regard, it was claimed that the issue of ratification was a bar to the use of derivative action and 
had never been governed by a consistent rule.241  
                                                 
236 There was an argument as to whether a fifth exception existed in English law under which a shareholder is 
allowed to bring a derivative claim if the interests of justice required it, see for example Estmanco (Kilner House) 
Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2. 
237 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, Cm 3769, 1997), para 6.4. 
238 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] Ch 204. Even a shareholder succeeded to prove 
the fraud and wrongdoer control he or she still had not absolute right to start a derivative claim as the decision of 
an independent organ became very important condition to initiate such action, under the independent organ 
condition an independent organ should decide whether it is in the commercial interests of the company to bring 
this action or not, see for example Smith v Croft (No 2) [1987] 3 WLR 405. 
239 Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565. 
240 See for example; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83. 
241 B Cheffins, ‘Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects’ (1997) 1(2) 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 227, at 254. 
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Such restrictive procedural rules prevented not only vexatious cases to be initiated but well-
grounded cases were not pursued to avoid such kind of complexity.242 Besides, the minority 
shareholders were facing many problems regarding the cost of litigation and the complexities 
in getting the cost indemnity order. In short, the derivative claims under common law rules was 
based on difficult procedures to work through, therefore, it lacked the flexibility and accessible 
criteria that help minority shareholders to use this way of protection to get their remedy. As a 
result, minority shareholders have used such claims in rare circumstances. Such kind of 
limitations and complications on the minority shareholders’ right to bring derivative claims 
against the controller of the company made the change of the common law rules essential. In 
this context, it was clearly agreed in the Law Commission’s report in 1997 (Shareholder 
Remedies, Cm 3769) and the Company Law Review (Company Law Review, Developing the 
Framework 2000) that the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions was very 
complicated, uncertain and not sufficiently wide to cover all kinds of misconduct that majority 
shareholders might commit. Consequently, adequate methods should be provided to the 
aggrieved shareholders with flexible and accessible criteria for determining whether a 
shareholder can pursue an action or not.243  The new statutory protections have been introduced 
via the Companies Act 2006.244 These provisions which replaced the common law rules245 aim 
                                                 
242 See for example; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83.  
243 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, Cm 3769, 1997) para 6.15. 
244 It has to be mentioned here that on March 26, 2015 two important bills that affect company law received the 
Royal Assent which are; the Deregulation Act 2015 (primarily ss.17-18-19) and Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 (primarily ss. 3-15-16-38- and 81 to 91). However, no major change was introduced to 
minority shareholder protection law by these Acts. For more details, see P Bailey, ‘Deregulation Bill and Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill Enacted to Amend Company Law’ Legislative Comment (2015) 370 
Company Law Newsletter 1, at 1.  
245 In this regard Professor Davies claimed that the common law derivative action rules have been consigned to 
the dustbin. However, others like D Kershaw believes that there is continued application of common law proper 
plaintiff rule and of the wrongdoer control requirement. In line with this view, Mr Richards J in Abouraya v 
Sigmund & Ors [2014] EWHC 277 (Ch) stated that some aspects of the common law derivative action live side 
by side with the statutory derivative action. Also Mr Justice Briggs in Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348 (Ch) 
stated that the UK Parliament did not implicitly or otherwise abolish the whole of the common law derivative 
action. The same position was taken in Bhullar v Bhullar & Ors [2015] EWHC 1943 (Ch) where the court 
confirmed that common law principles on a double derivative action are still applicable and have not been taken 
away by sections 260 to 264 of the Companies Act 2006. For more details, see P Davies, Gower and Davies’ 
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to offer a wide range of misconduct and wrongdoing under which the minority shareholder can 
start litigation against the controller of the company. Under the Companies Act 2006 (ss. 260-
264), each shareholder has a right to start derivative actions on behalf of companies on widened 
grounds of conduct and the court is empowered with free discretion to deal with such kind of 
claims.246 Additionally, this Act offers the minority shareholders a statutory right to petition on 
the grounds of oppression that was already introduced in the Companies Act 1948 to offer 
means that are more effective to the minority shareholders. This means was replaced in 1980 
by what became the right of members to petition against unfairly prejudicial conduct in CA 
1985 s. 459.247  This approach has also been adopted by the Companies Act 2006 ss. 994-999, 
thus, if the affairs of the company are being or have been conducted in a manner which is 
unfairly prejudicial to the member’s interests, such member can petition the court for various 
orders: regulate the conduct, require the company to refrain from action, authorise the member 
to bring a derivative action and finally the court is authorised to issue an order which ask the 
other members or the company itself to purchase the minority shareholder’s shares. In addition 
to those forms of protection, a minority shareholder can petition to the court for a winding up 
order on just and equitable ground (Insolvency Act 1986, s. 122(1)(g)).  
Since the English model of minority shareholder protection heavily relies upon the judicial 
protection, this chapter will primarily focus on these legal actions, (personal and derivative 
action, unfair prejudice action and the winding up remedy). However, a shareholder under the 
Companies Act 2006 has certain statutory rights which offer a type of precautionary protection 
to the minority shareholder, therefore, it would be worth to mention briefly to these rights as 
protective means prior to start evaluating the remedial route. These rights include for example; 
                                                 
Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012), at 654. D Kershaw, ‘The Rule 
in Foss v Harbottle is Dead: Long Live the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ [2015] Journal of Business Law 274, at 276. 
246 S. 263 (1) (2) (3) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
247 S Judge, Company Law (3rd end, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012 & 2013), at 149. 
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shareholder’s right to ask the court to call a general meeting (s. 306), the right to receive notice 
of any general meeting (s. 310), the right to have a copy of the annual account (s. 431), the 
right to inspect minutes of general meetings (ss. 248, 355 and 358), the right to inspect the 
register of members and index of members’ name without charge (s. 116(2)) and the right to 
require a copy of the register of shareholders within 10 days of the request subject to charge ( 
s. 116(2)).248 In addition to the above rights which are given to each shareholder, shareholders 
with at least 10% of the voting rights (5% if no shareholders’ meeting has been held for more 
than 12 months) have a right to call a general meeting (s. 303), also shareholders with 5% of 
the voting rights have a right to circulate a written statement (s. 314), additionally, shareholders 
with 10% of the voting rights have a right to have the company’s annual accounts audited.249 
Most importantly, shareholders with more than 25% of shares have a right to block a special 
resolution (this is called negative control),250 such a resolution are required, for example, to 
amend a company’s articles of association.251 Last but not least, variety of rights are granted to 
minority shareholders to apply to the court in specific circumstances eg, s. 721 allows a member 
of a company to apply to the court to object to payment out of capital for purchase or 
                                                 
248 S. 117 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that a company receiving such a request should either comply with 
the request within five working days or apply to the court under s. 117 (3). If the court is satisfied that the 
inspection or copy is not sought for a proper purpose it shall direct the company not to comply with the request. 
In this regard Mr Registrar Briggs in Burberry Group Plc v Fox-Davies [2015] EWHC 222 (Ch) found that the 
purpose was improper within the meaning of s. 117 and he directed the company shall not comply with the request. 
Fore a detailed discussion regarding the concept of proper purpose see Burry v Knight Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 604.   
249 S. 476 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
250 S. 283 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
251 For more details, see the leading case on amendment of the article; Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 
1 Ch 656 where it was held that alterations could not be interfered with by the court unless a change was made 
that was not bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole. Recently in Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors 
[2015] EWCA Civ 536 the court held that a company is free to amend its articles. However, it is the job of the 
court to observe this alteration to ensure that this power is exercised in good faith and in the interests of the 
company. Furthermore, it was held that it is the shareholders and not the court to determine what constitutes what 
is a benefit to the company, unless no reasonable persons would consider it as such. The Court of Appeal in 
Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors considered the insertion of the “drag along” provisions which require minority 
shareholders to sell their stake if the majority shareholder exited the company as being primarily for the benefit 
of the company, even if it also benefitted the majority shareholders themselves as there was no evidence of bad 
faith or improper motive. See D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 
Company Law Newsletter 1, at 2. 
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redemption of the company’s own shares, likewise s. 633 grants shareholders owning not less 
15% of the company’s shares a right to apply to the court to have the variation cancelled.252 
Having said that the English model of minority shareholder protection is largely dependent on 
the remedial tools, therefore, this chapter will discuss the English law regarding the protection 
of minority shareholders and will evaluate whether the Companies Act 2006 has put forward 
some improvements in this area. Examining such a developed system would give important 
lessons to other jurisdictions particularly Libya where the level of protection is very low and 
new protective tools and mechanisms have to be adopted.  
3.2   The personal action 
A share is a property entitlement and naturally certain rights personal to the shareholder are 
generated by virtue of share ownership,253 therefore, it is the right of a shareholder to start a 
personal action whenever he or she believes that a wrong has been done to the shareholder and 
his or her personal interest was harmed. However, in practice as there is no definite list of 
shareholder’s personal rights, it is not always easy to distinguish between personal wrongs 
which are acceptable as a ground for personal claims and corporate wrongs which do not gives 
the shareholder a right to bring such kind of action. Furthermore, in some case there is an 
overlap between these wrongs, as the same act might be considered a wrong to both the 
company and to the individual shareholder. 
Generally speaking, shareholders are entitled to bring proceedings when he or she thinks that 
his or her personal rights have been infringed, whether was that right conferred on the 
shareholder by a statute such as the right to inspect the company’s records and to receive 
                                                 
252 In addition to these rights a shareholder under s. 125 of the Companies Act 2006 may apply to the court for 
rectification of the register. See Re Hoicrest Ltd [2000] BCLC 194. 




dividends or his or her right of attending shareholder meeting or was that right awarded by the 
company’s constitutions. However, the difficulty facing the minority shareholder is that there 
are concerns that the courts have given a narrow interpretation to the concepts of personal 
wrongs, while at the same time the corporate wrongs notion have been interpreted very 
generously.254 This way of interpretation which categorises many kind of misconducts as 
corporate wrongs restricts the efficacy and effectiveness of personal actions. For instance; if 
the articles of association of the company have been altered via an ordinary resolution when an 
extraordinary resolution is required, the minority shareholder has the right to bring a personal 
claim as his personal right to have the article of association observed has been infringed, 
moreover he or she can bring a derivative action under the special majority exception to the 
rule in Foss v Harbottle.255 In such circumstances the courts tended to consider such kind of 
dispute as internal irregularities, and classified the acts as corporate wrongs, consequently, 
preventing an individual shareholder from disrupting the company’s business and preventing 
the shareholder from bringing a personal claim. Such generous interpretation to the corporate 
wrong restricted the scope and function of personal actions which was created to address 
shareholders’ personal wrongs.256 In this regards, the court in MacDougall v Gardiner257 held 
that the right awarded to the shareholder to a poll vote by the company’s constitution was not 
enforceable as it deemed the infringement of shareholder’s right to vote as an internal 
irregularity, therefore personal action was not allowed. On the other hand, in Pender v 
Lushington258 where the chairman rejected to recognise the vote of nominee shareholder the 
                                                 
254 See for example; Bentley Stevens v Jones [1974] 2 All ER 653 when a failure to notify a director of a general 
meeting was considered as a corporate wrong. 
255 J Poole and P Roberts ‘Shareholder Remedies- Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’ [1999] Journal 
of Business Law 99. 
256 Ibid. 
257 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, at 25. 
258 (1877) 6 Ch D 70. 
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court held the shareholders’ personal right to have their vote recorded in writing had been 
infringed, therefore, they were entitled to bring a personal action. 
Although the Law Commission in 1997 recommended that there should be clear line between 
personal and corporate actions,259 however, it was stated in that report that there is no real need 
to reform the current law, as there was no apparent hardship in identifying the personal rights 
of each shareholder. Moreover, the Commission rejected the suggestion of having a list of 
enforceable non-exhaustive personal rights under the company’s constitutions. The Law 
Commission justified this rejection by claiming that the adoption of such kind of list is arbitrary 
and will not be useful and significant considering the wide scope of the unfair prejudice 
remedy.260 This uncertainty has not been touched by the Companies Act 2006 and no changes 
have been introduced on this point, therefore, it is the function of the court to find out the clear 
line between personal and corporate wrongs, and consequently grant shareholders the ability 
to start a personal action if their personal rights were infringed. In this regard, it was argued by 
Lord Wedderburn that the minority shareholders' difficulties in bringing derivative actions 
could be overcome if there is a greater willingness to interpret wrongs as personal wrongs.261 
It seems clear that the scope of personal claims as a means of minority shareholder protection 
is very restricted, particularly in the cases where there is an overlap between corporate and 
personal wrongs. What is more, this kind of action is blocked by the so called “no reflective 
loss” principle which prevents a shareholder from recovering compensation for loss that merely 
reflects the loss suffered by the company.262  Under this principle if the individual shareholder 
or group of shareholders suffer loss in respect of a wrong done to the company due to a breach 
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261 K Wedderburn, ‘Shareholder Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ [1957] Cambridge Law Journal 194. 




of duty owed to it, such kind of loss is considered to be a reflective loss, and has to be recovered 
by the company itself, as a shareholder does not suffer any personal loss.263 In such cases a 
shareholder cannot usually have success with a personal claim to recover a reflective loss from 
a corporate wrong, and therefore, a shareholder can only bring a derivative action for losses of 
the company, even if the shareholder can show that the wrongdoer has affected his personal 
rights.264 In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd265 the Court of Appeal held 
that a shareholder was not allowed to recover a sum equal to the diminution in the market value 
of his shares or equal to the diminution in dividend, as this loss is merely a reflection of loss 
suffered by the company. Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co attempted to 
differentiate the reflective loss and loss that is separate and distinct from that suffered by the 
company. He claimed that a shareholder could bring a personal action to recover the loss that 
is separate and distinct from that suffered by the company.266 However, the question that arises 
is to what extent it is easy to determine whether the loss claimed by a shareholder is a separate 
and distinct or reflective loss. It was held in Stein v Blake267 that a shareholder is prevented 
from claiming as long as the company has a right to claim even if the company refuses or fails 
to use that right. Consequently, if a company suffered loss and failed to recover for whatever 
reason a shareholder is not allowed to bring a personal a claim, as preventing such kind of 
claim in this circumstances avoids the possible conflict of interests. 268 
Although it is stated in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co that the no reflective loss principle is based 
on the need to prevent double recovery and to protect the creditors of the company. It seems 
obvious that this principle favours the interests of the company over the interests of the minority 
                                                 
263 [1982] Ch 204, for more details see for example; J Mukwiri, ‘The no Reflective Loss Principle’ (2005) 26(10) 
Company Lawyer 304. 
264 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] Ch 204, see also; Johnson v Gore Wood & Co  
[2002] 2 AC 1. 
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266 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. 
267 [1998] 1 All ER 724. 
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shareholders, which is rational; nevertheless, this principle may put the minority shareholders 
in a difficult position, particularly in small Closed Joint Stock Companies where such kind of 
company loss is considered a personal loss to each shareholder.269 To strike a proper balance 
between these conflicting interests the Court of Appeal in Giles v Rhind introduced some 
exceptions to the no reflective loss principle.270 Under such exceptions if the company itself 
has no cause of action or it was forced to discontinue its action as a result of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing, the no reflective loss principle did not prevent a shareholder from starting a claim 
for the diminution in the value of his or her shareholding, even if that loss was merely reflective 
of the company’s loss. Therefore, in the above case the diversion of one business source of the 
company was sufficient cause to prevent it from starting its claim. There is a concern that those 
exceptions might open the door of a lot of cases which disrupt the company’s business and 
court’s work. This possibility led the court in Gardner v Parker271 to reject the application of 
the Giles exception, as this exception should be confined to the facts and not considered as a 
general exception to the no reflective loss principle .272 However, the position in Rehman v 
Jones Lang La Salle 273 and Malhotra v Malhotra274 was more in tune with the Court of Appeal 
in Giles v Rhind where the courts admit of exceptions to the general rule of no reflective loss.  
In brief, even though the application of the personal claim has enhanced the minority 
shareholder protection in England, however, this way of protection does not work as it ought 
to as the principles of internal irregularity and no reflective loss restrict such kind of action. 
The no reflective loss principle allows a corporate claim to prevent a shareholder from 
                                                 
269 B Hannigan, Company Law (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012). 
270 [2002] 4 All ER 977. 
271 [2004] 2 BCLC 554. 
272 J Mukwiri, ‘The no Reflective Loss Principle’ (2005) 26(10) Company Lawyer 304, for more details on these 
exceptions see for instance; Giles v Rhind [2002] EWCA Civ 1428, Gardner v Parker [2004] EWCA 781, and 
Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1. 
273 [2013] EWHC 1339 (QB).  In this case the court confirmed that the general principle of no reflective loss is 
not applicable where the company itself has no cause of action. 
274 [2014] EWHC 113 (Comm), at 53. 
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recovering compensation for loss that merely reflects the loss suffered by the company. 
Furthermore, under the internal irregularity principle generous interpretation is given to the 
corporate wrong which restricts the scope and function of personal actions. 
3.3 The derivative claim 
A derivative claim is a claim brought by a shareholder to remedy a wrong done to the company 
resulting most often from a breach of duty by a company’s directors.275 By such a claim, a 
member could institute proceedings on behalf of the company where the company itself cannot 
bring action against those running that company.276 The derivative action under common law 
was surrounded by group of restrictions that prevented the minority shareholder from bringing 
such claims in many circumstances. In most situations, these restrictions encouraged the 
minority shareholder to use alternative ways to get their remedies. Therefore, it was 
recommended by the Law Commission and the Company Law Review that there was a real 
need to have a new statutory derivative action that grants the minority shareholder more 
protection under flexible and accessible criteria. The Law Commission in 1997 concluded that; 
the derivative claim at common law was insufficient to provide a method of enforcement for 
the aggrieved shareholder.277 As a result, a new statutory derivative action was introduced in 
2006, which should have offered simple and flexible rules and consequently better protection 
for the minority shareholders.  
The new statutory derivative claim gave rise many important issues, such as the scope of the 
statutory derivative action with particular reference to the following questions; to what extent 
does the statutory right of members to bring a derivative claim in respect of a company mirror 
                                                 
275 D Milman, ‘Shareholder litigation in the UK: the Implications of Recent Authorities and Other Developments’ 
(2013) 342 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 1. 
276 See for example; J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013). 
277 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) paras 4.35- 4.36, Law Commission, 
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the derivative claim evolved at common law rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions. In 
other words, what are the solutions if any that have been offered by the new statutory derivative 
action to the underlying problems. Another major question arises after 2006 which is whether 
the 2006 Act replaced the old common law rules totally or whether the rules of Foss v Harbottle 
still applied.  To answer these questions this section will be divided into two sub-sections; the 
first sub section discusses the establishment of the statutory derivative action and the required 
conditions to obtain permission to continue this claim. While the second sub-section evaluates 
whether the statute has really removed or eliminated the barriers that prevent the minority from 
using this way of protection. 
3.3.1 Establishing a derivative claim under the Companies Act 2006   
Under the Companies Act 2006, a derivative action can be brought under Part 11 ss. 260-264 
(or in pursuance of a court order in proceedings for unfair prejudice, (CA s. 994).278 Under s. 
260 that came into force on 1 October 2007 a derivative claim might be brought in respect of 
a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed acts or omission involving negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust by directors of the company.279 It seems that the 
provision grants the minority shareholders a remedy relating to wide range of wrongdoings and 
misconducts under which their claim can be founded. In terms of negligence, the Act has 
changed the common law position where the pure negligence by directors was not accepted as 
a ground of a derivative claim, unless the directors has obtained some benefits from his own 
incompetence. 280  Whereas, under the Companies Act 2006 pure negligence constitutes a 
sufficient ground to bring a derivative claim against that director,281 moreover the Companies 
                                                 
278 As will be discussed later the common law principles on a double derivative action are still applicable and have 
not been taken away by sections 260 to 264 of the Companies Act 2006. See Universal Project Management v 
Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348 (Ch), Abouraya v Sigmund & Ors [2014] EWHC 277 (Ch) and Bhullar v 
Bhullar & Ors  [2015] EWHC 1943 (Ch).   
279 S. 263 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
280 See Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565 and Daniels v Daniels [1978] All ER 89. 
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Act 2006 does not require the claimant to prove that the acts or omission have been already 
committed as long as it is proved that it is proposed for the future. In that regard, any member 
of a company or any person who is not a member but to whom shares in the company have 
been transferred or transmitted by operation of law is eligible to be a derivative claimant.282 
That member is entitled to take action even though the cause of action arose before he or she 
became a member of that company.283 The action can be taken against the company’s directors 
or any involved party.284 The term “director” includes the current and former directors, de jure 
directors, de facto directors285 and the shadow directors.286  
A two-stage procedure was introduced by the Act for the applicant to get permission to continue 
the action as a derivative action.287 Firstly, a member of a company who is bringing a derivative 
action has to apply to the court and prove that the case in question is a prima facie case288 in 
order to consider whether such a claim should be allowed to proceed to trial.289 The court’s 
response is one of these points: if the applicant was not able to satisfy the court that there is a 
prima facie case the court must dismiss the application and it might make any consequential 
                                                 
282 Such a person might be a personal representative of the deceased members’ estate or member’s trustee in 
bankruptcy, see The Explanatory Notes of the CA 2006, para 494. 
283 See s. 265 The Companies Act, 2006. Under English law former shareholder is not allowed to bring a derivative 
claim as the Law Commission justified that there is no point in allowing former shareholders to bring such action 
as long as current shareholders could always initiate proceedings, also allowing the former member using such 
claim increase the possibility of having vexatious claims. For different position see s. 238 (a) of the Canadian 
Business Corporations Act 1985, under which a former member of a company can bring a derivative action. 
284 S. 260 (30) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
285 S. 250 of the Companies Act. 
286 S. 260 (5) (c) of the Companies Act, 2006. See J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). It has to be pointed out here that under ss. 89-91 of the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 the position on shadow directors is changed whereby greater clarity both in 
terms of definition and the range of duties owed by shadow directors were adopted.  See D Milman, ‘Revisiting 
the Core Principles of Modern Corporate Law’ (2015) 371 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 4. And P Bailey 
Deregulation Bill and Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill Enacted to Amend Company Law’ 
Legislative Comment (2015) 370 Company Law Newsletter 1. 
287 A new Practice Direction (19C) was inserted to the Civil Procedure Rule 1998 in order to incorporate this two-
stage procedure.   
288 The standard of a prims facie is established by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance v 
Newman Industries [1982] Ch 204 at 221H-222B. 




order it considers appropriate.290 In this regard, the court in Bridge v Daley 291 refused to grant 
permission to continue derivative on the ground that there is no prima facie case and court 
should not compel the company to continue such litigation. Moreover, the claimant shareholder 
was ordered to pay the costs of litigation, in addition to that, indemnity costs were awarded by 
the court against the claimant in respect of those costs incurred after the date of a previous 
hearing.292 By comparison, in Cullen Investment Ltd v Brown293 a prima facie case was proved 
and a derivative claim was allowed to proceed to trial.  
The court has a discretionary power to grant permission to continue the derivative claim, or 
refuse the application, and it may adjourn the proceedings on the application and gives such 
directions as it thinks fit.294 Moreover, to grant such permission the court might ask for more 
information to be provided either by the company or by the claimant shareholder. At the first 
stage the court only considers the claimant’s evidence to examine whether the planned action 
is serious and desirable to be brought, or whether it is a vexatious claim which aims to disrupt 
the company’ business, where the court should stop such claims without involving the 
defendant director or the company. The court may adjourn its decision to obtain some evidence 
or give some directions to make that decision. Such information might help the minority 
shareholder as they are usually not allowed to get some evidences which may support their 
claim. However, the court should bear in mind that the controllers of the company are against 
such kinds of actions, therefore, they will not provide any kind of information which might 
make them liable for the conduct in question.295 
                                                 
290 S. 261(1) (2) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
291 [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch). The unusual feature of this case is that it featured a public company and indemnity 
costs awarded against claimant.  
292 D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 
3. 
293 [2015] EWHC 473 (Ch).  
294 S. 261 (3) (4) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
295 See s. 261 of the Companies Act, 2006 which provides that (1) A member of a company who brings a derivative 
claim under this Chapter must apply to the court for permission (in Northern Ireland, leave) to continue it. (2) If 
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The decision of whether permission should be given or not depends on most cases on whether 
that claim was in the interests of the company as a whole or not, taking into account in particular 
to the matters identified in s. 172(1) (a-f), of the Companies Act 2006, in addition to the other 
additional factors as specified by s. 172(2), or in some circumstances the interests of the 
company’s creditors (s. 172(3)). However, permission must be refused if the act or omission 
has been already authorised in advance or ratified later on by the company, whether that act or 
omission has already happened or it is proposed to be done.296  
It seems from the above conditions that in order to obtain permission to continue a derivative 
claim a shareholder is no longer required to prove fraud on minority and the wrongdoers were 
in control of the company. An implementation of the condition was applied in Bamford v 
Harvey297 where the Roth J confirmed that it is not essential under Part 11 of the Companies 
Act 2006 for a claimant shareholder to prove the wrongdoer control in order to obtain 
permission to continue the claim as derivative claim.298 Prior to the above case, the Inner House 
of the Court of Session in Scotland in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd,299dismissed the first 
instance decision once they asked the minority shareholder to prove that the wrongdoer was in 
control of the company to get permission to continue the derivative claim.300 David Cabrelli 
claimed that the Inner House in the above case applied the real purpose of the UK Parliament 
which is giving the court the discretionary power that allows it to grant permission to 
                                                 
it appears to the court that the application and the evidence filed by the applicant in support of it do not disclose 
a prima facie case for giving permission (or leave), the court-(a) must dismiss the application, and (b) may make 
any consequential order it considers appropriate. (3) If the application is not dismissed under subsection (2), the 
court— (a) may give directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company, and (b) may adjourn the 
proceedings to enable the evidence to be obtained.  (4) On hearing the application, the court may—  (a)give 
permission (or leave) to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks fit, (b)refuse permission (or leave) and 
dismiss the claim, or (c)adjourn the proceedings on the application and give such directions as it thinks fit. 
296 s. 263 (b) (c) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
297 [2012] EWHC 2858 (Ch). 
298  See D Milman, ‘Shareholder Litigation in the UK: the Implications of Recent Authorities and Other 
Developments’ (2013) 342 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 1. 
299 [2009] CSIH 65. 




commence the derivative action even though the wrongdoer was not in control of that 
company. 301  Furthermore, it is no longer required for a shareholder to prove that the 
wrongdoers have obtained some benefits from their conduct.302 
More significantly, the court is allowed to give permission to start a derivative claim even if it 
is proved by the directors or the majority shareholders that conduct was committed in good 
faith, as the court in such circumstances prioritises the company’s interests over any other 
interests. What is more, s. 263(2) and (3) empowered the court with free discretion to be more 
involved and becomes a hypothetical reasonable board in such disagreements. By such power 
the court examines whether a reasonable independent board will grant the minority permission 
to continue their claim or not. In this context, in Stainer v Lee and others303 the court put itself 
in the position of a reasonable independent board and granted the minority shareholder 
permission to continue their claim. However, it might be argued that it is not always easy for 
the court to become an expert body and examine whether the reasonable independent board in 
these circumstances will allow the derivative action to be brought or not. 304  
In light of the foregoing, it seems obviously that the Companies Act 2006 has changed the 
organ (the controlling shareholders) who is allowed to grant permission to sue on behalf of the 
company and continue the derivative claim. Under common law rules it was left to those 
controlling the company to decide whether permission should be given or not, unless the 
wrongdoing was one of the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle. Permission is no longer granted by 
those managing the company, since under the new Act an application to obtain permission to 
constitute the derivative claim is considered by the court which is considered an independent 
                                                 
301 D Cabrelli, ‘Statutory Derivative Proceedings: the View from the Inner House’ (2010) 14(1) Edinburgh Law 
Review 116. 
302 D, Lightman ‘The Companies Act 2006: A Nutshell Guide to the Changes to the Derivative Claim’ [2007] 
Civil Justice Quarterly 37. 
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304 J Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims under the 
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external body that has no interest to stop such claim as long as it is desirable to be brought.305 
To grant such permission the court is required to take into account many factors which are 
listed by the Act. However, it should be borne in mind that, the court is obligated to strike a 
balance between the protection of the minority shareholder and the protection of the interests 
of the company as whole, therefore; nonsense claims that disrupt the company’s business 
should be refused.306 For example, the court should refuse the application if the conduct has 
been authorised or ratified by the company,307 or where the action considered being against the 
duty to promote the success of the company in accordance with s.172 of the Companies Act 
2006.308  
The free discretion of the court empowers it to consider other relevant factors that may affect 
its decision, such as; the alternative remedies available, the view of the non-interested 
members, the board’s decision not to sue, the good faith of claimant, the success needs of the 
company and the potential to ratify that conduct.309 In this regards, it was stated in the Law 
Commission report that these criteria grant the shareholders and their advisor the necessary 
information that are needed in such claims, moreover, courts will take advantage of these 
criteria in considering such applications.310 However, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sub-section, it is argued that the adoption of these criteria reflects the complex 
common law rules and makes the statutory derivative action more problematical. 
Having seen that the claimant firstly has to prove a prima facie case, if that was proved the 
court should start the second step by opening the case to further hearing to determine whether 
                                                 
305 J Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 205. 
306 A Keay and J Loughrey ‘Derivative Proceedings in A Brave New World for Company Management and 
Shareholders’ [2010] Journal of Business Law 151, at 162. 
307 S. 263 (2) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
308 S. 263 (2) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
309 S. 263 (3) (4) of the Companies Act, 2006. There is no clear definition to the terms of “good faith” and “success 
of the company” therefore it is a matter for the courts to weight on the facts of each case. 
310 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997). 
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permission should be given or not.311 At the second stage the court is also authorised to dismiss 
the application and adjourn the proceeding for further evidences or give some directions such 
as asking the general meeting to take place.312  The application can be refused for various 
reasons, since there are no specific rules that the court can rely on its decision. Some of these 
criteria were investigated in Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel,313 such as the potential of success, 
the cost of proceedings, the damage that would be caused to the company in the case of failure 
and the value of the compensation recovered.314 That is to say, the court might refuse the 
application if it thinks the action is unlikely to succeed at a full hearing or the cost of litigation 
is higher than the compensations that might be obtained by the applicant shareholder.315  
Moreover, the application might be refused if it would not benefit the interests of the company 
even though there is high chance that the derivative applicant will win the claim. 316 
Additionally, the court should take into account whether there is ability to use s. 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006 instead of the derivative claim under s. 260. In this manner, Cabrelli 
claimed that the English Courts are not prepared to give permission to continue a derivative 
claim whenever it was realised that a remedy under s. 994 is prima facie available.317 Cabrelli 
supported his claim by the decision in Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel when the permission was 
                                                 
311 The two-stage procedure was heavily criticized by the Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com 
No 246, 1997). In contrast, the position of Australian courts is much more realistic. See for example Hurlwy v 
BGH Nominees Pty Ltd (1983) 31 SARS 250, at 253 where it was stated that “in many cases a hearing to determine 
whether there was a prima facie case would be almost as long as a full trial and a good deal less satisfactory. In 
such cases the only reasonable course may be to determine the issue of standing, if raised as a preliminary issue, 
on the assumption that the allegation in the statement of claim are correct”. 
312 A Steinfeld, Blackstone’s Guide to The Companies Act 2006 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), at 13-
20. 
313 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch). 
314J Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 205. 
315 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds' Company Law (9th edn, Jordans, Bristol 2014). 
316 Yet the question that might be asked is to what extent courts are able to involve and discuss the business 
activities of the company and decide whether such conduct is considered against the company’s interests or vice 
versa. The court at this early stage does not have a complete picture regarding the application and minority 
shareholders do not have the enough evidences that support their claim. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
court should grant the permission on the availability of the prima facie condition only and regardless of other 
conditions. See J Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims 
under the Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 205. 
317 D Cabrelli, ‘Statutory Derivative Proceedings: the View from the Inner House’ (2010) 14(1) Edinburgh Law 
Review 116, at 120. 
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refused on the ground that the minority shareholder was able to use the unfair prejudice remedy 
instead of the derivative action.318 More recently in Bridge v Daley 319 permission to proceed a 
derivative claim was refused, furthermore, HH Judge Hodge felt that the complaints would 
have been more appropriate to have been tested in the context of a s. 994 petition rather than 
by dragging the company into a derivative claim.320  
In addition to the double procedure obstacle, s. 263 reintroduced the ratification bar which was 
applied at the common law rules, under this rules the court must refuse permission if the cause 
of action arises from an act or omission that has been authorised or ratified by that company. 
The issue of ratification was one of the main problems at common law, therefore it will be 
discussed in more details to consider whether the Companies Act 2006 has removed or at least 
eliminated such bar or whether the old common law rule was re-established. 
3.3.2 Ratification issues: 
Ratification was defined as the process by which “those to whom duties are owed may release 
those who owe the duties from their legal obligations….prospectively or retrospectively”.321 
The ratification bar was the most important barrier that has been used to restrict the 
implementation of derivative claim under common law, since under these rules it was the right 
of all shareholders to participate in such a decision. A decision to enforce a derivative claim or 
not was taken by all shareholders even those who alleged wrongdoers or those who are under 
their influence,322 so that the power of the controlling shareholders will affect such ratification. 
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To avoid such kind of ratification it was recommended by the Company Law Review323 that a 
decision to ratify conduct of alleged wrongdoers should be taken by other members of the 
company without reliance on the votes in favour of the accused directors or any connected 
person. This recommendation was adopted by the Companies Act 2006 where directors and 
any connected members with the act or mission in question shall not be counted in the voting 
on that ratification.324 However, as it was applied at the common law there are certain kinds of 
acts which are incapable to be ratified, such acts might be ultra vires acts, or it is clear that 
there is a fraud on the minority shareholders.325 
 It seems that the Companies Act 2006 preserves the previous common law on ratification with 
one vital alteration; under this change a decision to ratify conduct by directors amounting to 
default, negligence, breach of duty and breach of trust in relation to the company must be taken 
without reliance on the votes of the directors or any connected person with a personal interests 
in the ratification.326 Accordingly, barriers that prevent the minority from starting such claim 
have been reduced. That is to say, the possibility of ratifying directors’ conduct has been 
significantly tightened and consequently the former bar to derivative claims was diluted.327 
However, the question that arises here is to what extent the wrongdoers are still able to ratify 
their conduct even though they are prevented from the participation in this ratification. As the 
court is allowed to consider the alleged wrongs and consequently examine the possibility of 
                                                 
323 Company Law Review Developing the Framework, 2000, Company Law Review Completing the Structure, 
2000, Company Law Review Final Report 2001. 
324 Members with personal interests are allowed to attend and vote however their votes will be disregarded, see s. 
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Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 241. 




ratification of such conduct by the company, it is claimed that there is no real change in the 
statute as long as the alleged wrongs can be ratified.328 In other words, the statute does not offer 
much difference to the ratification issue that available in common law, as when the court 
deciding whether to grant permission to continue the derivative action or not it is depending on 
whether the alleged wrongs have been ratified or not.329 Keay and Loughrey, supported the 
above view and they claimed that the position that has been taken in Franbar Holdings Ltd v 
Patel330 clearly showed that common law rule of ratification has not been amended by the 
legislation.331 In Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel, the judge refused the application to grant 
permission to continue the derivative claim on the ground that the common law rule of 
ratification has not been changed by s. 239 of the Companies Act 2006.332 In this context, the 
court in Re Singh Brothers Contractors (North West) Ltd333 refused to grant permission to 
continue a derivative action on the ground that the alleged conduct either had been authorised 
by the company or had later been ratified.334 Moreover, the new ratification principle has not 
escaped criticism, as in some situations it prevents many shareholders from practicing their 
right to vote without having real interests to that alleged conduct. More importantly, there is a 
question that might be asked here which is how easy for the court to determine the shareholder 
who is in favour of the wrongdoing and who is not? That difficulty appears in particular in 
large companies where there are a huge number of shareholders and the alleged wrongdoers 
might be in de facto control. On the other hand, it could be argued that this view has ignored 
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that reality that the statute has made actual change in this issue as it will be difficult to get the 
ratification without the wrongdoers’ votes.  
3.3.3 An evaluation of the statutory derivative action  
There is no doubt that having a statutory derivative claim is considered a great achievement for 
various reasons.335 First and foremost, this codification offered efficient guidance to all who 
are involved in such kind of litigation, such as shareholders, directors, lawyers and judges.336 
Secondly this codification grants the minority shareholders a wider ground under which a 
derivative action can be founded, for instance, the scope of derivative claim has been expanded 
to include the breach of duty of skill and care. The Act has filled a gap in the common law 
when it allows the minority shareholder to use the derivative claim on the ground of negligence, 
consequently, the complex distinction between mere negligence and self-benefit negligence at 
common law in this regard was eliminated.337 Furthermore, a claimant shareholder is no longer 
required to prove fraud and wrongdoing control. In addition to that, the Act offers the court the 
required power with free discretion to be reasonable directors to grant permission to continue 
the derivative claim and deter vexatious actions that annoying the company’s business.338 By 
                                                 
335 The opponents of the new statutory derivative claim have criticised it on the ground that it opens floodgates of 
litigations against the company, which disturb the business of the company. In this regard, it claimed that under 
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such a codification and clarification minority shareholders have a better understanding of the 
derivative action which may increases their chance to obtain permission to continue the claim. 
Moreover, cases decided over the previous year show that there is noteworthy increase in the 
number of reported litigation after the enactment of Companies Act 2006 which is considered 
a good indication regarding the evolution of the judicial authority in such kind of actions.339 
On the other hand, it is claimed that the efficiency of the new statutory derivative action is 
likely to be the same as it was at common law, since the act has adopted the same substantive 
and procedures rules that were applied at common law. Moreover, as long as the common law 
difficulties are available, the minority shareholders prefer to get their remedies by more popular 
ways which provide more broad scope and flexible choice of remedies. 340  Indeed, the 
effectiveness of the statutory derivative action depends on the courts’ attitude toward such 
action, if the courts are more willing to involve in such cases there will be wide use of it, 
whereas if the courts keep to the old position and are still reluctant to interfere in such actions, 
it is doubted whether the new statutory action will be more effective than the common law 
one.341 Furthermore, although, the statute empowered the court with free discretion to deal with 
such kind of actions, however, it is still difficult for judges to be involved in such disagreement, 
as judges in most cases lack business expertise which enables them to make the suitable 
decisions that affect the company’s interests. Therefore, a considerable dilemma is facing the 
judges to use their discretion, as they believe that they are disturbing the company’s day-to-
day business.342 Additionally, courts will find some difficulties in defining some related terms 
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such as the success of the company and good faith that may result in inconsistent exercise of 
their discretionary power.  
The Act has mentioned many factors which courts should take into account when deciding to 
grant permission or not, there is no doubt that such factors will introduce great guidance to 
those who are involved in such actions, particularly judges and minority shareholders. 
However, these factors will create more obstacles in front of the aggrieved shareholder, in 
addition to increasing the cost of litigation and lengthening the time required for the court to 
grant permission.343 Moreover, it stated that the old restrictive attitudes by judges toward such 
kind of action at common law will continue, as such criteria which set out by the Act reflect 
the way the common law has developed.344  These criteria have been heavily criticised at 
common law as they never become clear, for example; the factor of the board’s decision not to 
sue is not clear to be applied, as it was required that such a decision should have been taken in 
good faith and for the benefit of the company, therefore, it would be the job of the court to 
examine whether such a decision was valid and taken under these conditions or not. 345  
Although, the court is not bound by such a decision, however, the question that arises around 
this is how much weight the court can give to the board’s decision not to sue. One other factor 
is considered when the court deciding the likelihood of granting permission which is the view 
of the members of the company with no personal interests, so it is for the court to define that 
term and find out such kind of shareholders. Recent cases showed that there are no clear criteria 
for the shareholder to obtain permission to continue the derivative claim. For instance in 
Mission Capital plc v Sinclair346 although the applicant has proved that the application was in 
good faith and the question of whether a director was acting in accordance with duties imposed 
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by s.172 was not seen as a bar to the claim, however the permission was refused on the ground 
that a notional director would not have attached much importance to the claim and it would be 
better for the claimant to get such remedy on an application under s. 994 (the unfair prejudice 
remedy).347 Also in Fanmailuk.com v Cooper348 where the court refused the permission on the 
basis that there were linked proceedings which if successful would make the derivative claim 
superfluous. 349  In a similar vein, in Kleanthous v Paphitis 350  the court refused to grant 
permission as it considered the existence of a possible alternative remedy a main reason to 
prevent the derivative claim. However, in contrast to that, the claimant shareholder in Hughes 
v Weiss351 was given permission to continue a derivative claim, and it was clearly stated in that 
case that the availability of alternative remedy did not necessarily bar a derivative a claim. 
It clearly appears that the Act provided a long procedure to obtain permission to continue a 
derivative claim and as stated by the law commission these currently stages are not practical 
and slow down the procedures of getting that permission which makes such way of protection 
ineffective and unusable.352 This criticism is shared by Keay and Loughrey when they stated 
that the condition of clean hands to bring the derivative claim was considered one of the major 
problems in the common law, as it was the main reason for refusing many cases, and 
unfortunately this condition was not removed by the new statutory regime.353 The majority 
shareholders will misuse this condition by claiming that there are no clean hands behind that 
claim, therefore, it is stated that the derivative action should be accepted if it is believed that it 
is for the company’s interests, even though there were was not clean hands behind that 
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action.354 In line with this view, Lord Glennie stated that it was not clear why a company could 
not benefit from a claim just because there were not clean hands behind that claim.355 What is 
more, the Companies Act 2006 has not defined the personal rights of the shareholders in the 
company, as this clarification and guidance will remove the confusion that faces shareholders 
in situations where there is an overlap between the personal and corporate wrongs. Since in 
some circumstances a shareholder might find an uncertainty whether the personal action should 
be brought or the derivative action instead to remedy the wrongdoing that has been committed. 
For instance, if the wrongdoing is an ultra vires act,356 it is not clear for that shareholder 
whether to bring a derivative a claim for breaching the s.171 duty to observe the company’s 
constitution or bring a personal claim under common law.357 However, it is said that in practice, 
the grounds of personal rights might be better served by other remedies such as the unfair 
prejudice remedy under s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and therefore, such confusion may 
gradually disappear.358 
In terms of ratification, on the one hand, it is admitted that the Companies Act 2006 has 
provided a better ratification procedure rather than common law rule, as under this Act the 
decision of giving a right to the company to constitute litigation is in hands of the court rather 
than the controllers of the company, furthermore a potential claimant is allowed to start his or 
her derivative a claim with no need to consider whether ratification is possible or not, as the 
court is the body that is responsible to examine the likelihood of ratification, moreover the 
                                                 
354  J Poole and P Roberts ‘Shareholder Remedies- Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’ [1999] Journal 
of Business Law 99. 
355 Lord Glennie in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd [2009] CSIH 65. 
356 See for example; Rolled Steel v British Street Corporation [1984] 2 WLR 908. According to the doctrine of 
ultra vires a company is limited to acting within the objects set out in its memorandum of association, therefore, 
this doctrine applies to transaction that are beyond the company’s power which are determined in its memorandum 
of association. However, it should be noted that from 1.10.2009, the common law rule is subject to CA 2006, s. 
31(1), which provides that, unless a company's articles specifically restrict the objects of a company, its objects 
are unrestricted. 
357  L Talbot, ‘A Contextual Analysis of the Demise of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires in English Company Law and 
the Rhetoric and Reality of Enlightened Shareholders’ (2009) 30(11) Company Lawyer 323.  
358 B Hannigan, Company Law (3nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), at 465. 
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court is not bound by such possibility rather it has to take into account such possibility. On the 
other hand, the Act was criticised as the old common law was being reintroduced in a different 
way. That is to say, since effective ratification still has an important role therefore, the difficulty 
of determining the effective ratification is still facing the courts.359 Likewise, the Act adopted 
the vague common law position regarding the capable and incapable acts with no more 
clarification, 360  under which it was really difficult for the court to differentiate between 
ratifiable and non-ratifiable conduct.361 Under such rule, if the wrongdoings have been ratified 
by a valid resolution the court has to accept such ratification and refuse permission to continue 
the claim. What is more, the court is allowed to adjourn the hearing of granting permission for 
some reasons, during that period the controllers of that company are being given an ample of 
time to ratify their conduct. More significantly, breaching the duty of skill and care by the 
directors of the company is still capable of being ratified in the new rule which presents more 
difficulties for minority shareholders to obtain permission even though the directors has 
breached those duties.362  
In terms of codifying the duties of directors it is obvious that this codification has a positive 
effect on the statutory derivative actions however, as s. 170(4) of the Companies Act 2006 
mentioned to the complex directors’ duties at common law in interpreting and applying the 
general duties, the court will find the same difficulties to deal with such issue. Similarly, the 
codification of directors’ duty to promote the success of the company does not have much 
impact of the efficacy of derivative claim, as this duty was drafted in vague and ill-defined 
language.363 Having said that, there are no clear criteria for the court to follow when dealing 
                                                 
359 See Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel [2009] 1 BCLC 1. 
360 S. 239 (7) of the Companies Act, 2006 where it is stated that (This section does not affect any…….. or any 
rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the company. 
361 A Keay and J Loughrey ‘Derivative Proceedings in A Brave New World for Company Management and 
Shareholders’ [2010] Journal of Business Law 151, 164-165. 
362 A Boyle, J Birds and Others, Company Law (6th edn, Jordans, 2007), at 686. 
363 D Attenborough, ‘The Company Law Reform Bill: An Analysis of Directors' Duties and the Objective of the 
Company (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 162. 
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with s. 172 of the Companies Act 2006 in the case of derivative claim, as the court finds 
difficulties to measure the manner at which directors have acted to see whether that act was for 
the long term success of the company or not, as this section is considered one of the most 
complicated sections in that law.364 As a result there is no clear guidance, framework, or 
definite standards for the court to follow at which controllers of a company can be held 
accountable for decision making processes. However, it might be argued here that the Act left 
that door open for the court so that its discretion and power can be practised and developed 
which can bring the required justice whenever it is needed. 
In terms of the financial barriers, on the one hand, the cost of litigation will prevent many 
malicious derivative actions that aim to disrupt the company’s business. On the other hand 
there is generally agreement that the cost of such litigation is considered a significant bar that 
prevents not only vexatious cases, but also well-grounded cases are stopped because of this 
obstacle. Additionally, the financial barrier encourages the controllers of the company to 
misuse the interests of the minority shareholders as they are sure that such kinds of shareholder 
are usually facing a financial problem. Such a barrier makes the directors and majority 
shareholders more confident in their actions as they know that there is a small risk of 
proceedings being brought against them.365 Furthermore, it is really important for the claimant 
shareholder to consider whether the outcome of the action is justified in comparison with the 
costs that are going to be paid, bearing in mind that the outcomes of such litigation will not be 
taken by the claimants shareholders as he or she claim on behalf of the company, therefore, the 
obtained recovery goes to the company and the claimant shareholder will only get his or her 
                                                 
364 A Keay, ‘Section 172 (2) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment’ (2007) 28(4) 
Company Lawyer 106. 
365 J Sykes, ‘The Continuing Paradox: A Critique of Minority Shareholder and Derivative Claims Under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 205, at 222. 
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share pro rata.366  In order to alleviate this problem the Court of Appeal in Wallersteiner v 
Moir367 created a restrictive procedure by which a claimant shareholder can obtain a cost 
indemnity order as long as his claim was based on reasonable ground and good faith.368 This 
restrictive attitude by the court toward granting the indemnity orders appeared in many other 
cases such as Smith v Croft where it was stated by Walton J that it is necessary for the claimant 
shareholder who is seeking an indemnity order to prove that this order is genuinely needed.369 
For these reasons the common law position regarding the indemnity costs order and the 
restrictive attitude by the judge toward granting such order was heavily criticised.370 In this 
regard Reisberg stated that this bar existed under common law which was against the interests 
of the company and which prevented the minority from starting their reasonable actions.371 In 
line with this, part 19.9E of the Civil Procedure Rules 1999 provides that “the court may order 
the company, body corporate or trade union for the benefit of which a derivative claim is 
brought to indemnify the claimant against liability for costs incurred in the permission 
application or in the derivative claim or both”. As mentioned above, although the indemnity 
orders existed however courts made such an order in certain and limited cases.372 For instance; 
the indemnity order was applied in Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd373 when Lewison J has stated 
“once the court has reached the conclusion that the claim ought to proceed for the benefit of 
the company, it ought normally to order the company to indemnify the claimant against his 
costs.” Also in Kiani v Cooper374 the court granted the claimant shareholders a pre-emptive 
                                                 
366  B Cheffins, ‘Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies’ 
(2003) 23(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
367 [1975] QB 373, in this case at 391G-392F there is a detailed discussion as to the court’s power to award an 
indemnity to a minority shareholder who brings a derivative claim. 
368 See Buckley L.J in Wallersteiner v Moir [1975] QB 373, at 404. 
369 [1986] 1 WLR 580. 
370 A Boyle, Minority Shareholders' Remedies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011). 
371 A Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward’ [2006] Journal of Business Law 
445. 
372 See for example Wallersteiner v Moir [1976] QB 373 and Smith v Croft [1986] 1 WLR 580 cited in J Birds 
and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). 
373 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch). 
374 [2010] EWHC 577 (Ch), see also Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch). 
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indemnity as to costs out of the assets of the company in relation to the claimant’s own costs 
but not in relation to any adverse order for costs. On the other hand, the claimant in Hughes v 
Weiss375  failed to obtain a pre-emptive indemnity as to costs, more recently in Bhullar v 
Bhullar376 although Morgan J granted permission to continue derivative claim, however he 
refused to order an advance indemnity by the company to the claimant against his liability in 
costs which reflects a cautious approach towards the granting of such orders.377 Furthermore, 
in Bridge v Daley,378  having been refused permission to continue a derivative claim, the 
claimant shareholder was ordered to pay the costs of litigation, in addition to that, indemnity 
costs were awarded by the court against the claimant in respect of those costs incurred after the 
date of a previous hearing.379 In this context, it is argued that the uncertainty at common law 
regarding the court’s power to make a cost indemnity order was adopted by the Act, therefore, 
the minority shareholders are still facing difficulties and uncertainties in obtaining that order. 
Therefore, the Act should have should have granted the court more power to give such order.380 
Yet, it might be claimed that giving such order under easy process to the minority shareholder 
encourages groundless actions against the company which disturb the company business.381 
However, this could be overcome when the court examined the good faith of the claimant and 
was satisfied that claimant was in the best interests of the company. In this regard it was stated 
in Wallersteiner v Moir382 that an order should be granted whenever the permission to continue 
the claim was obtained.  
                                                 
375 [2012] EWHC 2362 (Ch). 
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26(1) Civil Justice Quarterly 37. A Reisberg, ‘Derivative Actions and Funding Problem: The Way Forward’ 
[2006] Journal of Business Law 445. 
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Briefly, the costs of litigation still form the big obstacle that prevents the abused shareholder 
from using such a claim, as the Act has made no actual change to the issue of obtaining an 
indemnity costs order, and the old uncertain common law rules regarding granting the 
indemnity order are still applied.383 Reisberg has gone further than the current idea of an 
indemnity costs order when he suggested that a claimant shareholder should be rewarded with 
a portion of the proceeds of successful claims for his persistence in pursuing the derivative 
action.384 The Law Commission has refused this suggestion on the ground that the benefits in 
derivative action should go to the company and no individual shareholder or group of 
shareholders are allowed to take any part of those benefits.385 Reisberg, has supported his view 
by saying that the company remains the body taking the benefits, however it is necessary to 
encourage shareholders by such kind of protection of the rewards otherwise there will be no 
incentive to use the derivative action.  
Last but not least, the Act has been heavily criticised as it creates uncertainty and much 
academic debate as to whether the Act has removed the multiple derivative action386 which was 
a part of the common law, or such kind of action is still available under English law after the 
enactment of the Companies Act 2006. 387  The recent decisions in Universal Project 
                                                 
383 It should be noted here that a claimant in a derivative claim as in any civil proceedings is allowed to use the 
conditional fee agreement under s. 58 and 58A of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 ( Conditional fee 
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Management v Fort Gilkicker Ltd,388Abouraya v Sigmund & Ors389 and Bhullar v Bhullar & 
Ors390 were contrary to the view of most academic commentators 391 who believed that the 
common law derivative claim was entirely abolished by the Companies Act 2006 and the 
double derivative action no longer existed under English law.392 Mr Justice Briggs in the first 
case came to the conclusion that the multiple derivative action had been known to English 
common law and continues to be available in our day. Moreover, he further held that as the 
provisions of part 11 of the Companies Act 2006 did not apply to double derivative actions and 
the UK Parliament did not implicitly or otherwise abolish the whole of the common law 
derivative action. Therefore the common law rules of derivative actions continued to apply to 
the double derivative claims and courts are still allowed to entertain such actions.393 In the same 
manner, Richards J in Abouraya v Sigmund & Ors394 stated that some aspects of the common 
law derivative action live side by side with the statutory derivative action. To avoid such kind 
of uncertainty and to stop the mess of the common law derivative claim it was suggested that 
Parliament should take the other common law countries’ position where the scope of the 
statutory derivative action extended to include the double derivative actions.395 Such kind of 
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reform will provide a procedural mechanism by which the court could ensure that injustice 
would not be done without a remedy.396 
3.3.4 Conclusion  
Although the codification of the derivative claim has clarified many complicated and uncertain 
issues at common law rule in Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions, however, the Companies Act 
2006 has made no major change to the common law which may make the derivative claim as 
a first option for the abused shareholders. Under the above circumstances obtaining permission 
to continue a derivative claim depends very much on the courts’ attitude towards their judicial 
discretion, if the court applied such power properly and allowed the claimant shareholder to 
continue his or her desirable claim the old common law attitude will be overcome, otherwise 
the old approach will be reintroduced. Furthermore, the obstacles of ratification and litigation 
costs remain a considerable hurdle that prevents a minority shareholder from using the 
derivative claim, particularly in light of the availability of alternative remedies such as the 
unfair prejudice remedies. In other words, as long as the above difficulties are available the 
minority shareholders prefer to get their remedies via more popular and simple way which 
provide more broad scope and flexible choice of remedies. As would be discussed in the next 
section it would be much simpler for a shareholder to go through s. 994 than the derivative 
claim, as the issue of ratification and the two stages procedures to get permission are not 
applied. More importantly, under s. 994 the court has various options to remedy the petitioner. 
Therefore, as Sugarman has stated, with the availability of these provisions the unfair prejudice 
remedy is likely to remain the remedy of first choice for the minority shareholder as it has many 
advantages over derivative claims.397 Similarly, it was stated in the Law Commission that 
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unless major changes were made to the unfair prejudice remedy it would continue to offer 
advantages over the derivative action. Therefore, the following section is allocated to 
examining the unfair prejudice remedy to consider to what extent this way of protection is 
effective in comparison with the derivative action. 
3.4 Unfairly Prejudicial conduct  
3.4.1 Introduction  
 In addition to the above remedies that are offered to the aggrieved shareholder (i.e. derivative 
claim and personal actions) English law grants minority shareholders another significant 
remedy. Under such remedy a member of a company can apply to the court by petition where;  
“(a) the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial 
to the interests of its members generally or some part of the members (including at least himself), or (b) 
that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including any act or omission on its behalf) 
is or would be so prejudicial.”398 
The origin of this method of protection can be traced back to the Cohen Committee 399 which 
clearly identified the vulnerability of minority shareholders, particularly in private company, 
to oppression by the majority shareholders.400 The above Report led to the introduction of s. 
210 of the Companies Act 1948 where the aggrieved shareholder was allowed to seek redress 
in the case of ‘oppression’.401 Yet, up to 1980 the figures showed that there were only a handful 
of successful cases, therefore, s. 210 of the 1948 Act did not succeed to fulfil an effective role 
in protecting minority shareholders.402  The concept of oppression under s. 210 of 1948 Act 
was not clear enough in addition to the deficiency of the ‘oppression’ term to cover many types 
                                                 
398 S. 994 of the Companies Act 2006, (formerly s. 459 of the Companies Act 1985). 
399 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmnd 6695, 1945).  
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of misconduct, such as the infringement of legitimate expectations to participate in 
management or to have the dividends distributed on a regular basis.403 What is more, an order 
under s. 210 was only permitted if the facts constituted a ground for a winding up remedy on 
the just and equitable grounds. The above restrictions alongside with the judicial timidity 404 
led Parliament to amend the Companies Act in 1980 where a major change was made in this 
area in the form of s. 75 of the Companies Act 1980 as the term oppression was superseded by 
the concept of ‘unfair prejudice’.405 That provision was then consolidated as s. 459 of the 
Companies Act 1985 which was later extended by the Companies Act 1989. Section 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006 made no significant changes in this issue except some insignificant 
stylistic modifications. However, it should be borne in mind that the developed case law under 
s. 459 is directly applicable to s. 994.406 
After 1985, the numbers of cases brought under s. 459 increased, as the wording of this section 
was wide and unrestricted; furthermore, the courts departed from their traditional stance to 
keep themselves away from the internal affairs of the company.407 Therefore, not only the 
complaint of unfair prejudice to the petitioner but also to shareholders in general is allowed to 
be pursued under this section to obtain redress. As a result, many cases were brought which 
made such remedy oppressive towards the majority shareholders and for the company as a 
whole. That position necessitated the policy makers and the courts to produce some restrictions 
under which the quantity of cases coming before the courts and disturbing the company’s 
business could be reduced.408 
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In line with these demands the Law Commission recommended that some limitations and 
restrictions need to be placed to decrease a number of cases that coming to the court.409 Thus 
the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips410 took the opportunity to express the view that this 
jurisdiction has to be tightly controlled, so that some significant curbs were adopted which 
restricted the exploitation of that provision. Therefore, after O’Neill v Phillips an aggrieved 
and disappointed shareholder has no automatic exit option according to s. 994, as it has to be 
shown that the shareholder’s legitimate rights were trampled upon or ignored in order to obtain 
redress. 411  Moreover, Lord Hoffmann in this case redefined the concept of legitimate 
expectations when he stated that if there was no conclusive agreement between shareholders, 
then there could be no reasonable legitimate expectations. That is to say, O’Neill v Phillips has 
damped down the fires of litigation, leading to criticism against that judgment on the ground 
that the minority shareholder protection was reduced, therefore, the Company Law Review 
asked for statutory reversal of this authority but its demands fell on deaf ears.412 However, it 
appears recently that this remedial jurisdiction is coming back to prominence, as many cases 
are coming before the courts. Therefore, this part of this chapter is intended to analyse and 
examine the protection that is offered under the unfair prejudice remedy with particular 
reference to the following points: first the scope of the unfair prejudice remedy (especially the 
nature of the protected interests), and second the types of relief that are offered by succeeding 
with such remedy. 
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3.4.2 The scope of the unfair prejudice remedy  
Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 grants shareholders a strong tool of protection by 
which a shareholder is allowed to petition to the court to obtain a remedy whenever it seems to 
that member that the company’s affairs are being, or have been, conducted in a manner which 
is unfairly and prejudicial to the member or some part of the members. Thus, the discussion of 
the scope of this remedy raises the following issues: To which companies and other entities 
does the section apply, and who can apply for such kind of remedy? Most importantly, as there 
is no comprehensive definition of the concept of unfair prejudice it is the function of the court 
to determine the circumstances under which conduct is regarded as unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. The scope of the section should first be clarified in terms of its implementation, as it 
shows which kind of entities the section applies to. It apparently seems from the provision that 
s. 994 applies to all kind of companies as defined by s. 1 of the Companies Act 2006,413 
although, most of the successful petitions under this section in practice show that all instances 
of successful petitions relate to private companies as opposed to public companies.414 
A petition can only be brought by a member of a company or someone to whom shares in the 
company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law.415 The shareholder to whom 
shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted is allowed to petition even if the 
name of that shareholder does not appear on the register of member as long as it is proved that 
the controllers of the company have refused such registration.416 In that regard in Blunt v 
                                                 
413 It should be noted here that the section is applicable to Limited Liability Partnerships unless it was excluded 
by its members by an unanimous agree, such an agreement must be recorded in writing , see the Limited Liability 
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Jackson417 where the petitioner was never entered in the register of the company and indeed no 
register existed Roth J applied s. 125 which entitles the court in appropriate cases to order that 
the registration should be retrospective.418 Roth J concluded that the petitioner has suffered 
unfair prejudice within the terms of s. 994 and it was necessary to give him permission to ask 
for rectification of the register. In addition, it was shown in Re Brightview Ltd; Atlasview Ltd 
v Barton419 that a person who holds shares as nominee might be entitled to get remedy under 
this jurisdiction if it was proved that the interests of that shareholder are capable of including 
the economic and contractual interests of the beneficial owner of the shares.  
It seems that the former and prospective shareholders are not allowed to seek redress under this 
section.420 In this context, it has to be borne in mind that a petition should be refused if there is 
an arbitration clause which states such disagreements among members of the company are to 
be solved by arbitration. The Court of Appeal in Fulham FC v Richards 421 has clarified the 
uncertain position422 of whether a petitioner is allowed to obtain relief under s. 994 if the parties 
have agreed that disputes should be referred to arbitration where the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that an arbitration clause can exclude the s. 994 jurisdiction.423 Having said that, such petition 
is based on the allegation that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
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423 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 972. 
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manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner shareholders, however, the question that 
arises here is in what circumstances a conduct is considered as unfairly prejudicial conduct.  
3.4.2.1  Determining the unfairly prejudicial conduct  
In terms of the conduct being complained of, the petitioner has to establish that the conduct 
forms the basis of the petition is both prejudicial to the petitioner’s interests and unfair.424 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal in Rock Ltd v RCO plc425 refused to grant a remedy on the 
ground that although the fiduciary duties were breached by the directors when they sold the 
minority shareholder’s share at an undervalue which was clearly seen as improper and unfair 
conduct, however such conduct was not considered as prejudicial within s. 459. The Companies 
Act 2006 has not provided a comprehensive definition to the concept of unfair prejudice, 
therefore, it is left to the court to determine whether the petitioner was the subject of unfairly 
prejudicial conduct or not. In such circumstances it is well known that whenever the legislature 
leaves such issues without a definition the courts usually avoid to limit their wide discretion, 
then, the unfair prejudice term remains a wide term and it is within the power of the court to 
determine whether the conduct was unfairly prejudicial or not. In this vein, it was set out in 
Anderson v Hogg426 that the unfairness test is the criterion on which the court should rely and 
decide whether the conduct was unfairly prejudicial.427 Hoffmann LJ in Re Saul D Harrison & 
Sons Plc confirmed that the test of unfairness is determined from the consequence of the 
conduct so that a conduct is considered unfair and prejudicial if its impact was so regardless of 
its nature.428 Furthermore, the good faith conduct could be unfairly prejudicial as the central 
point is the result of the conduct and not its motive, in addition, the petitioner is not obliged to 
                                                 
424  See Re Macro v Thompson [1994] 2 BCLC 354. 
425 [2004] EWCA Civ 118. 
426 [2002] SC 190. 
427 M Hemraj, ‘Maximising Shareholder's Wealth: Legitimate Expectation and Minority Oppression’ (2006) 27(4) 
Company Lawyer 125. 
428 [1995] 1 BCLC 14, at 31. 
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prove the bad faith of the respondent as it does not have to be established. The petitioner who 
seeks a remedy is not lawfully required to show that the petition is based on clean hands, as the 
court in determining such unfairness is not taking into account the clean hands principle, 
however, if the contrary is proved and the court found that the petition was based on unclean 
hands, it might consider the petitioner’s behaviour either in deciding unfairness or choosing 
the proper relief, 429  moreover, it might consider the petitioner has not been unfairly 
prejudiced, 430  or refuse to grant a remedy even where the unfair prejudice conduct was 
established.431 
In Lord Hoffmann’s view the unfairness needs to be tested from a commercial context where 
the relationships are based on “keeping of promises and honouring agreements”.432 Therefore, 
in such agreements the relationships among the shareholders are governed by the relevant 
company laws, articles of association and shareholder agreement. Therefore, it is recommended 
for the court to start its investigations by asking whether the complained of conduct is in 
accordance with articles of association and shareholder agreement or not.433 In this regard, the 
Court of Appeal in Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & Ors 434  has rejected an appeal against the 
dismissal of a petition under s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 wherein the majority 
shareholders altered the articles of association to include “drag along” provisions requiring 
minority shareholders to sell their stake if the majority shareholder exited the company.435 The 
claimant Mr Arbuthontt claimed that the amendment to the articles of association was unfairly 
prejudicial to him as it forced him to sell his shares at a gross undervalue. The Court of Appeal 
                                                 
429 See Re A Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 237. 
430 Eg Kelly v Hussain [2008] EWHC 1117 (Ch). 
431 Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch 211; Richardson v Blackmore [2006] BCC 276. 
432 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, at 18. 
433 However, an alteration to a company’s article of association, even if passed by the requisite majority of 
shareholders, might be challenged as invalid in certain circumstances, see for example; Allen v Gold Reefs of West 
Africa Limited [1900] 1 Ch 656. 
434 [2015] EWCA Civ 536. 




in this case made a significant review of the law on this matter and dismissed the appeal on the 
ground that the original shareholders’ agreement already contained drag along provisions 
therefore, the alteration of the articles to contain a drag along was only an adjustment of an 
existing contractual right, rather than the introduction of new provisions. Besides, the Court of 
Appeal affirms that an amendment which harmfully affects one or more minority shareholders 
could not be nullified as long as it is proved that the alteration was made in good faith and in 
the interests of the company.436  Yet, It should be noted that providing enough evidence which 
confirms that the conduct was in accordance the company’s constitution and the relevant 
company laws is not a decisive evidence of the conduct being not “unfair”, as conduct could 
be a basis of unfair prejudice allegation even though it was lawful conduct.437 Such conduct is 
considered as unfair conduct and it can be unfairly prejudicial even if the Companies Act was 
not technically infringed by that conduct.438 
In O’Neill v Philips Lord Hoffmann confirmed that unfairness is present where there is breach 
of the rules or using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good 
faith.439 Consequently, unfairness occurs where the equitable considerations regard the conduct 
as unfair even though it was proved by the respondents that the terms on which they agreed 
that the affairs of the company should be run have not been breached, or that breach has 
happened when they were using their legal power.440   
It seems fair to conclude that determining whether conduct is unfair is a matter of fact which 
is considered along with the legal background of the relevant corporate structure which 
contains company’s articles of association and any shareholders’ agreements, hence, if that 
                                                 
436 See for example; D Crone, ‘Court of Appeal Rejects Unfair Prejudice Claim Based on Amendment to Drag-
Along Rights’[2015] Corporate Briefing 9. 
437 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14, at 19. 
438 See McGuinness v Bremner Plc [1988] BCLC 673. 
439 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
440 O’Neill v Philips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
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conduct is inequitable for the articles and the shareholders agreement that conduct is acceptable 
as a ground of petition. Furthermore, the unfairness can arise even if the conduct was in 
accordance with the articles and the shareholders agreement however it was enforced 
inequitably or it was proved that the articles and the shareholders agreement can be subject to 
the equitable principles. 441 Additionally, the court considers the conduct as an unfair conduct 
even if it is not acceptable as a ground of winding up remedy on the just and equitable basis 
under s. 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986.442 
Having seen that the right to petition under s. 994 is permissible whenever the petitioner’s legal 
rights were ignored or abused, moreover, the petition is allowed if such rights were not 
infringed but there was unfair use of power which abuses the enjoyment of those legal rights. 
What is more, s. 994 gives the shareholder a right to petition if the conduct was unfairly 
prejudicial to his or her “interests”, and its well-known that the interests is a wide expression 
that not only include the legal rights that are offered by the constitution of the company and 
the relevant company laws but also the legitimate expectations of each shareholder.443 In this 
context, it was stated in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc that the legitimate expectations rights 
arise out of a fundamental understanding among shareholders which formed the basis of their 
association, however, such understanding was not put into contractual form.444 By way of 
example, infringing the legitimate expectations of the shareholder to have a role in the 
management of the company grants him a right to seek relief under s. 994.445 Lord Wilberforce 
in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries446 stated that such expectations are usually found in small 
companies (quasi-partnership companies) as these kinds of companies are generally based on 
                                                 
441 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 975. 
442 In contrast see s. 210 of the Companies Act 1984, under which a conduct has to be such as would justify the 
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446 [1973] AC 360. 
104 
 
trust and mutual confidence.447 On the contrary, such expectations are less likely to be found 
in large public companies where the rights of each shareholder are contained in the company’s 
constitution and the relevant laws and there is less scope for legitimate expectations rights.  
The wider interpretation that was given to the term unfairly prejudicial conduct which 
encouraged the number of cases under s. 459 of the Companies Act 1985 to grow exponentially 
has been narrowed down by the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips where it was held that the 
concept of legitimate expectation is a concept which should be strictly interpreted and in 
accordance with traditional equitable principle.448 It was confirmed in the above case that a 
shareholder is not allowed to obtain remedy under s. 459 if the claim was only based on the 
fact that the relations between shareholders had broken down and they lost their mutual trust 
and confidence.449 Furthermore, it is claimed that it was clear from O’Neill v Phillips that the 
concept of legitimate expectation cannot stand alone as the basis of an application under s. 
994.450 
It seems understandable that ‘unfair prejudice’ is a wide term which includes the legitimate 
expectations in addition to strict legal rights, therefore, the courts in determining such conduct 
will not apply some open-ended notion of justice. Rather the surrounding circumstances in each 
case indicate whether the exercise of power or rights in question would involve a breach of an 
understanding or agreement between the parties which is considered against the concept of 
fairness.451 Such decisions by the courts should take into account the significant principles 
                                                 
447 The term of a quasi-partnership is not always clear, however, generally speaking the company is in a quasi-
partnership where there is a mutual trust and confidence in the relationship among its shareholders such as the 
relationship between member of a partnership, see Lord Wilberforce in the Ebrahimi case where he listed three 
typical elements of quasi-partnership companies; personal relationship and mutual confidence as the basis of their 
business association , understanding that all or certain shareholders will participate in management, and restriction 
on transfer member’s interests. 
448 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
449 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
450 C Wild and S Weinstein, Smith and Keenan's Company Law (16th edn, Harlow: Pearson Education 2013). 
451 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 975. 
105 
 
according to the developed and established equitable rules. The shareholders agreement or 
understanding could be a word or a conduct and do not have to be contractually binding in 
order to found the fairness.452 By way of example, non-payment of dividends and preventing a 
shareholder from receiving any return on his investment without acceptable justification is 
regarded as unfairly prejudicial conduct, particularly where some shareholders who are sitting 
as directors are taking monies for themselves by inflated fees. 453  Likewise if there is a 
legitimate expectation of the shareholder to participate in the company’s management and that 
shareholder was excluded from such participation that exclusion is considered as unfairly 
prejudicial conduct.454 For instance, in Re BC&G Care Homes Ltd: Crowley v Bessell455 it was 
held that the exclusion from management without a reasonable offer to buy the claimant out in 
circumstances where there is legitimate expectation of participation in management is generally 
regarded as one example of unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
In some cases the breach of a director’s fiduciary duties may constitute a ground for unfair 
prejudice where the controllers of the company diverted its business to another company which 
was controlled by the same majority or lined their pockets at the expense of the company and 
the petitioner. 456  It is not enough for the petitioner to show that the company is under 
mismanagement unless it is prolonged and coupled with exceptional circumstances.457 Other 
kinds of misconduct which may form the basis of a successful petition where the company is 
not really in need of further funds however, new shares were issued in an improper way to 
certain shareholders in order to squeeze out some other shareholders. Similarly, a shareholder 
                                                 
452 See O’Neill v Philips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, Re Guidezone Ltd [2000] BCLC 321. 
453 Grace v Biagioli [2006] 2 BCLC 70, Re McCarthy Surfacing Ltd [2009] BCC 464. 
454 See Oak Investment Partners XII, Limited Partnership v Bougthwood [2009] 1 BCLC 453, upheld by the Court 
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who has a legitimate right to be notified and may consulted on how the company’s business is 
run is entitled to petition if he or she was prevented from getting such information.458 In this 
regard, subsection (1) (a) of s. 994 has provided a detailed statutory ground of unfair prejudice 
arising from the inappropriate removal of a company’s auditor.459 The Law Commission also 
has listed some conduct which they considered as the most common ground of unfair prejudice 
allegations, which are; the diversion or misappropriation of the assets of the company, 
exclusion from management, the payment of excessive remuneration to directors and 
inadequate dividends to shareholders, failure by the majority to provide information regarding 
the way by which the company is run and the attempt by the majority to amend the articles of 
association for improper reasons.460 
In brief, in order to have a successful petition the petitioner has to persuade the court that the 
complained of conduct is both unfair and prejudicial.461 In so doing the court have to consider 
from an objective prospective the relevant circumstances in each individual case to satisfy the 
test of unfair prejudice.462 However, the fact the wrongdoer does not have the intention to act 
unfairly and prejudicially is not decisive of the matter, similarly, it is not sufficient to prove 
that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down and the company has 
become deadlocked and is unable to carry on its activity as trust and confidence between the 
shareholders no longer exists. As a result a petitioner must show that such breakdown was a 
result of unfairly prejudicial conduct.463 Such a petition can be based on past, present and future 
                                                 
458 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 977. 
459 See Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch). 
460 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Com No CP 142, 1996) para 7.2. 
461 See Nicholas v Soundcraft Electronics Ltd [1993] BCLC 360, Sikorski v Sikorski [2012] EWHC 1613 (Ch) 
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462 See Re R A Noble v Sons Ltd [ 1983] BCLC 273, Fisher v Cadman [ 2006] 1 BCLC 499, Wilson v Jaymarke 
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misconduct,464 however, in the case of future conduct the proposed misconduct must be at an 
early stage.465 In Re Kenyon Swansea Ltd,466 an injunction to restrain a shareholder meeting 
was issued by the court as the resolutions tabled at the meetings endeavoured to alter articles 
of association which would have been unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholders of the 
company. Nonetheless, convincing the court that the respondents’ conduct was unfairly 
prejudicial is not sufficient to gain the required remedy, as it was clear from s. 994(1)(a) that 
in order to obtain such remedy a petitioner has to prove that the conduct committed was conduct 
of the company’s affairs therefore it is the task of the next point to clarify such affairs.  
 3.4.2.2 The affairs of the company 
The conduct complained of must be conduct in the affairs of the company, which is a proposed 
act or omission by or on behalf of that company;467  such conduct does not have to be a 
continuing act or omission as long as it is apparent from the appropriate circumstances that the 
single conduct was unfairly prejudicial. No clear definition was produced to enlighten the 
concept of company’s affairs, however the case law has identified the term as “the acts done 
by the company or those authorized to act as its organs in the course of the company's 
business”.468 Consequently the "company's affairs" include not only the board’s decisions and 
resolutions of shareholders but also any conduct by the directors where they are acting on 
behalf of the company. Therefore, wrongdoings which are committed in the wrongdoer's 
personal capacity beyond the course of the company's business would not be considered as 
within a company's affairs.469 In the case of a group situation, conduct of the affairs of company 
                                                 
remedies under s. 122 the Insolvency Act and s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 in Hawkes v Cuddy (No2) [2009] 
EWCA Civ 291. 
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can in appropriate circumstances be a conduct of the affairs of another company for the purpose 
of the section. By way of example, the affairs of the subsidiary are considered the affairs of the 
parent and vice versa.470 In this context, it is important to distinguish between shareholders’ 
disputes concerning dealing with their shares in the sense of their private position as 
shareholders and acts or omissions which are unfair conduct in the company’s business. David 
Richards J in Re Coroin Ltd 471  made the point that in general terms, disputes between 
shareholders personally cannot be characterised as relating to the company’s affairs. So that 
the courts should differentiate between shareholders’ disputes concerning dealings with their 
shares in the sense of their private position as shareholders which are not accepted as ground 
of such petition and the acts or omissions which are unfair conduct in the company’s 
business.472 
The unfair prejudice petition was traditionally created to provide redress for personal wrongs, 
as corporate wrongs are remedied by the derivative action.473 In this vein, it was held in Re 
Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2) that corporate wrongs were not appropriate to be reviewed under 
the unfair prejudice petition,474 however it seems that the broad wording of the provisions and 
the wide discretion granted to the court made such a remedy more inclusive to cover the 
corporate wrongs as well. Therefore, it is discussed in the next point whether a member of a 
company can apply to the court by petition to obtain a substantive remedy for the company in 
relation to corporate wrongs. 
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3.4.2.3  The unfair prejudice remedy and corporate wrongs  
 As the expression of interests includes not only the personal wrongs but also corporate wrongs 
that may affect all members of the company.475 And since s. 996 grants the court the power to 
initiate a derivative claim and made the corporate relief a presumable consequence of an unfair 
prejudice petition,476 it was held in Clark v Cutland477 by the Court of Appeal that there was a 
wide discretion under s. 461 CA 1985 (s 996, CA 2006) to grant a substantive remedy for the 
company in relation to corporate wrongs based on directors’ breach of duties. So the unfair 
prejudice petition can be used to obtain either a personal or corporate relief.478 The same view 
was taken in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Ltd 479   where the minority 
shareholder brought a petition under s. 994 regarding a corporate wrong and the court accepted 
the petition and ordered the majority to pay damages to the company. Moreover, it was stated 
by Arden L.J in Clark v Cutland that as the petitioner sought corporate relief it is open to him 
to seek an order against the company for the costs that were incurred in proceedings.480 
Reisberg’s view does differ from that but he argued that granting an indemnity order to the 
petitioner should be available in the cases where it is proved that alleged conduct was a 
corporate wrong and the remedy sought is for the benefit of the company.481 Under such 
conditions, unless the scope of s. 994 is restricted to the personal wrongs only the complaints 
of corporate wrong would chose the unfair prejudice petition in order to save money and time 
and avoid the derivative action with its difficult procedures.482 Moreover, it is argued that it is 
                                                 
475 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) para 16.3. 
476 It will be discussed later in this section that it is within the court power to make an order and initiate derivative 
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unreasoned to keep these two separate remedies if they provide the same remedies for corporate 
wrongs.483 However, this view is criticised as each of these remedies has its own role and scope 
and they both exist to protect different interests.484 The use of the unfair prejudice remedy 
against corporate wrongs faced another criticism since it makes the classic distinction between 
the personal and corporate wrongs in such circumstances vague.485 Furthermore, allowing 
corporate wrongs to be remedied under s. 994 casts down the issue of having a lot of vexatious 
cases that only aim to curb the company’s business. Thus if the unfair prejudice petition is used 
to remedy corporate wrongs a filtering system should be applied by which malicious petitions 
would be avoided. Such a system would strike a balance between the interests of the 
shareholder and the interests of a company as a whole, and consequently prevents the abuse of 
unfair prejudice petition in the case of corporate relief.  
Under the unfair prejudice petition the court is given discretionary power to provide the 
aggrieved shareholders with a sufficient remedy. In that process, a shareholder is allowed to 
exit from the company by asking his shares to be bought at fair value. Furthermore, the buyout 
options not only the remedy that a court can offer to the aggrieved shareholder, as s. 996 gives 
the court a wide discretion to grant whatever relief it thinks appropriate. As a result, these 
sections considered to be the most critical sections that deal with the issues of shareholders 
rights and remedies in the Companies Act 2006. Thus the offered remedies under this way of 
protection are discussed in the following sub-section. 
                                                 
483 A Reisberg, ‘Shareholders' Remedies: In Search of Consistency of Principle of English Law’ (2005) 16(5) 
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 3.4.3 Remedies available under this jurisdiction   
No major changes were produced by s. 996 of the Companies Act 2006 (which replaced s. 461 
of the Companies Act 1985) in terms of the kinds of relief that are available to the petitioner 
who has been successful in petitioning the court alleging unfairly prejudicial conduct. 486 
However, it should be borne in mind that the developed case law under s. 461 is directly 
applicable to the existing section. Firstly, although there is no mention in s. 996 to the 
possibility of interim relief for the petitioner, nevertheless, it seems that it is within the power 
of the court to grant such a relief; hence, a petitioner should ask for such  relief to hold the ring 
through the period that the claim arrives to the trial.487 In so doing the petitioner may ask the 
court to preserve his right of access to information or restore the status quo ante in respect of 
conduct of which the petition was based. However, as stated above it is within the power of the 
court to grant the interim relief or refuse it.488 
At the final stage s. 996 (2) gives the court the discretionary power to grant the petitioner the 
appropriate relief it thinks fit. Under subsection (2) the courts may;  
“regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in the future; require the company to refrain from doing 
or continuing an act complained of, or to do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted to 
do; authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such person 
or persons and on such terms as the court may direct; require the company not to make any, or any 
specified, alterations in its articles without the leave of the court; provide for the purchase of the shares 
of any members of the company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a 
purchase by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly”.489 
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It should be noted that the above named remedies are just for example and it is not an exhaustive 
list, as the court is given the discretionary power to grant the petitioner the appropriate relief it 
thinks fit. Moreover, some of the above named remedies have not been used and some are less 
common and they were utilized in only exceptional cases. It seems from the above that the 
minority shareholder is allowed to commence a derivative action under s. 996, however as 
Hannigan argued it is less likely that an aggrieved shareholder who is able to obtain a direct 
personal remedy through s. 994 would ask the court for permission to commence a derivative 
action.490 Therefore, this alternative remedy has not been used to any great extent as separate 
proceedings need to be commenced with pleadings, harsh procedural hurdles and costs. Under 
these circumstances if a shareholder claims that a wrong done to the company it is better for 
him to establish a derivative claim instead of starting two sets of proceedings (unfair prejudice 
petition and derivative action) to obtain such a relief.491  The remedy of redirect the petition to 
initiate a derivative action in not practical remedy and has faced ruthless criticism, however, 
theoretically, it is within the discretion of the court to grant such remedy.  
As the main goal of such remedy is to bring justice to the petitioner, it was stated in Re Bird 
Precision Bellows Ltd492 that the court must assess the appropriateness of any particular remedy 
as at the date of hearing and not at the date of presentation of the petition and it may even take 
into account conduct which have happened between those dates. Therefore, the court is entitled 
to look at the reality and practicalities of the whole situation, past present and future. However, 
according to the Law Commission’ s survey, which was based on unfair prejudice cases, the 
most common and practical remedy is the exit option,493 where the court will issue an order by 
which the shares of the petitioner have to be purchased at fair value by the respondent or, in 
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some exceptional cases, by the company itself.494 On the other hand, in some exceptional cases 
it might be unfair to force the shareholder to leave the company therefore, it is within the power 
of the court to ask the respondent to sell his shares to the petitioner where it appears to the court 
that is the most appropriate remedy.495 In this regard, the court in Thomas v Dawson496 granted 
the petitioner an option to acquire the defendant's single share in their quasi-partnership 
company.497  
The remedy of buying out the petitioner’s shares at fair value either by the other shareholders 
or by the company raises some important issues which are essential to obtain the required 
justice. For instance, the valuation of shares for s. 996 Companies Act 2006 casts down the 
issue of whether the purchase will be in accordance with the articles, taking into account that 
several case suggest that the right to sell one’s shares under the articles is an alternative remedy 
when considering a just and equitable winding up petition under s.122 of the Insolvency Act 
1986. Another significant matter is considered in the shares’ valuation which is the fair value 
of the shares, as the shares in question have to be purchased at fair value. It is clear that the 
court is the body that determinates the fair value of the share in question taking into account 
that each case hinges very much upon its individual facts. The court will value the petitioner’s 
shares either on a pro rata basis where value of assets divided by percentage of shares held (Re 
Bird Precision Bellows)498 or at a discount basis (Grace v Biagioli)499, and the difference 
between these two ways of share valuation may be very substantial.500 
                                                 
494 Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222. 
495 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] Ch 419, at 429. 
496 [2015] EWCA Civ 706. 
497 See Re Nuneaton Borough FC Ltd [1991] BCC 4, Re Brenjield Squash Racquets Club Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 184, 
Oak Investment Partners XII, Limited Partnership v Boughtwood [ 2009] 1 BCLC 453 upheld by the Court of 
Appeal at [2010] EWCA Civ 23. 
498 [1984] BCLC 195, Nourse J fixed the price of a 26 per cent shareholding on a pro rate basis without discount 
for the fact that the shareholding was a minority shareholding. 
499 [2006] BCLC 70, at 96-97. 
500 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 980. 
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The unfettered discretion that is given to the court should be correctly exercised by the judges 
to fix a price to become fair in the all circumstances and in the exercise of its discretion it could 
take into account the merits of the case.501 In so doing the court will generally apply the pro 
rata formula if the company was a ‘quasi-partnership’,502 and will not discount the value of the 
shares on the ground that they are a minority shareholdings, even the market would apply such 
discount.503 On the other hand, if the quasi-partnership element was not seen in the company 
and the petitioner was a normal investor in the company the court will ignore the pro rata basis 
and apply the discount.504 Yet, it should be noted here that in some circumstances although the 
case of quasi-partnership is not existed, however, the surrounding facts and the principles of 
justice require that the valuation of the petitioner shares should be made on pro rate basis rather 
than applying the discount basis and vice versa.505 In this regard, it was confirmed by Robin 
Hollington QC in Re Blue Index Ltd that in valuing a petitioner shareholder's shares the 
fundamental principle was that it would be prejudicial to treat a wronged petitioner as a willing 
seller and discount the price accordingly, it would substantially defeat the purpose of this 
                                                 
501 See for example Thomas v Dawson & Anor [2015] EWCA Civ 706 where the petitioner appealed against the 
judge's grant of an option to acquire the defendant's single share in their quasi-partnership company for the sum 
of 55,000 in his claim for unfair prejudice. However, the court has dismissed the appeal on the ground that the 
judge has not departed from the broad scope of the statutory discretion afforded to him. 
502 See CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 where the Privy Council 
gave some guidance to the quasi-partnership company, in this case it is noted that the characteristics of such 
companies will typically include (i) that there is a business association formed or continued on the basis of a 
personal relationship of mutual trust and confidence;(ii) that there is an understanding or agreement that all or 
some of the shareholders should participate in the management of the business; and(iii) that there restrictions on 
the transfer of shares so that a member cannot realise his stake if he excluded from the business,  see also Re Bird 
Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] Ch 658; and compare Fowler v Gruber [2009] CSOH 36 where a company had 
ceased to be a quasi-partnership at relevant time. 
503 See Re BC&G Care Homes Ltd: Crowley v Bessell [2015] EWHC 1518 (Ch) where no minority discount was 
applied and the valuation date applied was before the claimant was excluded from management.   
504 See Strahan v Wilcock [2006] 2 BCLC 555, where a discount was applied as the company is not a quasi-
partnership and there are no exceptional circumstances to require pro rate valuation, also Re McCarthy Surfacing 
Ltd [2009] BCC 464 where a quasi-partnership has ceased prior to the application therefore, the discount was 
applied.   
505 See Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch).  
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remedy if the wrongdoer majority shareholders were routinely rewarded by a discount for a 
minority shareholding.506  
The share valuation issue raises another critical question which is the time of valuation, in this 
regard, it is noted that much the latest case law on share buyouts is focused on the appropriate 
date of valuation,507 for example, whether shares should be valuated as at prior to the conduct 
complained of or the time of the court order. The Court of Appeal in Profinance Trust SA v 
Gladstone508 has provided a comprehensive view on the appropriate time of shares valuation, 
and it made clear principle by which the proper time of valuation is the date of sale, however 
if it appears to the court that there is more appropriate date to value the share the court has the 
power to do so. By way of example, if it was proved that the business of the company has been 
reconstructed or the petition has been on foot for long period and there has been a general 
collapse in the market, the court in such circumstances might choose another earlier date to 
make an appropriate valuation. In this context, it was stated in Re OC (Transport) Services Ltd 
that the court may order a valuation of shares on the date on which the unreasonable conduct 
occurred.509  
In this situation where the respondent has offered an effective offer at fair value to buy the 
petitioner’s share and the petitioner has unjustifiable refused that offer the court has the power 
to strike out that petition. It is noted that the offer is an effective offer if; it offers a fair value 
(in quasi-partnerships it has to be basis on pro rata without and discount), if the parties have 
not agreed on the value, the respondent should offer to submit to a valuation by an independent 
expert acting as expert and not as arbitrator, the offer should provide for both parties to have 
                                                 
506 [2014] EWHC 2860 (Ch), at 26. This a view was further confirmed by Edward Bartley Jones QC in Re Addbins 
Ltd [2015] EWHC 3161 (Ch). 
507 See Re Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch), Groly v Good [2010] EWHC 1 (Ch), Re 
Sctoitec Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1830 (Ch) and DiGrade v D’Angelo (Re Abbington Hotel Ltd) [2011] EWHC 
635 (Ch). 
508 [2002] 1 BCLC 141, see also Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch). 
509 [1984] BCLC 251. 
116 
 
equal rights to information about the company and to make submission to the expert, and in 
the case where the court has slowly responded to the petitioner’s complaints , the court’s claim 
should contain an offer to pay the costs incurred by the petitioner is pursuing the complaints.510  
However, it could be argued that in some circumstances even where the above conditions were 
present the respondent’s offer will not be an effective offer.511  For instance, the offer will not 
be effective where the petitioner does not want to leave the company and prefer to buy the 
respondent’ share rather than selling his shares and being forced out from the company.512 In 
this context, in O’Neill v Philips Lord Hoffmann has confirmed that if the petitioner was 
complaining that he was prevented from using the right of participating in the company’s 
management and the respondent has offered the petitioner a rational offer, then the exclusion 
as such is not considered as unfair conduct and the responded has the right to ask for a striking 
out the petition.513 Having said that the aim of such remedy is to bring justice, therefore parties 
are allowed to settle the unfair prejudice outside the court. However, such settlements do not 
always end litigation as one party might be unhappy with the value that determined by the 
expert, therefore he or she will go to court to get that valuation set aside. For example in Begum 
v Hossain514 the valuation of the expert was set aside as the valuer had not followed his mandate 
in that he failed to consider relevant information given to him.515 As a final point, although s. 
996 of the Companies Act has not referred to the winding up remedy under such a petition 
however, more recently Hildyard J in Apex Global Management Ltd v FI Call Ltd516 has 
confirmed the willingness of the court to have recourse to the winding up remedy on just and 
                                                 
510 O’Neill v Philips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
511 Isaacs v Belfield Furnishing Ltd [2006] EWHC 183 (Ch). 
512 Oak Investment Partners XII, Limited Partnership v Boughtwood [2010] EWCA Civ 23. 
513 O’Neill v Philips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 110, In the case of appointing an independent expert to make the 
valuation, the court should not place too many restrictions which curb the valuer from exercise his discretion 
properly see Oak Investment Partners XII, Limited Partnership v Boughtwood [2010] EWCA Civ 23. 
514 [2015] EHCA Civ 717. 
515 D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 
4. 
516 [2015] EWHC 3269 (Ch). 
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equitable grounds in an appropriate set of circumstances. 517  In short, the unfair prejudice 
remedy has come to be a ‘way out’ or ‘exit’ remedy and ensures that the aggrieved shareholders 
have the right to seek a buyout order to leave the company with proper compensation.518 
3.4.4 Conclusion  
 A remedy under s. 210 of the Companies Act was hard to attain, as it was only permitted in a 
very limited situations, therefore, many demands were made for removing such artificial 
limitations that prevented shareholders from obtaining appropriate relief.519  In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s a wider interpretation was given to the term of unfairly prejudicial conduct 
which not only meant rights enjoyed strictly qua member in the narrow sense of a term but also 
the legitimate expectations of a shareholder to participate in management. This wider view 
made the number of cases under s. 459 of the Companies Act 1985 (s. 994 Companies Act 
2006) grow exponentially, however, the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips narrowed down 
this concept again and it was decided that the legitimate expectations is concept which should 
be strictly interpreted and in accordance with traditional equitable principle.520 It has been seen 
that no substantial change was made in this issue by s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 except 
some minor stylistic modifications. The Companies Act 2006 like the previous Companies 
Acts has not provided a clear explanation of the concepts of unfairness and prejudice therefore, 
the uncertainties that faced the related parties and courts under s. 459 of the 1985 Companies 
Act remain under s. 994.521  It is argued that a clear guidance and criteria should have been 
adopted which would remove the deficiency and uncertainties and would develop the law in 
                                                 
517 D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 
4. 
518 The judiciary’s reliance on exit option in s. 994 has not escaped criticisms as the company and other shareholder 
will not be protected from the harm of the wrongdoing majority, see eg R Redmond-Cooper, ‘Management 
Deficiencies and Judicial Intervention: A Comparative Analysis’ (1988) 9(8) Company Lawyer 169. 
519 See Re A Company (No 004475 of 1982) [1983] Ch 178. 
520 1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
521 R Goddard, ‘The Unfair Prejudice Remedy’ (2008) 12(1) Edinburgh Law Review 94. 
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this area. On the other hand, with the broad scope of the unfair prejudice remedy and the wide 
discretion given to the courts to grant the remedy that they think fit such as; regulating the 
affairs of the company, or require the company to refrain from action, or ordering an injunction 
or derivative action, or most significantly providing buyout order, and with the problems 
associated with the derivative action the unfair prejudice remedy continues to be the most 
popular and powerful means that minority shareholders can use to obtain their relief under 
English laws. The unfair prejudice remedy is considered to be an intermediate remedy as it 
does not involve the winding up of the company in contrast with the winding up remedy under 
s. 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 where the live of the company will be ended by such 
extreme remedy. 
3.5 Just and Equitable winding up remedy and its relationship with the unfair prejudice 
remedy  
In addition to above mentioned remedies, minority shareholder under English law has a right 
to go to the court to request an order to wind up the company if it is just and equitable that the 
company be wound up (s. 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986). 522  Under this remedy 
dissatisfied shareholder can seek an order to have the company wound up if it is proved that 
the so-called substratum of its business no longer existed.523 However, it is within the discretion 
of the court to examine whether it is just and equitable to have the company be wound up or 
refused such request. The House of Lords in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries524 stated the 
company was based on personal relationship (Quasi Partnership), therefore preventing Mr 
Ebrahimi from using his legitimate expectations to participate in the management of the 
                                                 
522 This right was derived from the common law of partnership, see for example H Rajak, Sourcebook of Company 
Law (2nd edn, Jordans, Bristol 1995), at 534. 
523 It should be noted that there is no need to such an order if the dissatisfied shareholders are the majority 
shareholder as s. 84 of the Insolvency Act 1986 grants them a right to pass a special resolution for voluntary 
winding up. 
524 [1973] AC 360. 
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company makes the winding up of the company is just and equitable. More recently in Harding 
v Edwards525 as there was no other solution Rose J has granted a petition to wind up the 
company on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so.526 On the other hand, in Re Quiet 
Moments Ltd527 the court refused to grant a winding up remedy on the just and equitable ground 
as it could not be said that the first respondent was to blame for the breakdown of trust and 
confidence within the company.528 
As such a remedy is drastic remedy which breaks up the live of the company, s. 125 (2) of the 
Insolvency Act provided that if the court of the opinion that the petitioners have another remedy 
to pursue or the petitioner was acting inappropriately in seeking such remedy the petition 
should be refused. What is more, in practice, it is not easy for the petitioner to convince the 
court that he or she was behaving reasonably to have the company wound up instead of seeking 
any other remedy.529 In that process, the petitioner has to prove that there is no other remedy 
available and it is just and equitable to wind up this entity, whereas granting a remedy under s. 
994 is dependent on whether the petitioner has succeeded to show that the unfair prejudice 
conduct was established or not.530 Under s. 210 of the Companies Act 1948 in order for the 
petitioner to obtain relief against oppression he had to establish that it would have been just 
and equitable to wind up the company. However, the above condition is no longer required as 
s. 75 of the Companies Act 1980 removed that requirement. Consequently, as discussed above, 
a petitioner shareholder who seeks a relief under s. 994 is not required to show that it is just 
and equitable to wind up the company. Likewise, winding up the company under s. 122 (1) (g) 
for just and equitable reasons is permissible even if the shareholder failed to satisfy the unfair 
                                                 
525 [2014] EWHC 247 (Ch). 
526 Two other grounds for the just and equitable winding up remedy which are: Oppression and Deadlock see Lock 
v John Blackwood [1924] AC 783, Re Yenidie Tobacco Co Ltd [1935] All ER Rep 803. 
527 [2013] EWHC 3806 (Ch). 
528 D Milman, ‘Shareholder Law: Recent Developments in Practice’ (2015) 378 Company Law Newsletter 1, at 
5. 
529 A Boyle and J Birds and Others, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (9th edn Jordans, Bristol 2014). 
530 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 977. 
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prejudice test.531 In this regard, the court should bear in mind that the winding up remedy is a 
drastic remedy which ends the company’s existence. Therefore, such remedy should be refused 
in the circumstances where it appears to the court that there is no a deadlock in the company’s 
affairs and the petitioner shareholder is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company 
wound up instead of asking for other less extreme remedy either under s. 994 or using the 
derivative claim tool.532 To avoid the overlap between the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
winding up remedy, which has created some uncertainties, the Law Commission in 1997 
suggested that the winding up remedy should be added to the s. 459 of the CA 1985 (s. 994 CA 
2006).533 However, this proposal was refused on the ground that such reform would make the 
winding up remedy an easy option that damaging the company’s business and reputation, 
furthermore opening such door for the shareholder would have adverse effect of the business 
activities as a whole.534  It seems that there is a reluctance to apply this extreme remedy as the 
court prefers to order a minority shareholder to be bought out, rather than a company being 
wound up. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter was allocated to assess the protection of minority shareholder under English law. 
It seems obvious that the minority shareholders were facing many difficulties in the common 
law rule (Foss v Harbottle and its exceptions) as such rules were so complicated. Therefore 
there were high demands which requested the reform of these tools of protection. A new 
statutory derivative action was introduced in the Companies Act 2006 under which the court is 
allowed to accept the claim in broad scope of misconduct and not only the fraud, moreover, 
                                                 
531 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013), at 977. 
532 S. 125 of the Insolvency Act, 1986. see also  Shah v Shah [ 2010] EWHC 313 (Ch), for more discussion in the 
interface between the unfair prejudice jurisdiction and the winding-up jurisdiction see the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Hawkes v Cuddy (No 2) [2009] EWCA Civ 291. 
533 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) paras 4.24-4.49. 
534  DTI, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Document (DTI URN 98/994 Nov 1998) paras 4.26-4.27. 
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under this Act it is within the power of the court to grant permission to proceed an action after 
the filtering system to ensure the desirability of the claim. On the other hand, it is also notably 
that the new statutory derivative action is not the most preferred action for the minority 
shareholder as its long procedures, costs and time made the unfair prejudice remedy prevail 
over the derivative action. Furthermore, it was seen that the common law derivative claim was 
not entirely abolished by the Companies Act 2006 as recent decisions affirmed that Part 11 of 
the Companies Act 2006 did not apply to double derivative actions. Therefore, the common 
law rules of derivative actions continued to apply to the double derivative claims. To avoid 
such a kind of uncertainty and to stop the messiness of the common law derivative claim it was 
suggested that Parliament should take the other common law countries’ position where the 
scope of the statutory derivative action extended to include the double derivative actions. 
In terms of the unfair prejudice remedy, although the O’Neill v Phillips has restricted the scope 
of such a remedy, however it remains the most favoured remedy with its easier requirements 
to meet and with its effectiveness to remedy a broad scope of wrongs. The courts are given 
extensive discretion in determining the unfair prejudice conduct and due to the broad 
interpretation was granted to it to contain not only the unlawful conduct but also the lawful 
inequitable conduct, therefore, the unfair prejudice remedy has developed in English law and 
become the most popular remedy for minority shareholder, in particular for those in quasi-
partnership companies. That is to say, due to the broad scope of this remedy and due to the 
complex procedures in derivative action and the extremist result of winding-up remedy the 
unfair prejudice remedy is the most practical remedy that shareholder can pursue to obtain a 
relief. Having said that the main goal of this work is to examine to what extent the Libyan 
regime of minority shareholder protection provides an equal level of protection to that found 
in the other selected regimes (English and Moroccan Laws), therefore, following an 
examination of the main tools of protection under English laws, it is the job of the next chapter 
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to study the position under Moroccan laws to consider the protection tools that are available 
under such regime. The examination of these systems would grant the researcher a chance to 
















Chapter 4   Protection of minority shareholders in Morocco 
4.1 Introduction  
Libya and Morocco are both North African Countries and their legal systems are considered as 
Civil Law Systems as their laws have been influenced inter alia by Roman law through the 
modern French Civil Code (Code Napoleon). Moreover, since the above countries are Islamic 
countries and Islam is the official religion of the nations, their legal systems have been 
influenced by the principles of Islamic law. In Morocco it was noticeable from the early 1990s 
that the area of company law has been given a great attention by the Moroccan legislature 
therefore, many Acts that govern the business activities in Morocco were reformed.535 Such 
Acts were introduced to encourage domestic and foreign investors to set up their businesses in 
Morocco. Furthermore it was claimed that the focus has mainly been on creating a business 
environment where the interest of all shareholders is respected and where all shareholders 
inside those companies are treated equally.536 In so doing, the latest Companies Acts have 
devoted a remarkable level of attention to the interests of minority shareholders and tools that 
protect their interests.537 For the above reasons, the Moroccan Law was chosen as one of the 
comparator jurisdictions to examine the level of protection that is provided under this 
jurisdiction and to provoke thought about what can be learned from Morocco’s experience by 
the Libyan legislature. 
However, for the purpose of illustration, and before proceeding any further, it would be useful 
to have a brief introduction regarding Companies laws in Morocco and presents types of 
                                                 
535 See for example, The Joint Stock Companies Act, (JSC Act) which was issued on 2 June 1996 (Act No 17.95). 
Act No 5.96 which was issued on 7 January 1997 which relates to the General Partnership, Limited Partnership, 
Limited Partnership by Shares, with Limited Liability Companies, and the Participation in Association. 
536 A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 




Companies and partnerships that are allowed to undertake business activities in that 
jurisdiction.  
4.2 General background   
As Morocco was under The French Protectorate,538 the French Companies Act that was issued 
on 24 July1876 (and its adjustments in 1893, 1903, 1913 and 1943) was applied in Morocco 
by the Act issued on 11 August 1922. Under ss. 30-51 and 52 of the above Act the types of 
companies and partnerships that were allowed to undertake business activities in Morocco are; 
General Partnership (Sharikat Tadhamun), Limited Partnership )Sharikat Tawsiyah Baseeth), 
Participation in Association or Joint venture (Sarikat Almahasa), Joint Stock Company 
(Sharikat al Mosahamh) and Limited Partnership by Shares (Sharikat Tawsiyah Belashum(.539 
In addition to the above kinds of Companies and Partnerships, the Moroccan legislature 
adopted another kind of company in September 1926 which is the Limited Liability Company 
(Sharikat that Massoliyah Mahdoda) which also was governed by the French Act that was 
issued on 7 of March 1925.540 
The above Acts that governed business activities in Morocco for long period of time (1922-
1996) were abolished when new Acts were introduced in 1996 and 1997. These Acts are; the 
Joint Stock Companies Act, (JSC Act 1996) which was issued on 2 June 1996 (Act No 17.95), 
and Act No 5.96 which was issued on 7 January 1997 which relates to the General Partnership, 
Limited Partnership, Limited Partnership by Shares, with Limited Liability Companies, and 
                                                 
538 The French Protectorate in Morocco was established by the Treaty of Fez which  existed from 1912, when 
a protectorate was formally established, until Moroccan independence (1956), and consisted of the area of 
Morocco between the Corridor of Taza and the Draa River. 
539 It should be borne in mind that prior to that time Morocco, as Islamic country knew all kind of Islamic 
Commercial companies such as Sharikat Almozara, Sharikat Almodarba, Sharikat Alkrad and so on. For more 
details, see A Alsbaii, Companies and Economic Interest Groups (Deep Study in the New Companies Acts No 
5.96 and 17.95 and the Adjustments Made by 13.97 Act that Relates to Economic Benefit Groups (2nd edn, Part 1, 
Dar Nashar Almarefa Rabat 2009), at 12. See also F Zakani, Joint Stock Companies in Sharia and law (1st edn, 
Dar Alnefas, Amman 2012).   
540 As will be discussed in the Libyan chapter the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 has the same kinds of these 
Companies and Partnerships.  
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the Participation in Association. The JSC Act was amended on May 2008 by the Act No 
20.05,541 also the Act No 5.96 amended by the Act No 21.05 on 14 February 2006.  As a result, 
these two Acts and their amendments govern companies and partnerships in Morocco. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the Act of Contracts and Obligations 1913542 is 
applied to such companies and partnerships where the provisions of the above Acts are not 
applicable.543 
Generally speaking, companies in Morocco are classified into three main types; the first type 
are the Civil Companies, in this regard, a company is considered as a civil company if its 
purpose is to pursue non trade activities, furthermore, such companies should not take one of 
the six provided forms of trading companies. Second; the joint venture (association in 
participation),which is classified as trading company when it makes trading activities, while it 
is considered as a civil company if its activities are none trade activities.544 Thirdly, the trading 
companies, which are the five provided forms that mentioned above, and they are considered 
as trading companies even if their purpose is to make non-trade activities. These forms are the 
General Partnership (ss. 3-18  Act No 5.96), Limited Partnership (ss. 19-30 Act No 5.96), 
Limited Partnership by Shares (ss. 31-43 Act No 5.96), Limited Liability Company (ss. 44 -87 
Act No 5.96) and the Joint Stock Companies (ss. 1- 454 of Act No 17.95 which was amended 
by the Act No 20.05  in 2008).545 
Having said that, the law determines forms of commercial companies; therefore, any 
commercial company should take one of the above named corporate or partnership forms. In 
                                                 
541 See, Law of Commercial Companies (1st edn, Dar Alenmaa Altakafi Rabat 2010). 
542 The Contracts and Obligations Act, 1913.  
543See A Alsbaii, Companies and Economic Interest Groups (Deep Study in the New Companies Acts No 5.96 and 
17.95 and the Adjustments Made by 13.97 Act that Relates to Economic Benefit Groups (2nd edn, Part 1, Dar 
Nashar Almarefa, Rabat 2009), at 36. 
544 Act No 5.96, ss. (2) (89). 
545 See A Alsbaii, Companies and Economic Interest Groups (Deep Study in the New Companies Acts No 5.96 
and 17.95 and the Adjustments Made by 13.97 Act that Relates to Economic Benefit Groups (2nd edn, Part 2, Dar 
Nashar Almarefa Rabat 2009), at 288-289. 
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this vein, it should be borne in mind that the Moroccan legislature does not differentiate 
between partnerships and corporations, therefore, all commercial associations that are 
mentioned in the Above Acts are called companies and all these forms of companies and 
partnerships enjoy a legal personality except the joint venture.546 
It is clear that the most important species out of these commercial companies and partnerships 
is the Joint Stock Company, since it is the purest type of capitalized company that stands at the 
other end of scale from the partnership. The Joint Stock Company is defined as a company 
whose capital is divided into shares and the liability of its shareholders is limited to the par 
value of their shares.547 It is a legal entity (juristic person) created under statutory authority and 
has the powers, limitations, and characteristics provided for in the statutes. It is entirely separate 
from its shareholders, directors and employees. The liability of each shareholder is limited to 
the value of the shares to which he has subscribed. Consequently, shareholders are not liable 
for the debts or obligations of the company beyond the said value of their share. This separate 
existence is the basis of the most important attraction of the corporate form for joint investment. 
Therefore, the Moroccan legislature gives it a separate Act and more than four hundred 
sections. 
The Joint Stock Company in Morocco as in many Civil Law countries, may be either a public 
company (listed company) which offers its shares and debt securities to the public through 
public subscription, 548  or a private company (closed Joint Stock Company, non-listed 
company), where its shares are entirely subscribed by its promoters and cannot offer its shares 
for public subscriptions. Since this study is examining the protection of minority shareholder 
                                                 
546 S. 7 of the JSC Act 1996 and s. 2 of the Act No 5.96. 
547 This concept is very common and well known in most current legal systems. For example, s. 2 of the Egyptian 
Act No 159/1981 defines a joint stock company as a:"Company whose capital is divided into shares of equal 
values; such shares being transferable in the manner provided for in the law". 




in such kind of firms, this chapter will examine the protection of minority shareholders in the 
Closed Joint Stock Company in Morocco in order to consider the level of protection under such 
a jurisdiction in order to extrapolate lessons that might enhance the Libyan level of minority 
shareholder protection. 
Having illustrated that such kind of companies are controlled by the majority shareholders via 
the general meeting and the board of directors, therefore, the Moroccan legislature in the JSC 
Act 1996 tried to adopt an effective system that maintain good relationships among the 
shareholders and protect the interests of the minority shareholders. Such a system and 
protection aim to create a business environment that allows local and foreign investors pursue 
their role within the company. In this regard, minority shareholders are given legal rights and 
tools that enable them to impose effective supervision over the controllers of the company. 
Such mechanisms would create a necessary balance that reduces the potential for abusive 
misconduct by majority shareholders and offer an appropriate remedy to minority shareholders.  
The protection of minority shareholders under the JSC Act 1996 takes many different forms, 
such as strengthening the rights of minority shareholders, and grants them some mechanisms 
to boost the supervision tools. For instance, the statutory auditors have been given sufficient 
power to make certain that the board of directors and the majority shareholders do not further 
their own interest and to ensure that all shareholders are treated equally.549 Additionally, in 
terms of corporate governance and management, the above Act adopts a new structure of 
management where there are two types of Joint Stock Companies; first the joint stock company 
which is controlled by one board of directors (ss. 39 to 76). Second, the joint stock company 
that is managed by two different boards (ss. 77- 106 based on the German model which was 
                                                 
549 S. 166 of the JSC Act 1996. See A Alsbaii, Companies and Economic Interest Groups (Deep Study in the New 
Companies Acts No 5.96 and 17.95 and the Adjustments Made by 13.97 Act that Relates to Economic Benefit 
Groups (2nd edn, Part 3, Dar Nashar Almarefa Rabat 2012), at 48. 
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adopted in France550 and consequently in Morocco). In the second type there are two boards, 
the executive board formed by natural persons (maximum of 5 or 7 if the company is listed) 
which principally in charge of the management of the company, and the Supervisory Board551 
(minimum 3 persons) which is principally in charge of the supervision and control of the 
executive board’s management.552 The aim of having such organ is to impose some sort of 
supervision over the board of directors, however as the members of the supervisory board are 
usually appointed and isolated by the general meeting553 they fall under the control of the 
majority shareholders. Moreover, Rabia Gait claimed that this innovation has not worked well 
in Morocco as most of the joint stock companies are owned by small numbers of shareholders, 
therefore the members of the supervisory board are themselves the members of the board of 
directors.554 In other words, as long as the majority shareholders control the general meeting 
they still have the power to take decisions that might damage the interests of other shareholders 
and the company as a whole.555 Consequently, it becomes necessary for a minority shareholder 
to find a way to invoke judicial authority to ensure that the interest of minority shareholders is 
considered and to obtain a remedy in the case of misuse. 556  That is to say, although 
strengthening minority shareholders’ rights and creating effective supervision tools inside the 
company enhances the level of protection to the minority shareholders, however these 
                                                 
550 In France, since 1966 companies are allowed to choose between a one-tier or a two-tier board structure which 
consists of a management board that manages the firm's operations, plus a separate supervisory board that excludes 
managers and is charged with overseeing the firm's activities, including the appointment and monitoring of 
corporate managers. See F Belot and others, 'Freedom of Choice between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An 
Empirical Analysis' (2014) 112 (3) Journal of Financial Economics 364, at 364. 
551 S. 84 of the JSC Act 1996 provides that each member of this board has to be a shareholder in the company. 
552 S. 1 of the JSC Act provides that the minimum numbers of shareholders are five. Also s. 6 of the same Act 
provides that; the minimum capital stock is three Million Moroccan Dirham for listed companies and three 
hundred thousand for non-listed companies.   
553 See s. 80 of the JSC Act, 1996. For more details see R Gait, ‘Shareholder’s Position in the Joint Stock 
Company’ (Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 2004), at 181-182. 
554 R Gait, ‘Shareholder’s Position in the Joint Stock Company’ (Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 
2004), at 190. 
555A Admolod, ‘the Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Right in the Joint Stock Company’ (2013) 19 November 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 11 March 2014. 
556 T Albakti, ‘The Role of Judicial Authority to Protect the Minority Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company’ 
(2013) 110 The Moroccan Journal of Local Management and Development 139, at 139. 
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preventative tools are not sufficient as there are other kinds of misconduct which cannot be 
expected by the minority shareholders. Furthermore, some kinds of disagreements among the 
shareholders reach a deadlock which makes the winding up of that company necessary.557 
Therefore, remedial mechanisms have to be adopted either by granting the minority 
shareholders the appropriate relief or by liquidating the subject company. In this regard, this 
chapter will consider the protection tools that are offered to the minority shareholders in 
Morocco in order to propose a reform in the Libyan law of minority shareholder protection. It 
is divided into two main sections; the first section focuses upon the preventative mechanisms 
by which specific rights and supervision tools are given to serve the interests of minority 
shareholders and limit the possibility of misuse by the majority shareholders. The second 
section deals with the remedial approach when actions are proceeded with by the minority 
shareholder to stop the abusive conducts, or to obtain an appropriate relief.558 This section 
examines to what extent the rules governing the remedial approach are able to offer sufficient 
relief to the aggrieved minority shareholders. Such a discussion will be concluded by a brief 
overview which represents similarities and differences between the Moroccan and English 
systems of minority shareholders protection.  
4.3 The protection of minority shareholder via specific rights and supervision tools (the 
preventative mechanism) 
The Moroccan legislature, as with other legislatures, provides the minority shareholders with 
some rights and tools that enable them to exercise some sort of supervision over the board of 
                                                 
557 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 110. 
558 Some of the Moroccan scholars divide the protection of minority shareholders into a statutory protection (as 
we call it a preventative mechanism) and a judiciary protection (which we call a remedial route) the reason behind 
adopting such a division, it is believed that both types of protections are statutory protection as both came from 
the statute and it is believed that this division is more sensible.  
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directors, the general meetings and the statutory auditors.559 The aim of giving such rights and 
supervision tools is to decrease the risk of expected abusive conduct instead of a remedy that 
regulates conduct later on. In addition to that, these ex ante legal tools and mechanisms would 
allow the minority shareholders to participate in the company’s day to day management.560 
This sort of protection applies through specific rights that are granted to each shareholder, so 
that he or she is able to monitor the activity of the company. However, as shareholders do not 
always have the time and experience to make an effective supervision, it was necessary to have 
other organs such as the statutory auditors to do such a job. Furthermore, the JSC Act 1996 has 
created a new form of supervision where a shareholder is allowed to ask the court to appoint a 
judicial expert to consider one or some issues that may affect the interests of such a 
shareholder. To examine the preventative approach under Moroccan law this section is divided 
into two subsections; the first examines how some specific rights strengthen the position of the 
minority shareholders inside the company, while the second discusses the effectual tools that 
control the majority power within the company. 
4.3.1 Strengthening the position of minority shareholder by enhancing their rights  
To increase the level of protection the Moroccan Legislature has provided the minority with 
some rights such as having enough information regarding the company’s decision and their 
right to attend and call the general meetings. 
4.3.1.1 Shareholder’s right to obtain information  
First and foremost, to ensure that a shareholder participates in the company’s decisions he or 
she has right to attend the general meetings of that company, therefore, s.122 of the JSC Act 
                                                 
559A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 12 March 2014. 
560 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 225. 
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1996 asks the controllers of the company to inform shareholders for the next general meeting 
in at least fifteen days before that meeting. Furthermore, s. 125 provides that; it is within the 
discretion of the court to render void a general meeting that was called without such processes, 
unless all the shareholders have attended that meeting.561 In this regard, the Court of Appeal in 
Paris 562  has set aside a general meeting that was called without inviting the claimant 
shareholder. In its judgment the court considered that the shareholder’s right to attend and 
participate in the company’s decision was breached therefore that meeting was void. 563 
However, it is not enough to give a shareholder a right to be informed or to attend the general 
meeting without having sufficient information regarding the agendas of that meeting. Thus, a 
shareholder should have a right to see the relevant documents on a timely and regular basis, by 
which means he or she would be able to participate in the company’s management. 
In that process, ss. 140 and 141 of the JSC Act provide that it is a right of each shareholder to 
have all the required information either from the day of calling the meeting or at least fifteen 
days before the next scheduled meeting. Section 141 lists the information that needs to be 
obtained by each shareholder such as; the agenda of the next meeting and the reasons for having 
such agenda, the financial statements, the members of board of directors and the supervisory 
board and the candidate shareholders to the board, the reports of the statutory auditors, the 
supervisory board and so on.564 Determining the agendas of the general meeting prevents the 
controllers of the company from adding or dropping out any new points in that meeting. If the 
controllers of the company are allowed to discuss new agenda points some abusive decisions 
might be taken with no consideration to the interests of other absence shareholders. In the 
                                                 
561 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 238. 
562 Having seen in the introduction of this chapter that French company law is influential in Morocco. 
563 Paris 26/ March 1986 cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, 
Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 241. 
564 See ss. 142-142 of the JSC Act, 1996 and its amendments in 2008.  
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private joint stock company this obligation is on the organ who called the meeting while in the 
public joint stock company it is compulsory for the controllers of the company in thirty days 
before the called general meeting to publish in the Official Gazette a summary of the statutory 
auditor’s report and all the required information.  
In addition to the shareholders’ right to have information before the general meetings, s. 146 
of the JSC Act 1996 grants each shareholder a right to have all the information that is listed in 
s.141 at any time. Such right allows each shareholder to have all information that related to the 
last three financial years in addition to the information that relates to the general meeting of the 
past year. Moreover, s. 147 allows a shareholder to take a copy of those documents as he might 
need to consult a specialized person regarding one or some issues, also s. 157 grants a 
shareholder a right to delegate a proxy to practice the right that is given by ss. 141-145-146. If 
a shareholder was prevented from such information either totally or partially, s. 148 grants that 
shareholder a right to petition the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court to issue an order 
that obligates the company to give the petitioner shareholder all the required information.565 
With such an order, the court issues a daily fine for the delay in granting the shareholder the 
listed information.566 Moreover, s. 392 of the JSC Act 1996 imposed a fine on the controllers 
of the company from 8000 to 40000 Moroccan Dirham (equivalent to 540 to 2704 GBP) if they 
do not comply with the above sections.  
However, it should be noted here that the petition in such circumstances is conditioned on 
proving that the petitioner shareholder has tried to get that information from the subject 
company, nevertheless he or she failed to obtain that information. In this regard, the President 
of the Commercial Court of Rabat stated that as there was no evidence which confirmed that 
                                                 
565  S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 28. 
566 S. 148 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
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the petitioner and his consultant have tried to obtain that information, therefore this petition 
had to be refused.567 
It seems that the aim of the above sections is to protect the minority shareholders, as the 
majority shareholders are usually the controllers of the company (or in a good relationship with 
those controllers), therefore, they are able to obtain that information at any time. Furthermore, 
no specific percentage is required therefore each shareholder can petition the court for the 
above reason. The right to obtain information is a public policy right, thus any previous 
agreement that denies the shareholder’s right to have that information is deemed a void 
agreement. 
4.3.1.2 Shareholder’s right to call the general meetings or to include specific items on the 
agenda  
The general meeting is the organ that makes the strategy of the company and that makes most 
of decisions to implement such strategies. Such a meeting is usually called by an invitation 
from the board of directors or the supervisory board. Yet, to allow a shareholder to participate 
in the company’s decisions he or she has to be granted a right to attend and call the general 
meeting. In these circumstances, if neither the board of directors nor the supervisory board 
have invited the general meeting, s. 116 of JSC Act enables a shareholder or groups of 
shareholders who hold at least 10% of the shares or lees than this percentage in the case of 
urgency to go to the court to appoint a judicial proxy to invite the general meeting to be 
convened.568 Prior to the enactment of the JSC Act 1996, the Commercial Court of Agadir has 
                                                 
567 See the Commercial Court of Rabat, an urgent case No 278, file No 250/9/2011, issued on 11/04/2011, 
(unpublished), see also the same court in the urgent case No 151, file No 126/09/2010 issued on 22/02/2010, cited 
in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 28, see also T Albakti, ‘The role of judicial authority to protect 
the minority shareholders in the Joint Stock Company’ (2013) 110 The Moroccan Journal of Local Management 
and Development 139, at 148. 
568  S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 13. 
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appointed a judicial proxy according to a minority shareholder’s request who asked the general 
meeting to take place and listed his required points on its agenda.569 In this case, it was clear 
from the company’s documents that the company had not been invited to hold a general 
meeting for more than one year; therefore, the court decided that it is the right for those 
shareholders to petition the court to protect their rights.570 
After 1996, under s.116 of the JSC Act a shareholder is allowed to petition the Presiding judge 
of the Commercial Court as judge sitting in chambers to deal with matters of urgency to appoint 
a judicial proxy who invites the general meetings to take place. To apply this section the court 
has to ascertain that the board of directors and the supervisory boards were not willing to invite 
the general meeting to such an event and the number of claimant shareholders forms at least 10 
percent of the company’s capital unless it is proved that it is an urgent case.571 In this context, 
the Commercial Court of Appeal in Fez upheld the decision of the Commercial Court of 
Tangier, 572 when it had appointed a judicial proxy to invite the general meeting to take place. 
The Court of Appeal justified its decision by saying that s. 116 of the JSC Act provided that it 
is a right for a shareholder to petition the court to appoint a proxy who will invite the general 
meeting in the case where neither the board of directors nor the supervisory board have invited 
the general meeting to take place.573 Section 116 of the JSC Act has not escaped criticism as it 
is not easy to muster 10% percent of shareholders practically in the company with large number 
of shareholders, although this figure is not applied in the case of urgency, however it is also 
                                                 
569 The Commercial Court of Agadir, case No 38/98 issued on 17/09/1998, (2004) (1) Journal of Commercial 
Courts 113, at 115. 
570A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 12 March 2014. 
571 See the decision of the Commercial Court of Casablanca, case No 89/449, issued on 18/08/1998 (2000) 82 
Journal of Moroccan Courts 209, at 213. 
572  The commercial court of Tangier, an urgent case No 161/1/2006, issued on 28/06/2006 
http://adala.justice.gov.ma/AR/Jurisprudence/JPC_fes_2008.aspx accessed 24 March 2014.  
573  The Commercial Court of Appeal in Fez, file No 716/2008, issued on 16/07/2008, 
http://adala.justice.gov.ma/AR/Jurisprudence/JPC_fes_2008.aspx accesses 21 March 2014. 
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not easy to prove that the case is an urgent case.574 In Egypt, s. 61 of the Egyptian Companies 
1981575 has adopted a different system, as it is the job of the president of the board of directors 
to call the general meeting, and the statutory auditor and shareholders who hold at least 5% 
percent of the capital are allowed to ask the board of directors to invite the general meeting, 
yet their request has to be based upon serious reasons, and it is within the power of that board 
to accept their request or not. It seems that that board of directors is not the right organ to 
examine the request of a shareholder to have a general meeting as in most cases such a request 
would be rejected by the board; therefore, the Moroccan position which allows the judicial 
authority to interfere is recommended. 
The question that arises here is whether such a right allows that shareholder to ask the court to 
cancel or at least delay the organized general meeting. The above provision does not provide 
such a right, yet the Moroccan courts have adopted a principle by which the judge of the 
Commercial Court as an urgent judge is allowed to delay the general meeting wherever it seems 
that there are justifiable reasons.576 Therefore, the Commercial Court of Casablanca has issued 
an order to stop a general meeting when it was found that such a meeting would have negative 
effects on the claimant shareholders. In this case, the minority shareholders petitioned the 
Commercial Court of Appeal of Casablanca which upheld the first instance decision to 
postpone the exceptional general meeting that aimed to merge the Moroccan Banks of Africa 
and East with the National Bank of Economic Development. The Commercial Court of 
Casablanca had listened to the minority shareholders’ petition and stopped the exceptional 
                                                 
574 See for example; Z Abujana, ‘Some Aspects of Minority Shareholders Protection in Morocco’ (2007) 13 
October Moroccan Journal of Business Law 121, at 126. 
575 Act No 159, 1981. 
576 The Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca, decision No 1630, file No 83/1113, issued on 13/12/1983, in 
this case the court grounded its judgment on s. 149 of the Civil Procedural Law which allows the president of the 
Primary Court to work as an urgent judge in these circumstances, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders 
Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 271. See 
also H Zoair, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholder by the Judicial Authority’ (unpublished dissertation, High 
Judicial Institute, Rabat 2009), at 35. 
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general meeting until the company complied with legal procedures that were provided in ss. 
232-233.577 Furthermore, in the above case, the respondent appealed the first instance decision 
on the ground that the petitioner shareholders did not hold the required percentage to make 
such claim. However, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on the ground that s. 116 of JSC 
Act and s. 21 of the Commercial Court Act allows the courts to interfere in the case of urgency 
without the availability of such percentage.578 
 To enhance the role of the minority shareholders inside the company it is not sufficient to grant 
them a right to call the general meeting rather than giving them a chance to include their 
suggestions on the agenda of such a meeting. Therefore, s. 117 of the JSC Act gives a 
shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 5% percent of the capital (or 2% if the 
company’s capital is five Millions Dirham) to ask for the listing some specific items on the 
agenda. The importance of this section is that it allows the minority shareholder to recommend 
some persons to hold positions in the board of the directors; consequently they would have 
some representatives inside that board.579 
Additionally, s.118 of the JSC Act prevents general meetings from discussing any point unless 
it was already added to that agenda. This prevention grants the minority shareholder guarantee 
that there will not be new points in the coming general meetings. 580  In this context, the 
Commercial Court of Agadir has removed some items from the agenda of the next general 
meeting on the ground that such points are being under consideration by the court of first 
                                                 
577  The Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca, file No 4/99/2535, issued on 04/01/2000 
http://adala.justice.gov.ma/AR/Jurisprudence/JPC_fes_2008.aspx accessed 21 March 2014. 
578 The Commercial Court Act No1.97.65, issued on 12/02/1997. 
579 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
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580A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ )2012( 24 October 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 13 March 2014. 
137 
 
instance and it is against the interest of the company to have such items prior to having them 
solved by the court. 581 
It appears that the legislature attempts to protect the minority shareholders by giving them a 
right to call the general meeting and schedule any agenda item and prevents the controllers 
from discussing any point which was not listed in that schedule. By such rights they are able 
to play an effectual role in the company’s decisions, in particular where the board of directors 
is under the controller of the majority shareholders. In addition, other supervision organs have 
been created to make sure that the majority shareholders are not abusing the interests of other 
shareholders; these organs are the statutory auditors and the appointed expert.  
4.3.2 The tools that control the majority power within the company. 
It is not always easy for a shareholder to realize that the conduct of the controllers of the 
company is against his own interests or it only serve the interests of majority shareholders, 
therefore professional organs are created inside the company to control the majority power and 
to make certain that all shareholders are treated equally. Therefore, it is the job of this sub-
section to examine the function of statutory auditor and the judicial appointee and their role in 
protecting the minority shareholder.  
4.3.2.1 The supervision role of the statutory auditor and shareholder’s right to make a 
complaint about such organ. 
The importance of the Joint Stock Company necessitates the creation of a professional organ 
that observes the controllers of the company and provides its shareholders with the necessary 
information that relates to such a company. In this manner s. 166 of the JSC Act provides that 
it is the job of the statutory auditors to oversee on permanent basis the accounting documents 
                                                 
581 The Commercial Court of Agadir, case No 38/98, issued on 17/09/1998, (2004) 1 Journal of Commercial 
Courts 113, at 115. 
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of the company and check the accuracy of the information contained in the company’s financial 
reports and so on. Moreover, it clearly stated by this section that it is also the job of the statutory 
auditor to ascertain that all shareholders are treated equally. Consequently, the statutory auditor 
is the legal effective device that is created to keep an eye on the controllers of the company and 
their functions. By such device the minority shareholders would be able to get the relevant 
information that relates to the business activities of the company and by which shareholders 
know about the financial statements of their company. To do this job, such an organ should be 
independent from the shareholders, and majority shareholders should not control the statutory 
auditors. On the other hand, the minority shareholder should use this organ in way that does 
not cause a disturbance to the company’s business.582 
In that process, section 159 of the JSC Act provides that each company has to appoint at least 
one statutory auditor and in the case of listed companies, the minimum number is two.583 This 
statutory auditor has to be a registered expert, moreover to ensure that such an organ remains 
independent and do its job objectively, s. 161 of the JSC Act prevents any shareholder who 
have some privileges and the members of the board of directors, members of the supervisory 
boards from holding such a position.584 If this statutory auditor left the company for whatever 
reason, he or she cannot be appointed within the next five years as a member of the board of 
the director and cannot be appointed as a general director. 
In terms of protecting the minority shareholders, if the general meeting has not appointed a 
statutory auditor s. 165 allows each shareholder to petition the Presiding judge of the 
Commercial Court as judge sitting in chambers to appoint the statutory auditor.  
                                                 
582A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 13 March 2014. 
583 S. 163 of the JSC Act provides that it is the job of the general meeting to appoint the statutory auditor. However, 
if no statutory auditor was appointed by this organ it the job of the president judge of the court to appoint one 
upon a request from any shareholder. 
584 S. 161 of the JSC Act, 1996.  
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To make the role of the statutory auditor more effective s. 170 of the JSC Act allows the general 
meeting and the board of directors to invite the statutory auditors to attend their meetings, 
although this attendance is not compulsory, however, s. 178 considers void all decisions that 
were taken by these organs in the absence of the statutory auditor who was appointed in correct 
way.585  
Furthermore, section 176 grants the statutory auditor the right in the case of urgency to invite 
the general meeting, so if it is believed that the minority’s interests are disregarded a general 
meeting has to be called to inform such shareholders of this conduct.586 It might be claimed 
that the minority shareholders themselves have a right to call such a meeting; therefore, this 
provision would not benefit the minority shareholders. Nevertheless, such a claim can be 
rebutted by stating that the minority shareholders need the 10% support to call a general 
meeting unless an urgent case was proved, furthermore, the statutory auditor by his oversight 
role would always have a higher chance to discover the abusive conduct.   
Although, it is the role of the statutory auditor to ascertain that all shareholders are treated 
equally, however, it is still possible to have statutory auditors who work with the majority 
shareholders and undermining their role as an independent and neutral organ. Therefore, s. 164 
of the JSC Act allows a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 5% of the capital 
to complain about the statutory auditors to the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court as 
judge sitting in chambers to deal with matters of urgency. The petition has to be well founded 
and has to be submitted within 30 days from the happening date of the conduct complained of. 
The Presiding judge of the Commercial Court will appoint another statutory auditor until the 
                                                 
585 This attendance in Egypt is obligatory, as s. 106 of the Egyptian Companies Act 1981 obligates the statutory 
or his representative to be present at those meetings as the attendance of the statutory auditor with their reports 
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586 The JSC Act, 1996. 
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general meeting appoints another statutory auditor or auditors. 587  The court is given the 
discretion to examine whether the petition is well founded or not, in other words, the Presiding 
judge of the Commercial Court has the discretionary power to consider whether the request is 
justifiable or not. Yet, the issue that arises here is how easy is it for the minority shareholder to 
prove that the statutory auditor was not objective in his job. In particular, the Moroccan 
legislature has not provided any guidance on such conduct, which leaves the minority 
shareholders facing difficulties to prove their complaints. The Court of Appeal in Paris 
considered the complaint against the statutory auditor was justifiable whenever it is proved that 
it aims to protect the interest of the company and it is proved that the statutory auditor was 
unqualified or he is working with the controllers of the company.588 
Having seen that s. 164 of the JSC Act 1996 grants a shareholder a right to petition within 30 
days from the happening date of the conduct complaint of, therefore this section faces some 
criticism, as in most cases it is challenging for such shareholders to justify their claim within 
that period. Moreover, this period is a short period as in most cases the reasons for the 
impeachment will not appear within it. Therefore, it is stated that the 30 days period opens a 
very narrow door to the minority shareholders which very difficult to go through.589 In this 
context, some scholars suggested that this period should start from the date when the 
shareholder knows the reason for the complaint.590 Such an amendment would make this way 
of protection sufficient and would not increase the number of nonsense claims as the courts 
have a discretion to accept or refuse this kind of claim. In addition to the claim of impeachment, 
                                                 
587A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 
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if the statutory auditor has made mistakes or it is seen that some obstacles were facing him, s. 
179 allows the board of directors, the supervisory board, a shareholder or group of shareholders 
who hold at least 5% of the capital to petition the court to remove the statutory auditor and 
appoint another auditor. Though the Moroccan legislature grants the minority a chance to 
remove the statutory auditor by this section, however, the concept of mistake and obstacles are 
broad and have not been clarified. Some scholars consider that, such kind of mistake has to be 
a professional mistake such as providing the general meeting with false information regarding 
the financial state of the company.591 In this regard, The Court of Appeal in Paris considered 
the frequent omission of the statutory auditor as justifiable reason to remove him from such a 
position.592 
It seems that the legislature in Morocco grants minority shareholders a right to petition to 
remove the statutory auditor in order to avoid the cases where the majority shareholders (or the 
general meeting, board of directors or the supervisory board) disregard the role of this organ 
or where it seems that the statutory auditor is working with the majority shareholders.593 In 
Egypt the legislature has adopted a different system, although s. 103 of their Companies Act 
1981 allows a complainant to suggest substituting the statutory auditor without any minimum 
percent of shareholders; however this request is considered by the general meeting which takes 
its decision by the majority shareholders. Therefore, it is said that if the statutory auditor is in 
a good relationship with the majority shareholder such substitution would not take place, thus 
the Moroccan position is more appropriate.594 
                                                 
591 A Fali, ‘the Concept of Capital in the Joint Stock Company’ (Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University Rabat 
2007), at 184. 
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Briefly, it is fair to conclude that the statutory auditor organ would prevent, or at least reduce, 
any abusive conduct of the controllers of the company if its functions were carried out 
objectively. However, as it is still possible to have a statutory auditor who is working with 
majority shareholders and who pays no attention to the minority shareholders’ interests. 
Additionally, it was noted that there is difficulty in proving mistakes of this organ which makes 
such a way of protection not effective, therefore, no court decisions that removed the statutory 
auditors for these reasons were found.595 In these circumstances, it is recommended that some 
examples of the concepts of mistakes and obstacles needs to be provided to activate this method 
of protection. To complement the role of the internal organs that reduce the offensive acts of 
controllers of the company minority shareholders are given a right to ask the court to appoint 
a judicial expert to examine one or some issues that relate to the company’s day to day business, 
therefore the function of this tool is going to be discussed in the next point.   
4.3.2.2 Appointing an expert to report on issues  
Prior the enactment of the JSC Act 1996 the Supreme Court of Morocco classified the minority 
petition to appoint an expert as a facet of the right to have information about the company’s 
affairs, which is allowed to each shareholders under s. 141.596 However, after the above Act, s. 
157 authorises a shareholder or group of shareholders representing 10% of the capital, to 
petition the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court as judge sitting in chambers to deal with 
matters of urgency to appoint an expert or experts to make a report regarding one or more issues 
relating to the company’s business. The job of the appointed expert is to write a report regarding 
that issue and examine whether the decisions that relate to such an issue serve the company’s 
                                                 
report about the financial state of the company was incorrect. See A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in 
the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 293. 
595  S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 41-42. 
596 The Supreme Court of Morocco, file No 1406/1996, issued on 30/07/1997, (1998) 21 (53-54) Journal of 
Supreme Court 227, at 227. 
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interests or only the interest of the majority shareholders. Copies of such a report have to be 
sent to the board of directors, the supervisory boards, the statutory auditors and the petitioner. 
Moreover, the following general meeting has to consider the issued report with another report 
to be provided by the statutory auditors. The remuneration of the appointed expert have to be 
paid by the company unless it was proved that the petition was abusive and it aimed to harm 
the company.597 
There is no doubt that such a supervisory tool would complement the role of the statutory 
auditors as it imposes internal supervision over the board of directors. Furthermore, as the 
statutory auditors are not allowed to interfere in the company’s decisions, the appointed expert 
with his qualifications and experience would be able to increase the level of protection as he 
or she would be able to provide a shareholder with the necessary information regarding the 
issue that he or she was appointed to examine. The importance of this way of protection appears 
where it seems to some shareholders that the statutory auditors are not fulfilling their function 
as ought to be, or they are standing with one side within the company. In Aizaldden Bastanni’s 
view the appointed expert plays a significant role in protecting the minority shareholders as he 
provides them with important information that is relevant to the company’s management.598 In 
this manner, the Commercial Court of Rabat has appointed an expert in relation to one issue 
that was reported by the petitioner shareholder.599 Nevertheless, such a petition was refused in 
many cases where the petitioner had asked the court to make a comprehensive report regarding 
the company’s activities.600 Such refusals were grounded on the basis that s. 157 allows a 
                                                 
597A Fahad, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Joint Stock Company’ (2012) 24 October 
http://www.marocdroit.com  accessed 14 March 2014. 
598 A Bastanni, Companies in Morocco Laws and Comparative Jurisdictions, Comparative study (2nd edn, part 1, 
Matbat Alnajah Aljadeda 1998), at 205. 
599 An urgent case No 600, file No 530/03/2006, issued on 12/07/2010, (unpublished), cited in S Belmris, ‘The 
Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished dissertation, High Judicial 
Institute, Rabat 2011), at 33. 
600  See for example The Commercial Court of Marrakech, decision No 310, file No 190/01/06, issued on 
06/06/2006, cited in Z Abujana, ‘Some Aspects of Minority Shareholders Protection in Morocco’ (2007) 13 
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shareholder to petition regarding one or some specific issues regarding the management of the 
company, therefore, a petitioner has to specify one or two issues in his petition otherwise the 
petition would to be refused.601 The reasons for rejecting such a comprehensive petition is that 
such kind of petition will disturb the business life of the company and this job was already 
granted by s. 166 of the JSC Act to the statutory auditors.602 In France, a shareholder’ s petition 
is not accepted in the court unless it is proved that he or she has asked the board of directors 
and the supervisory board to clarify such issue and no clear answer was given.603 The Court of 
Appeal in Paris considered this section as a weapon handed to the minority shareholders to 
protect their interests. However, such a petition should be refused whenever it is proved that 
petition is against the interests of the company.604 If the expert’s report shows that there is some 
misleading by the controllers of the company, minority shareholders are allowed to go to the 
court to ask the general meeting to make an urgent call, moreover, if the court found that such 
a misconduct harmed the minority shareholders an order to remedy the situation for those 
shareholders might be issued.605 
It seems that this tool imposes a restriction over majority power and provides the minority 
shareholder with the necessary information therefore it plays an important role in protecting 
the minority shareholders. However, the job of the appointed expert usually relates to one or 
some specific issues and it is not for the whole activities of the company. Additionally, it is not 
                                                 
601  See also The Commercial Court of Casablanca, decision No 333/99, file No 1482/01/1998, issued on 
02/03/1999, cited in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ 
(unpublished dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 35, see also see also A Hamdawi, Majority 
Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 
2013), at 275. 
602  S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 34. 
603  H Zoair, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholder by the Judicial Authority’ (unpublished dissertation, High 
Judicial Institute, Rabat 2009), at 30. 
604 See the Court of Appeal in Paris, issued on 22/03/1986, cited in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), 
at 34. 
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always easy to recruit 10% of the company shareholding, therefore it is recommended that such 
a percentage level needs to be reduced. 
In light of the foregoing, it obviously appears that the Moroccan legislature has attempted to 
offer sufficient protection to minority shareholders, either by strengthening their rights to 
become more involved with the company’s activities or via creating supervision tools which 
introduced to control the power of the majority shareholders. However, these preventative 
means do not offer the required standard of protection as majority shareholders still have the 
power to take decisions that further their own interests and ignore the interests of other 
shareholders. Therefore, corporate law in Morocco grants minority shareholders a right to sue 
the company’s controllers and ask the judicial authority to deliver the required justice.  
4.4 The shareholders’ actions against the controllers of the company (the remedial route) 
It has been seen that the controllers of the company might abuse their power to further their 
own interests and pay no attention to the interests of others. Furthermore, they might 
intentionally harm the interests of other shareholders and the interests of the company as a 
whole. To prevent or at least reduce these kinds of misconduct, the Moroccan laws allow the 
minority shareholder to sue the controllers of the company whenever they believe that the 
majority shareholders or the company’s controllers are not running the business properly. In so 
doing, the Moroccan legislature provided different tools by which appropriate remedies might 
be obtained, so that minority shareholder has a right to bring the nullity action by which the 
abusive conduct could be voided.606 However such a remedy would not remove the damage 
caused by those decisions, therefore, minority shareholders are allowed to start liability actions 
against the controllers of the company as such shareholders have suffered financial losses thus 
they are eligible for compensation. In addition to the above actions, in some cases it seems to 
                                                 
606 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
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some shareholders the controllers of the company are not only disregarding the interests of 
other shareholders, but also it becomes apparent to those shareholders that there is a real 
indication that the relationship between the shareholders has reached the deadlock, 
consequently the Moroccan courts are granted a power to wind up this company. Last but not 
least, the judicial authority in France has created another way of minority protection under 
which a temporary controller of the subject company might be appointed by the court.607 
Therefore, the last sub-section of this chapter will examine the petition of appointing 
provisional manger and the possibility of applying such petition by Moroccan courts. 
4.4.1 The nullity of the act 
There is no doubt that abusive decisions of the controllers of the company can lead to improper 
consequences among the shareholders of that company, thus it a necessary for the continuation 
of the company to reconsider such kind of acts and decisions. In terms of voiding, it is clear 
from ss. 337-348 of the JSC Act 1996 that the Moroccan legislature has adopted the main 
principal of “no nullity without provision”,608 which states that the company’s constitution or 
its conduct could not be set aside except where the law clearly provides that, or where it seems 
that such conduct is against the public policy. Therefore, the provision is clear in preventing 
nullity without a provision, this prevention aims at protecting the business live of the company, 
however, an alternative system of nullity was created which called La nullite virtuelle, and 
under such system of nullity the court is offered free discretion power to void such acts.609La 
nullite virtuelle system aims to cover the point where the statutory nullity does not apply. In 
this context, s. 338 of the JSC Act 1996 enables each shareholder, who had suffered damage 
                                                 
607 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia 2013), at 387. 
608 The policy behind such principle is to prevent the nullity of companies as important part of the national 
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609A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
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from the company’s decisions to start a nullity action against those decisions. There is no 
minimum percentage of shareholders required so that each shareholder is allowed to bring a 
nullity action regardless of the number of shares he or she owns, and no other restrictions 
prevent shareholder from starting that claim.610 Therefore, a general meeting’s decision which 
delays the distribution of allocated dividends, or which takes on the debts of another company 
can be nullified on the ground that such decisions are against the interests of minority 
shareholders and the company as a whole. However, the question posed here is whether a 
shareholder who voted for the decision in question is able to bring a nullity action against that 
decision. The French jurisprudence allows a shareholder to ask for the voiding of a decision 
even though he or she voted for that decision, as it might be difficult at the time of voting to 
realise whether it was abusive decision or not.611 In contrast with this, s. 76 of the Egyptian 
Companies Act allows only shareholders who voted against the decision or who had not 
attended the general meeting for justifiable reasons to make an action that aims to set aside 
such a decision.612  As no clear provision prevents any shareholders from starting this claim in 
Morocco, it is argued that this right is granted to the whole body of shareholders even for those 
who voted for the decision or who did not attend that meeting.613 This view could be supported 
by claiming that in some cases it would not appear to a shareholder at the issuing date whether 
a decision is abusive or not, therefore it is fair to give a shareholder a chance to reconsider his 
position regarding that decision.  
Prior to taking its decision in the nullity suit, s. 340 of the JSC Act grants the court the power 
to ask the defendants to withdraw or obviate their decision and the court cannot make a 
                                                 
610 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 360. 
611 Ibid, at 361. 
612The Egyptian Companies Act 1981.  
613 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
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judgment of invalidity only after at least two months from the date when the claim was brought. 
Therefore if the controllers of the company withdrew their decision the action has to be 
withdrawn, however, if no solution appeared in the above period that court has to go through 
the action and gives its decision regarding the claim.614 
In this manner, the Court of Appeal in Casablanca (Commercial Division) had nullified a 
decision of the general meeting on the ground that the private privilege given by the general 
meeting to the shareholders was not justifiable; thus, the Court of Appeal considered it as an 
abusive decision since it was designed for the self-interest of those shareholders.615 In line with 
this judgment, the Commercial Court of Appeal in Marrakech nullified the special general 
meeting’s decision which was taken without the attendance of the claimant shareholders. In 
this case, the court stated that as it is a right of each shareholder to participate in the special 
general meeting, and chapter 28 of the articles of association of the company says that the 
general meeting is formed from the whole shareholders regardless of the percentage of the 
shares they hold, therefore the decision of the general meeting was void.616 
More recently, the Commercial Court of Rabat has rendered void a general meeting on the 
ground that the controllers of the company had not invited the claimant shareholder to such 
meeting which is contrary to s. 71617 of the JSC Act.618 The court has applied s.71, which stated 
that in the case of having such meeting without inviting each shareholder to such a meeting is 
considered void. 
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The Supreme Court of Morocco619 has invalidated the decision of a general meeting that 
delayed the distribution of dividends on the ground that such a decision was against the interests 
of some shareholders. Furthermore, The Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca 
considered the meeting that took place without a legal invitation to the claimant shareholders 
as voided meeting and voided all the decisions that were taken in that meeting.620 In France, 
the French Supreme Court considered the decision of general meeting as an abusive decision 
when it seemed to the court that the majority shareholders had abused their voting right to issue 
that decision.621 
In brief, the Moroccan legislature has adopted the nullity action as way of protecting the interest 
of minority shareholders and interests of the company as a whole, however, it appears that the 
courts are applying such a remedy in restricted situations as there are many obstacles that 
prevent shareholders from starting that claim. First and foremost it is not enough for the 
claimant shareholder to prove that conduct was offensive rather than proving that the subject 
decision was against the interests of the company and only serves the interests of the controlling 
shareholders.622 Therefore, it is not always easy for those shareholders who are not able to 
obtain information regarding the company’s decision to prove that this decision is an abusive 
one, particularly where the decision affects the minority interests in an indirect way. In so 
doing, a shareholder has to convince the court that the decision breaches the principle of equal 
treatment of all shareholders and aims to further the interests of some shareholders rather than 
                                                 
619 Decision No 620, file No 209/03/2003, issued on 07/06/2006, (2008) (68) The Journal of Supreme Court 118, 
at 121. 
620 Decision No 3065/2011, file No 4421/12/2010, issued on 23/06/201, unpublished, cited in Zoair H, ‘Protection 
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the interests of the company.623 To make this action more effective it is suggested that instead 
of asking the minority shareholders to prove that the conduct was abusive, the burden of proof 
should be moved to the majority shareholders and they have to convince the court that the 
decision is not breaching the equal treatment principle and it was taken for the interest of the 
company.  If it is claimed that such an idea restricts the power of the controllers of the company, 
it is suggested that majority decisions that may affect the interests of other shareholders have 
to be issued with their justifications which would assist the court in considering whether the 
decision was abusive or not. 
In addition to the above obstacles, as the costs indemnity order is not applicable in Morocco 
the claimant shareholder is required to pay the fees of such an action; therefore, the cost of this 
litigation forms a significant bar that prevents any shareholder from using this claim. Having 
seen under s. 157 of the JSC Act that the cost of appointing an expert will be paid by the 
company, unless it was proved that a petition to appoint an expert was abusive, therefore, the 
cost of such litigation should be paid by the company unless it was proved by the controllers 
of the company that the minority action is a malicious action. That principle is adopted in Egypt 
where the costs of such claims are paid by the company if the minority action was based on 
serious reasons.624  
Furthermore, the nullity system has faced a different kind of criticism as it has negative effects 
on the financial and economic status of the company therefore; it affects the national economy 
as a whole. The minority shareholders might use their right in an abusive way which affects 
the business life of the company, moreover, the nullity remedy in some cases is not a sufficient 
remedy for the minority shareholder as the conduct of majority shareholders causes financial 
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losses to the minority shareholders, thus it would be better for the minority shareholders to seek 
compensation from the controllers of the company. In that regards, it is stated that the 
appropriate method toward the abusive conduct of the majority shareholder is to make the 
controllers of the company personally liable for their abusive conduct, so that such controllers 
are responsible to compensate the affected minority shareholders from those decisions.625 
Additionally, it is said the compensation is considered to be a very important remedy since it 
preserves a balance among the conflicts arising out of the dissension of shareholders which is 
not achieved by the nullity relief626. Therefore, it is the task of the next sub-section to discuss 
liability actions under Moroccan law.  
4.4.2 The liability actions  
The minority shareholders’ right to go to the court to protect their interests benefits not only 
the minority shareholders but also the company’s interests and consequently affects the 
national economy. In this regard, the minority shareholders are allowed to start a liability action 
either by the Personal Action (Individual lawsuit) or the Derivative Action (Ut Singuli lawsuit) 
to obtain an appropriate remedy.627  The Commercial Court of Fez distinguished between these 
two actions when it stated that the derivative action is proceeded with on behalf of the company 
by its representative or some shareholders to protect the interests of this company, while an 
action is classified as personal action where one shareholder or more goes to the court to protect 
their own interests.628 Hence, when a shareholder brings a derivative action his personality 
merges with the company’s personality and he will be a representative of the company aiming 
to protect its interests. While in the personal action a shareholder is bringing action whenever 
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he or she believes that his or her personal interest was harmed and he aims to protect his own 
interests.629Accordingly, personal and derivative claims under Moroccan Laws are considered 
in this sub-section by examining their procedures and the appropriate remedy that could be 
granted to the aggrieved shareholders.  
4.4.2.1 The Personal Action 
Under s. 353 of the JSC Act 1996 each shareholder or group of shareholders is allowed to go 
to the court to protect their own interest, so that the board of directors’ decision which prevents 
distributing dividends to the shareholders with no logical reasons or which restricts a 
shareholder’s priority right to buy new shares would affect the personal interests of a 
shareholder and allows that shareholder to sue the controllers of that company. As the JSC Act 
1996 has not provided many details of such an action, jurisprudence in Morocco630 defines the 
personal action as a claim brought by one shareholder or more by his or her name to obtain a 
remedy in respect to a misconduct already established by the controllers of the company.631 
Such an action is like any other tort action where it is necessary for a claimant to prove three 
conditions, the mistake, damage and the causal connection.632 The mistake could be an act that 
is against the interest of the claimant shareholder or any actual or proposed act or omission 
involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by directors of the company. 
Therefore, this action could be founded if articles of association and the relevant laws have 
been infringed or where it seems to some shareholders that the controllers of the company are 
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not properly managing the company 633 The claimant in this action does not aim to protect the 
interests of the company but rather the personal interests of that claimant. However, since the 
interest of each shareholder is a part of the company’s interests and there is a duty on each 
shareholder to protect the interest of the company even via the judicial authority, s. 353 of JSC 
Act 1996 allows a shareholder to combine the personal action with the derivative action. The 
reason behind that is that in some cases the majority conduct harms the personal interest of the 
shareholder and the interests of the company as well. In this regard, the French Supreme Court 
confirmed that there is nothing that prevents a shareholder or group of shareholders from using 
the personal action and the derivative action at the same time. The Supreme Court stated that 
if the representative of the company did not brought such an action, a shareholder who already 
started a personal action to protect his personal interests is allowed to bring a derivative action 
to protect the interests of his company.634 
Section 352 of the JSC 1996 determines the possible defendants in this action, which are; the 
controller of the company, the general director, or in some cases the delegated general director 
and the member of the two tier boards. It seems that the above section did not mention the 
company as a defendant, however some scholars believe that there is nothing that prevents the 
aggrieved shareholder from suing the company as a legal entity to become responsible for the 
damage that caused by its controllers.635 Furthermore, s. 352 does not prevent a shareholder 
from bringing an action against the company under the general rules that are provided in the 
Law of Contacts and Obligations. However, as a shareholder in such a claim acting 
independently he or she is responsible for the fees of such litigation therefore, the cost of such 
                                                 
633 M Almashishi, ‘Shareholder’s Right to Sue the Company’ (2001) 91 Journal of Moroccan Courts 13, at 17.   
634 Cass, Com. Rendu Le 03/11/1980, Bull Joly, 1980, at 698. Cited in T Albakti, ‘The role of judicial authority 
to protect the minority shareholders in the Joint Stock Company’ (2013) 110 The Moroccan Journal of Local 
Management and Development 139, at 149. 
635 A Hadayataallah, ‘Shareholder’s Right to Sue His Company and to Obtain a Remedy’ (2001) 91 Journal of 
Moroccan Courts 27, at 27. 
154 
 
legal action is considered a significant bar that prevents many shareholders from using this 
claim. 
4.4.2.2 The Derivative Action  
Section 353 of the JSC Act 1996 provides that in addition to the personal action each 
shareholder or group of shareholders is granted a right to start a derivative claim636 against; the 
controller of the company, the general director of the company and the delegated general 
director or the members of the two tier boards, in order to get a remedy.637 Moreover, s. 354 of 
the JSC 1996 allows a shareholder or group of shareholders on behalf of the company to start 
such an action without any minimum percent of the capital, furthermore, no previous 
permission is needed to start the claim and any previous agreement that prevents a shareholder 
from using such an action or puts some restrictions on the shareholder’s right to use this actions 
is deemed void. Namely, neither the board of directors nor the general meeting have the power 
to stop or withdraw the proceeding action against the company even by special resolution.638 
Such a claim can be brought either by a shareholder or by the representative of the company,639 
however, as Alsbaii claimed, it is very rare to have such an action brought by the representative 
of the company, the representative is usually in a good relationship with the controllers of the 
company, moreover in some circumstances the representative himself is involved with the 
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abusive conduct.640 This claim is brought when it seems to the shareholders that the controllers 
of the company are breaching the laws and regulations or they are infringing the articles of 
association or they are furthering their own interests with no regard to the interests of others 
shareholders and the company as a whole. This claim is brought on behalf of the company and 
by its name as a legal entity against those who cause damages to it, hence, it is the company 
and not the claimant shareholder who obtains relief from this action.641 
As mentioned above, a shareholder or group of shareholders do not need to obtain permission 
from the general meeting to pursue their claim. Furthermore, the decisions of the general 
meeting cannot prevent or stop the derivative action against the controllers of the company, 642 
so that the general meeting’s decision to stop a derivative action against the controllers of the 
company has no effect on such a claim.643 The previous shareholder is not allowed to take this 
action even if it was proved that the disputed conduct happened when he was a shareholder. 
The limitation of this action is five years from the date of discovering that conduct unless the 
conduct was classified as crime then such period will be extended to twenty years.644 
There is no doubt that the derivative claim in Morocco constitutes a significant tool of 
protection to the minority shareholder as this right is not restricted by the general meeting’s 
decision to bring or to stop this claim. However, it has not escaped criticism since there are 
some barriers that prevent a shareholder from using this action. First and foremost, the claimant 
shareholder would not gain any direct personal benefit from such proceeding. Second as the 
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costs of this litigation are paid by the claimant shareholder and not by the company, therefore, 
it is stated that the derivative action with its barriers has not formed an adequate pressure 
mechanism on the majority shareholders.645 However, it could be argued that the Moroccan 
system of derivative claims is more appropriate as no minimum percentage of shareholders is 
required to start the proceeding. In addition to that the company’s controllers would not be able 
to prevent such proceeding. Furthermore, the ratification bar that prevents minority 
shareholders from starting a claim in England is not applicable. However, financial risks for 
shareholders in the pursuit of derivative claims prevent many shareholders from starting this 
claim. To eliminate this bar, the indemnity costs order has to be adopted in Morocco where the 
claimant shareholder would not be required to pay the fees of such an action as he or she is 
litigating on behalf of the company and not for his or her own interests.  
 4.4.2.3 The court’s power in liability actions 
There is no doubt that the compensation is considered to be a very important remedy since it 
preserves a balance among the conflicts arising out of the dissension of shareholders which is 
not achieved by the nullity relief.646 Although there is no clear provision to determine the rules 
of reimbursing  the minority shareholders in the liability actions under the JSC Act 1996 and 
in its origin the French Commercial Code 1966, however that does not prevent the courts in 
France and Morocco from adopting the general principle of civil liability under s. 1382 of the 
French Civil Code 1804 (s.77 of the Law of Obligations and Contract in Morocco) which 
provides that “any act of man, which causes damages to another, shall oblige the person by 
whose fault it occurred to repair it” 
                                                 
645 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 




In these circumstances, unless a member proved that he voted against that conduct,647 the 
controllers of the company would be liable for decisions that caused damage to the other 
shareholders or the interests of their company. Furthermore, an absent member will be also 
liable of that conduct if he or she is not able to prove that his or her absence was justified.648 
Although there are some difficulties in determining the responsible shareholder of the abusive 
conduct particularly in the big joint stock companies, however, these difficulties fade in the 
case of closed joint stock companies where there is only a small number of shareholder and 
some of those shareholders form the majority shareholders.649 Such responsibility will reduce 
the possibility of abusive conduct as the controllers of the company know that they might have 
to pay compensation to the affected shareholders. In this regard the Supreme Court of Paris 
upheld the decision of the first instance which asked the majority shareholders to remedy the 
minority shareholders as the interests of the minority were affected by the abusive conduct of 
the majority shareholders.650 
Though the compensation relief offers suitable remedy to some shareholders, however, in some 
cases it only offers a provisional solution to such problems, since when a shareholder feels that 
there is significant disagreement inside the company that affects the interests of the company 
and its shareholders it is insufficient for such a shareholder to obtain the compensation remedy. 
Specifically, when it becomes clear to the shareholders that relationship among shareholders 
reaches a deadlock the Moroccan law allows that shareholder to ask not only for suitable 
                                                 
647 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 208. 
648 A Hadayataallah, ‘Shareholder’s Right to Sue His Company and to Obtain a Remedy’ (2001) 91 Journal of 
Moroccan Courts 27, at 33. 
649 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 211. 
650 The French Supreme Court, issued on 06 June 1990 cited in A Alshhab, ‘The Judge’s role in the Joint Stock 
Company’ (High Diploma Dissertation, Mohammed V University, Rabat 2004), at 53. 
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compensation but also to liquidate the company’ life and have the winding up remedy. 
Therefore, the winding up relief will be discussed in the next sub-section.   
4.4.3 The winding up remedy  
The previously discussed remedies would not always offer an appropriate remedy to the 
minority shareholders, since when the majority shareholders repeated their abusive conduct or 
it seems to the minority shareholders that their relationship with other shareholders is broken 
completely, it becomes rational to allow them to ask for a winding up of their company. 
Therefore, the winding up remedy is considered one of the available weapons that minority 
shareholders can use to face the offensive conduct of the controllers of the company, such a 
remedy ends the relationship among the shareholders and breaks up the company’s life. 
Though there was no mention of such kind of remedy in the JSC Act 1996, however, s. 1056 
of the Contracts and Obligations Act 1913651 gives each shareholder a right to ask the court to 
wind up the company whenever it seems that there are significant disagreements amongst the 
shareholders, or it appears to the court that the contract terms of the relationship are being 
breached.  A shareholder’s right to seek the winding up of the company is a public policy right, 
therefore any previous agreement that prevents any shareholder from using such right is 
deemed void. This right was confirmed by the Moroccan Supreme Court on 14/02/1990652 
where it was declared that whenever it seems to the court that a deadlock has been reached and 
the continuance of the company will harm the interests of the shareholders or the company as 
a whole, such company has to be wound up. Along with the same line, the Primary Court of 
Casablanca has wound up the company on the ground that there were no indications appears to 
                                                 
651 Issued on 12 August 1913 and was amended in 22 September 2011. 
652 Decision No 377, file No 1247/89, issued on 14/02/1990, cited in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority 




the court that such agreement among shareholders would be solved.653  More recently, on 
11/10/2011, the Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca issued a decision to wind up a 
company when it was clear to the court that there were critical disagreements among the 
shareholders.654 The same decision was taken by the Commercial Court of Appeal in Fez where 
it is confirmed that each shareholder has a right to wind up the company whenever that 
shareholder satisfies the court that there are justifiable reason to that result.655 
That is to say, if the interests of the company necessitate winding up it is the role of the court 
to wind up that company, however the question that arises here is what kind of disagreements 
are considered as deadlock points. It is said that the critical disagreements are disputes among 
shareholders that disrupt the company’s business and which destroy the relationship among 
those shareholders.656 Therefore, it is within the discretion of the first instance court to examine 
the significance of the disagreement, which may justify the winding up of the company or not, 
and it is the task of the Supreme Court to review the first instance justifications. In this context, 
the Supreme Court in Morocco in 22/12/2004657 confirmed that it is within the power of the 
first instance court to examine whether a company has reached a deadlock or not. In other 
words, the reasons for winding up the company that are provided by s. 1056 are only examples 
therefore, by way of analogy the court has a discretion to wind up a company for other reasons 
as long as its decision was based on serious grounds, taking into account the interests of the 
                                                 
653 Decision No 2159, issued on 29/07/ 1987 cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint 
Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 404. 
654 Decision No 4084/2011, file No 474/12/2011 cited in T Albakti, ‘The role of judicial authority to protect the 
minority shareholders in the Joint Stock Company’ (2013) 110 The Moroccan Journal of Local Management and 
Development 139, at 155, see also A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, 
Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 272. 
655 Decision No 364, file No 1484/2002, issued on 25/03/2005, cited in A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of 
Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 2011), at 217. See also T Albakti, ‘The 
role of judicial authority to protect the minority shareholders in the Joint Stock Company’ (2013) 110 The 
Moroccan Journal of Local Management and Development 139, at 155. 
656 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat, 1997), at 832. 
657 Decision No 1408, file No 713/01/2001, issued 22/12/2004, (2005) 8 Moroccan Journals of Law and Business 
89, at 91. 
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company and other shareholders. That position was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Fez658 
where it stated that it is a right of each shareholder to petition the court to wind up his company 
if serious and justifiable reasons were available, such as critical disagreement between 
shareholders or breaching the shareholders’ obligations. The court in this case has also 
confirmed that these reasons are just for illustration, so that the court has the power to wind up 
the company whenever it seems that there are justifiable reasons for that result, however, it is 
the function of the Supreme Court to examine the reasons on which the first instance court has 
relied when it took that decision.659 
In brief, although, the winding up remedy is an extreme remedy, however it is the appropriate 
remedy in the case where the claimant shareholder convinces the court that the relationship 
among the shareholders is broken. However, such winding up should not contrary with interests 
of the company and courts should consider carefully the reasons at which the claim is based. 
Furthermore, even it is proved that such relationship was broken it is still within the discretion 
of the judge to grant such relief or not. Since the winding up relief has negative effects on the 
company and on the whole economy, therefore courts tend not to grant such remedy unless it 
was proved that the relationship among shareholders has broken down and there is no 
alternative relief that can keep this company alive. In these circumstances the judicial authority 
in France has created another tool of protection under which minority shareholders are allowed 
to petition the court to appoint a provisional controller of the subject company. Therefore, the 
possibility of applying such tool in Morocco is discussed in the next sub-section. 
                                                 
658 Decision No 346, file No 1484/2002, issued on 25/03/2005, cited in A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of 
Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 2011), at 217. 
659 The French Supreme Court has discussed the issue and stated that; the general disagreements are not sufficient 
reason to wind up the company, particularly when the financial state of the subject company has not reached the 
deadlock. Cass. Com 11/05/1960, Dalloz 1960 Som. St 31, cited in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), 
at 65, see also A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st 
edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 399. 
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4.4.4 The interim controller petition  
The institute of a provisional controller of the company was created by the Judicial Authority 
in France when the French courts applied s. 1961 of the Civil Code in cases where it is claimed 
that the company’s constitutional organs are unable to do their functions, or in the cases where 
there is disagreement among shareholders of the company that prevents such company from 
doing its business. Under s. 1961 the court has a power to interfere where there is an immovable 
or movable thing whose ownership or possession is in contest between two or several 
persons.660 The application of this section was only used in cases where it seems to the court 
the company’s constitutional organs (the board of director and general assembly) are no longer 
able to run the business, or when it appears that there is critical disagreement between these 
constitutional organs, therefore, an interim controller has to be appointed to replace the 
company’s controllers. However, the courts have extended this section and it was applied in 
situations where there is abusive conduct by the controllers of the company, therefore, it 
became a means to protect the interests of the minority shareholders.661 In this regard, the Court 
of Appeal in Paris662 has appointed a provisional controller of the subject company on the 
ground that the majority shareholders have entirely disregarded the interests of the company 
and other shareholders.663 The French judicial authority has not only applied the provisional 
controller in the situations where the company’s constitutions are unable to manage the 
company but also this controller was appointed in the cases where the interests of other 
                                                 
660 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 229. 
661 See for example the Court of Appeal in Amiens, issued on 11 February 1964, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority 
Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 
2013), at 388-389. 
662 Issued on 22 May 1965, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, 
Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 394, see also A Gomirah, The Abusive 
Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 2011), at 228. 
663 The same decision was taken by the Court of Appeal in Rouen in 25 September 1969. Cited in A Hamdawi, 
Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, 
Rabat 2013), at 395. 
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shareholders were ignored. Yet such an appointment was rejected by the Supreme Court in 
France when it was found that the minority petition was not based on serious reasons.664 
In Morocco many scholars such as Abdoalwhed Hamdawi665 and Amina Gomirah666 believe 
that there is nothing that prevents the Moroccan Court from applying such a principle as long 
as s.149 of the Moroccan Civil Procedural Act 1974 grants the president judge of the primary 
courts the same discretionary power. They support their view by a decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Agadir when a provisional controller was appointed when it was clear to the court 
that a critical disagreement among the shareholders existed.667 They claimed that although the 
petitioner in the above action was not a minority shareholder, however, by way of analogy it 
seems that the court would appoint such a manager if the petition brought by minority 
shareholders.668 Gait also support this opinion and stated that each shareholder has a right to 
petition the court to appoint a provisional manager in the case where is seems to that 
shareholder that the controllers of the company are furthering their own interest or ignoring the 
interests of other shareholders.669 
The job of the appointed a provisional manager is to solve the current problems, therefore, the 
manger’s authority differs from case to case. It is the function of the court to determine in its 
decision the power of the interim manager taking into account the reasons beyond that 
appointment. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the interim manager was appointed 
                                                 
664 Issued on 25/March 1974, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, 
Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 396. 
665 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 396. 
666 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 211. 
667 Decision No 1487 issued on 25/06/1992 cited in R Gait, ‘Shareholder’s Position in the Joint Stock Company’ 
(Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University Rabat Morocco 2004), at 287, See also A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct 
of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 2011), at 211. 
668 A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 
2011), at 226. 
669 R Gait, ‘Shareholder’s Position in the Joint Stock Company’ (Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 
2004), at 282. 
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under exceptional circumstances consequently, the power of such institution should be 
restricted on solving the present issues that led to this conflict,670 then, the court has to observe 
whether the appointed manager is acting as has to be or not.671 
Prior to concluding this chapter we must mention the buy-out relief which is applied in 
Morocco by s. 1057 of Obligations and Contracts Act672 on Civil Companies and Partnerships. 
This remedy has to be granted to a minority shareholder in the Joint Stock Companies to 
complement the minority protection regime. Although s. 221 of the JSC Act 1996 adopts this 
remedy, however it is just applied in the case of conversion. In this regard, s. 221 allows in the 
case of conversion the shareholders to withdraw from this company and they will get the 
amount of money that is equal to their rights in company’s capital. The determining of this 
amount in the case of disagreement will be fixed by an expert appointed by President of the 
Court.673 This relief was recently adopted in Tunisia in 2009 where s. 290 of the Law No 16 
which adjusted the Companies Act 2000674 allows a shareholder or group of shareholders in a 
non-listed company who hold a percentage which does not exceed 5% of the capital to sell-out 
their shares and leave the company. These shares have to be purchased by another shareholder 
or group of shareholders who hold the rest of the shares. These shares have to be purchased at 
fair value, which is decided by an expert appointed by the court, and if the other shareholders 
refuse to accept such a value, the court within one month will issue an order that values the 
shares and asks the other shareholders to purchase them.675 It seems that the above section (s. 
209 of the Tunisian Companies Act 2000) grants the buy-out remedy only to a shareholder or 
                                                 
670 A Darwish, ‘Does a Shareholder Have a Right to Sue His Company to Get a Remedy?’ (2001) 91 Journal of 
Moroccan Courts 17, at 26. 
671 See the Court of Appeal in Rouen, issued on 25 September 1969, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders 
Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 395. 
672 Issued on 12 August 1913 and was amended in 22 September 2011. 
673 See A Gomirah, The Abusive Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, 
2011), at 236. 
674 Issued on 16 March 2009  
675 K Alaiari, ‘The Minority Right to Leave the Company’ (2009) 51(7) Journal of Judiciary and Legislation 25, 
at 31.  
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group of shareholders who hold a small percentage (not exceeding 5% of the capital), therefore 
it does not provide any protection to the minority shareholder who holds more than this 
percentage. Thus, this relief should be granted to each shareholder whereby minority 
shareholders should always have the right to leave the company and sell their shares at fair 
value. Adopting this remedy would increase the level of protection in Morocco and save 
shareholders the cost and time of litigation in addition to avoiding its negative effect on the 
company and its reputation.  
4.5 Conclusion and comparative view  
Minority shareholders under Moroccan laws are granted specific rights to participate in the 
management of the company. In addition to that, independent organs inside the company were 
created to ensure that the interests of the company and all shareholders are being taken into 
account in the controllers’ decisions. In that regard, the minority shareholders have rights to 
call a general meeting and schedule any point on its agenda and to prevent the controllers from 
discussing any point which was not listed in that schedule. Furthermore, such rights are 
protected by the judicial authority where s. 148 of the JSC Act grants each shareholder a right 
to petition the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court to issue an order that obligates the 
company to give the petitioner shareholder all the required information. Also shareholders who 
hold 10% of the shares (or less than this percentage in the case of urgency) are allowed to go 
to the court to appoint a judicial proxy to call the general meeting or to delay or stop such 
meeting. Furthermore, the Moroccan Courts have the ability to remove some items from the 
agenda of the next general meeting. Beside these rights, the preventative mechanism contains 
two other means which are the statutory auditor and the appointed judicial expert. In this vein, 
it was apparent that such organs aim to protect the interests of the minority shareholders, 
therefore, if the general meeting has not appointed a statutory auditor a shareholder is allowed 
to petition to the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court to appoint a statutory auditor. 
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Additionally, a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 5% of the capital are 
able to complain about the statutory auditors to the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court 
as judge sitting in chambers to deal with it as a matter of urgency. In the case of having some 
mistakes by the statutory auditor or where it was clear that he faces some obstacles, the board 
of directors, the supervisory board, a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 
5% of the capital are able to petition the court to remove the statutory auditor and appoint 
another auditor. 
As the statutory auditors are not allowed to interfere in the company’s decisions, or in some 
circumstances it seems to some shareholders that the statutory auditors are not doing their 
function, or they are standing with one side within the company, a shareholder or group of 
shareholders who hold 10% of the capital, is given a right to petition the court to appoint an 
expert or experts to make a report regarding one or more issues relating to the company’s 
business. The appointed expert with his qualifications and experience would be able to increase 
the level of protection as he or she would be able to give the shareholders the necessary 
information regarding the issue that he or she is appointed to examine. If misleading conduct 
by the controllers of the company is found by such a report, minority shareholders are allowed 
to go to the court to ask the general meeting to make an urgent call, an order to remedy those 
might be issued if it was proved that such misconduct harmed the interests of minority 
shareholders. Most importantly, the costs of such an appointment are paid by the company 
unless it was proved the petition to appoint an expert was abusive. However, the minority 
shareholders with less than 10% of the shares would not be able to use this method, therefore 
this right has to be granted to each shareholder or at least to shareholders who hold 5% of the 
shares. In terms of the statutory auditor organ, it was argued that the period of 30 days from 
the date of the conduct complained against the statutory auditors that determined by s. 164 is 
too short for the minority shareholders, as it is very rare to know of conduct within this period. 
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Thus, it is suggested that such time should start from the date where the minority shareholders 
know the reason for the complaint.  
On the other hand, under the remedial mechanism, minority shareholders have a right to litigate 
against the controllers of the company, either by the nullity action where the subject conduct 
would be voided, or by the liability actions (personal and derivative claim) where the 
appropriate remedy could be obtained. No previous permission from the company is required 
to start such proceedings. Furthermore, any agreement that prevents a shareholder from using 
such actions or puts some restrictions on the shareholder’s right to use this actions is deemed 
void. Neither the board of directors nor the general meeting has the power to stop or withdraw 
the action proceeding against the company even by special resolution. It is within the 
discretionary power of the court to consider the conditions of each case and grant the 
appropriate remedy. In the nullity action the court has a power to nullify the decision that affect 
the interests of minority shareholders whereas in liability actions they would ask the controller 
of the company to compensate them. In the case of critical disagreement or where it appears to 
the court that a deadlock has been reached and the continuation of the company will harm the 
interests of the shareholder, a shareholder or group of shareholders are granted a right to claim 
the winding up the company. To avoid the winding up result it was seen that the provisional 
manager petition, which was applied by the French courts, is adopted in Morocco and has 
increased the level of protection. 
It was seen that the law No 20.05 that was issued on 23/05/2008 and amended the JSC (17-95) 
has strengthened the minority protection regime where it reduced the 10% requirement to 
complain about the statutory auditor to 5%. However, such percentage is still that same 
regarding the appointment of an expert and calling the general meeting to be held, therefore it 
needs to be reduced to in these levels as well. To enhance the level of minority protection in 
Morocco the buy-out relief which was adopted by Tunisian Law has to be adopted, as such 
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relief would prevent the minority actions and their costs so that it would complement the 
available tools that protect the minority shareholders. 
The aim of this work is to consider minority shareholder protection under English and 
Moroccan laws and to examine whether the Libyan shareholder protection regime offers 
equivalent protection to that found in the above systems. Following the discussing of this 
protection in these two systems it would be useful to any proposal for reform of the Libyan law 
of minority shareholder protection to have a brief comparison between the protection tools 
under Moroccan regime with those available under English laws. Such a comparison will 
illustrate the main means of protection that are available in England and Morocco and shows 
the differences and the similarities between these two regimes. 
English law, like other common law countries, heavily relied on litigation as a main route that 
is used to protect the minority shareholder. Therefore, this study in relation to English law is 
primarily focused on these legal actions, (personal and derivative actions, unfair prejudice 
action and the winding up remedy). However, it was illustrated that minority shareholders 
under the Companies Act 2006 have certain statutory rights which offer a type of precautionary 
protection to the minority shareholder. Similarly, minority shareholders under Moroccan JSC 
Act 1996 are granted specific rights and tools to encourage their participation in the company’s 
decisions. In addition to that, supervision organs were created inside the company to restrict 
the ultimate power of majority shareholders and reduce the abusive conduct of the controllers 
of the company. On the other hand, the Moroccan law allows minority shareholders to ask the 
court to interfere and grants the proper remedy. 
In both systems (English and Moroccan) a shareholder is given a right to bring a personal and 
derivative claim to obtain a remedy. However, it was noted that the “no reflective loss” 
principle which restricts the personal action in England is not applied under the Moroccan 
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laws.676 Besides avoiding the non-reflective loss principle in the personal action, the Moroccan 
laws has provided more appropriate procedures of the derivative claim as the two-stage 
procedure that is introduced by the Companies Act 2006 for the applicant to get permission to 
continue the action as a derivative action and the ratification issue are not adopted in Morocco. 
Furthermore, the condition of clean hands to bring the derivative claim which considered one 
of the main reasons for refusing many claim in England is not recognized under Moroccan 
regime. In terms of litigation costs, the minority shareholders in English law have the ability to 
apply for an indemnity order which asks the company to indemnify the claimant against his 
costs whereas such a right is not available in Morocco. Therefore, it was apparent in Morocco 
that minority actions were used in rare cases and it is claimed that the financial bar was the 
main reason that prevents many shareholders from starting such claims.  
The Moroccan legislature has not adopted the unfair prejudice petition which is considered the 
key distinctive feature of the English regime and which has very much advanced the level of 
protection and overshadow the use of derivatives action in England. Under such a petition the 
English courts are given a discretionary power to grant the appropriate relief, however, the buy-
out remedy is the most common remedy under the unfair prejudice petitions.677 The other 
remedies that offered under the unfair prejudice petition such regulating the affairs of the 
company, or require the company to refrain from action are applicable in Morocco under the 
personal and derivative actions. 
 A shareholder under Moroccan law is allowed to start a petition in order to wind up the 
company whenever it seems that there are significant disagreements amongst the shareholders, 
or it appears to the court that the contract terms are being breached. Such a remedy is also 
                                                 
676 Under such principle the individual shareholder or group of shareholders suffer loss in respect of a wrong done 
to the company due to a breach of duty owed to it, this kind of loss is considered to be a reflective loss, and has 
to be recovered by the company itself, as a shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. 
677 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Com No CP 142, 1996) para 6.11. 
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applied by English law (s. 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986) where it seems to the court that it 
is just and equitable to wind up the subject company. Finally, the petition of appointing an 
interim manager of the company which is available in Morocco is not replicated under English 
company law, however the procedure of appointing a caretaker receiver can achieve the same 
result678. In this regard, it is provided by s. 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 that “High 
Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in 
all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so”. 679 In this regard, 
it was stated in the Law Commission Report that; in order to preserve the position during the 
inevitable delay between the presentation of a petition and the final hearing, petitioners will 
frequently seek interlocutory injunctions.680 In short, except the unfair prejudice petitions, it is 
clear that there is much under Morocco law that mirrors the position in English Law, such as 
the personal and derivative actions, the winding up remedy and to some extent the caretaker 
remedy which tells that there is much convergence in this area of law and there is a limited 
scope for novelty. Having considered the English and Moroccan systems of minority 
shareholder protection it is the job of the next chapter to assess to the minority shareholder 
protection under the Libyan regime in comparison with the rights and tools that presented in 
the above jurisdictions.   
 
 
                                                 
678 For the use of the receivership remedy in cases where disputes have arisen see BAT Industries plc v Windward 
Prospects Ltd [2013] EWHC 3612 (Comm) and Catch a Ride Ltd v Gardner [2014] EWHC 1220 (Ch). 
679 The power to appoint a receiver repeats the terms of predecessor provisions going back to s. 25 (8) of the 
Judicature Act 1873. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the power to appoint a receiver where it is just and 
convenient is a long standing remedy there is a considerable paucity of law in relation to its use by shareholders. 
See P Willcocks, Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (1st edn, The Federation Press, Australia 1991), at 67. 
680 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Com No CP 142, 1996) para 10.7. 
Examples of cases where interlocutory injunctions have been granted are; Re a Company (No 19002612 of 1984) 
[1985] BCLC 80; Malaga Investments Ltd & Others, Petitioners (1987) 3 BCC 569; Re Mountforest Ltd [1993] 
BCC 565; and Safinia v Comet Enterprises Ltd [1994] BCC 883. 
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Chapter 5   The protection of minority shareholders under Libyan 
Law 
5.1 Introduction  
 Libya has a civil law system, influenced to some extent by Islamic law. Most of its laws were 
deeply influenced by French laws 681  via the transplantation of Egyptian laws. 682  The 
Companies Law is not an exception; therefore, the overall structure of Libyan Companies Law 
is similar to that found in the MENA683 region where the French laws are prevalent. 
In Libya the first Commercial Code was issued in 1953, however this Act has been abolished 
and it was thoroughly revised in 2010 where a new Business Activities Act was passed (Act 
No 23/2010), which came into force in 21/08/2010. The above Act covers most of companies 
law aspects relating to incorporation, regulation, merger liquidation and dissolution of the 
organised associations. In addition to the Business Activities Act 2010, the Civil Code 1953 is 
regulating various aspects of the Company law in particular the Civil Companies.684  
As with other Libyan legislation the first sections685 of this Act set out the following hierarchy 
of legal sources: Legislative provisions of the Business Activities Act No 23/2010; Legislative 
provisions of the Civil Code where there is no applicable section in the Business Activities 
Act; Case Law, and the Custom of merchants. 
                                                 
681 The French Commercial Code of 1807 was the historical source of the Egyptian Commercial Code which, in 
turn, was the historical source of the Libyan Commercial Code. See M Albadawi, Law of Economic Activities: 
General Principles and Rules (3rd edn, part 1 Aljameha  Almaftoha, Tripoli 2013), at 31- 32. It has to be mentioned 
here that the previous Criminal Law was affected by the Italian Law, however most of its provisions were adjusted 
to comply with Islamic law.   
682 In these systems there is distinction between Private Law and Public Law; Private Law rules govern the legal 
relations between individuals or private juristic persons, whereas, Public Law rules are applicable to the legal 
relations to which the state, as a sovereign power is a party. Private law includes: Civil Law, Commercial Law, 
Civil and Commercial Procedure Law, Labour Law (Employment Law), International Private Law, Property Law 
and so on. See for example A Abodah, Basics of Libyan Law: Theory of Law (1st edn, Part 1 Naser University, 
Tripoli 1993). 
683 The term MENA stands for Middle East and North African Countries. 
684 Libyan Civil Code which was issued on 23/11/1953. 
685 Ss. 2-3- 4 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
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Companies and partnerships under Libyan Laws are governed by ss. 12- 408 of the Business 
Activities Act 2010 and ss. 494-536 of the Libyan Civil Code 1953. In addition to the 
participation firm (association in participation) or what is locally in Libya called "Sharikt al 
Mahasa", there are five forms of commercial business organizations in which commercial 
association could be established. Three of these are partnerships and the other three are 
companies. The partnerships are: General partnership (ss. 51-76), Limited or Simple 
Partnership (ss. 77-90) and the Participation in Association (ss. 91-97). They are known by 
their Arab names which are respectively: Sharikat Tadhamun (تاكرش )نماضتلا , Sharikat 
Tawsiyah Baseeth (ةطيسبلا ةيصوتلا تاكرش) and sharikat al mahasa ( ةصاحملا تاكرش(. The three 
corporations are: the Joint Stock Company (ss. 98-260), Limited Partnership by Shares (ss. 
261-270) and the With Limited Liability Company (ss. 271-291). Their Arab names 
respectively are: Sharikat al Mosahamh. (ةمهاسملا ةكرش) Sharikt Tawsiyah Belashum ( ةكرش(
مهسلأاب ةيصوتلا and Sharikat that Massoliyah Mahdoda (ةدودحملا ةيلوئسملا تاذ ةكرش(. All the 
above mentioned companies and partnerships are constituted by contract and enjoy legal 
personality except the association in participation.686 
Section 13 of the Libyan Commercial Law provides that; “A company shall be considered a 
trader as long as it takes one of the five forms stipulated in the Business Activities Act 2010 
whatever the purpose that the company is formed for”. It is quite clear that the legislature 
adopted a formal criterion to distinguish between commercial and civil companies. However, 
the participation firm (association in participation) and what is locally in Libya called "Sharikt 
al Mahasa is considered a trading entity if it makes business activities and a civil entity when 
it makes civil activities.687 
                                                 
686 S. 24 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
687  Commercial associations are classified under new Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 into three main 
divisions: partnerships and corporations, and third category comes in between (the mixed entities) .The distinction 
is not based on differences of objectives; rather the relative importance of the identities and the personal 
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Although the Libyan Civil Code contains provisions applicable to all companies and 
partnerships regardless of their type, nature or activities, the Business Activities Act 2010 
deems that all partnerships and companies are commercial. In fact, any entity formed in one of 
the five provided forms is considered a commercial company regardless of its purposes, and in 
such cases, provisions of both the Business Activities Act 2010 and Civil Code 1953 and are 
applicable. If there is any conflict between the codes, the provisions of the Business Activities 
Act 2010 will prevail.688 In this regard, it has to be pointed out that in Libya and Morocco most 
of statutes have influenced to some extent by Islamic law, therefore companies and 
partnerships in Libyan and Morocco are not allowed to carry on activities that contradict Sharia 
principles or fundamental foundations of their society. So that if the object of the company 
opposes to public order or moral such as gambling or drugs, or the object is forbidden for any 
reason such as white slavery, the contract should be deemed null and void.689 
The Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 like most Arab Company Laws 690  does not 
differentiate between partnerships and corporations, therefore, all commercial associations 
which are mentioned in the Above Act are called companies. In contrast, under English Law 
and the Commonwealth a company is a body corporate or corporation registered under the 
Companies Act 2006 or similar legislation; therefore, the “company” term does not include 
partnership or any other unincorporated group of persons, although such entities may be loosely 
described as a company.691 
                                                 
considerations of the partners, as well as, the role of the contract in the legal organization. See ss. 50-98-261 of 
the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
688 S. 2 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
689 See S Ghumidh, Bahraini Commercial Companies Law, Provisions and Explanations (1st edn, University of 
Bahrain, Bahrain 2014), at 33. And M Made, and f Alzahwi, The Commercial Companies in Libyan Law 
(University of AlJabal Algharbi. Libya 1997), at 29-30. 
690 See for example; The Egyptian Companies Act, 1981, The Tunisian Companies Act, 2000 and in Morocco the 
Act No 5.96 1997 which relates to the General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Limited Partnership by Shares, 
with Limited Liability Companies, and the Participation in Association. 
691  A Cahn and D Donald, Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Laws Governing Corporation in 
Germany, UK and USA (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK & New York, 2010), at xxii. 
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The Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 comprises general provisions which are applied to 
all companies and partnerships and certain provisions for each association in particular. The 
Business Activities Act 2010 heavily regulates joint stock companies as compared to others 
bodies. In this regard s. 98 provides that shareholders of such company should be liable for the 
company’s debts and obligations only to the extent of the value of their shares. Joint Stock 
Company under Libyan Law may be either a public company which offers its shares and debt 
securities to the public through public subscription,692 or a private company (Closed Joint Stock 
Company which is the main subject of this research), where its shares are entirely subscribed 
by its promoters,693 and it cannot offer its shares for public subscriptions. The number of 
shareholders must not be fewer than ten, and the company's capital must not be less than 
100,000 Libyan dinars (LD).694 In the light of the democratic management and the control 
system of the joint stock company, the majority shareholders via the board of directors (which 
is based on the unitary board model, s. 172 of the Business Activities Act 2010)695 and the 
general meetings play the role of the executive power since they are responsible for the day to 
day affairs. Such power has to be used in the benefit of the company and the whole 
shareholders. Directors of the company have to act within the powers and purpose of the 
company that set out in its memorandum and articles of association “the ultra vires principal” 
(s.14 of the Business Activities 2010). Under the ultra vires principle, a company is formed 
only for limited purposes and it is limited to acting within the objects that are determined in its 
constitutions. So that the company cannot carry on any activities which is not authorised by its 
                                                 
692 S. 107 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
693 S. 99 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
694 The Libyan Government’s Decree No 186, issued on 22/04/2012.  
695 The United States and the United Kingdom provide examples of the unitary board structures, while some other 
jurisdictions such as Germany, Netherland, Denmark, France and Morocco have adopted a two-tier board model, 
under such model there is a management board that runs the business and a supervisory board that appoints and 
supervises the management board. Having seen in the previous chapter that in Morocco that a firm can choose 
between having a one tier or two tier board model. See R Gait, ‘Shareholder’s Position in the Joint Stock 
Company’ (Ph.D thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 2004), at 181-182. 
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constitutions and any act undertaken outside those limitations is ultra vires and may be 
challenged in the courts.696 
Having shown that controllers of the company may have misused their power where they 
further their own interests or take decisions that harm the interests of minority shareholders 
and the company as a whole. Therefore, it is the task of the legislature to develop some rules 
that enhance the confidence of minority shareholders by promoting transparency and 
accountability inside the company in addition to providing remedial mechanisms which either 
grant the minority the appropriate relief or end the company’s business. Having illustrated that 
the English and Moroccan laws enable the minority shareholders with various tools under 
which the power of majority shareholders might be controlled and the abusive conduct are 
being remedied. Some of these instruments allow those shareholders to bring litigation against 
the controllers of the company either to stop the abusive action or to obtain an appropriate 
remedy. Therefore, this chapter will shed light on the level of protection that offered to minority 
shareholders under the Libyan regime in comparison with the protection tools that available in 
England and Morocco, and examines to what extent the Libyan shareholder protection regime 
would benefit from the long commercial experience in England and the new adopted means in 
Morocco. The suggested reform would take into account that there is no workable ready-made 
system of protection for the minority shareholder that can be wholly adopted by Libyan 
corporate law.  
However, before proceeding any further, it has to be pointed out that after the establishing of 
United Kingdom of Libya on 1953 until the earlier part of Gaddafi’ Regime (1970s) the 
contribution of the private sector to investment exceeded 30% of the investment. 697 
                                                 
696 In contrast see s. (31) (1) of the Companies Act 2006 which provides that; unless a company's articles 
specifically restrict the objects of a company, its objects are unrestricted. 
697 S Ganous, Libyan Revolution in 30 Years, Political, Economic and Social Transformations, 1969-1999 (1st 
edn, Dar Al Jamahiriya for Publication, Distribution and Advertising 1999 Libya), at 225. 
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Nonetheless, as the latter regime adopted the socialist policy the Libyan government during the 
1980s and 1999s became the major controller of the Libyan economic system.698 However, it 
was clearly seen in the last decade of the Gaddafi era that the Libyan economic system is being 
relatively transitioned into a market economy and a functioning capitalistic regime. In this 
regard, many privatisation policies were adopted during the 2000s to encourage this 
transition.699 After the fall of this regime in August 2011, a comprehensive review of economic 
legislation became a key task for the future Libyan legislatures so as to adopt effective rules 
that complete such a transition and contribute to the development of the commercial 
environment in Libya. In that process, new rules need to be adopted which offer a sort of 
protection to all investors who wish to set up their business in Libya. One group of investors 
who need this protection are minority shareholders as result of the application of the majority 
rule principle. Taking these considerations into account this chapter will focus mainly on the 
existing provisions in the Business Activities Act 2010, the Civil Code 1953 and other related 
laws. This study aims at finding out the weak and inefficient aspects of laws dealing with the 
protection of minority shareholders and what lessons can be learned from the English and the 
Moroccan jurisdictions in order to minimise the possibility of abusive conduct by the 
controllers of the company. To reach such a conclusion the protection of minority shareholders 
under the Libyan regime will be discussed in two main points, the first part deals with rights 
and instruments that could prevent or reduce the possibility of abusive conduct by the majority 
shareholders (the preventative approach) while the second part will shed light on the 
                                                 
698 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies , Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 93. 
699 4845 companies were privatised under this policy see Hesham Shernanna and S Elfergani, Privatisation and 
Broaden the Ownership Base "A Step towards the Application of the People’s Socialist (International Centre for 
Studies and Research 2006). 
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shareholder’s right to ask the judicial authority to protect the minority shareholder and what 
types of remedies that could be obtain by such litigation (the remedial route).700 
5.2 Rights and instruments offered by Libyan Law to prevent or reduce the possibility of 
abusive conduct by the company’s controllers 
 The Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 grants each shareholder essential rights that cannot 
be touched by the controllers of the company via the board of directors or the general assembly. 
Such rights enable each shareholder to participate in the management of the company and 
practice a sort of supervision over the majority shareholders and the other institutions inside 
the company. In spite of the essential rights that are granted to each shareholder, there are other 
rights that are exclusively given to the minority shareholders whose own specific percentage 
of the company’s capital. Through such rights the abusive conduct of majority shareholders 
might be stopped at an early stage and by which the minority shareholders would be able to 
participate in the management of the company.701 
5.2.1 Shareholders’ right to obtain documents and have information about the company  
 In most cases the majority shareholder either control the company or have a good relationship 
with those controllers, therefore, they usually have easy access to those documents, however, 
this is not the case with the powerless shareholder who is in real need of all information to 
protect his own interests. Therefore, each shareholder should be allowed to have documents 
and information relating to his or her company, by such information and documents a 
shareholder becomes able to practice effectively his role of participation during the meetings 
of the general assembly and giving his vote with full knowledge of facts. Such a right serves 
the interests of minority shareholders rather than the interests of the majority one. What is 
                                                 
700 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 




more, the majority shareholder would usually attempt to prevent the minority shareholder from 
getting any information that may lead such a minority curtailing their actions or start litigation 
against the majority. To obtain such information the legislature puts some obligations on the 
board of directors and other institutions inside the company to enable the shareholders to access 
documents related to shareholder meetings, inventory, financial statements, consolidated 
accounts, reports of the board of directors, draft resolutions submitted to the general assembly 
and related subjects.702 Obtaining such information would make the general meetings for the 
minority shareholder more effective. 
Although, the right to obtain certain information can be exercised at any time, however, it is 
seen from ss. 223-224 of the Business Activities Act 2010 that the Libyan Legislature does not 
give enough effect to such right as s. 224 allows a shareholder only to see the register of the 
shareholders and the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings and their decisions. The above 
sections do not give a shareholder a right to ask for the financial statements nor the minutes of 
the board of directors and its decisions, also a shareholders is not allowed to see the minutes of 
the supervisors’ committees. 703  In contrast with the Libyan position, having seen in the 
previous chapter that ss. 140 and 141 of the JSC Act in Morocco grant each shareholder a right 
to have all the required information from the day of calling the meeting or at least in fifteen 
days before the next scheduled meeting.704 Giving a shareholder a right to have the agenda of 
the next meeting would prevent the controllers of the company from adding or dropping out 
any new points in that meeting. If the controllers of the company are allowed to discuss new 
points some abusive decisions might be taken with no consideration to the interests of other 
                                                 
702 S Ghumidh, Bahraini Commercial Companies Law, Provisions and Explanations (1st edn, University of 
Bahrain, Bahrain 2014), at 184. 
703 See F Ahmouda, ‘Transparency in Companies Law’ (2014) 3 Journal of Legal Sciences 65, at 87-97. See also 
M Tibar’ ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 101. 
704 Such information is listed by s. 141 of JSC Act 1996, for more details see Chapter Four (4.3.1.1), at 131-132. 
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absent shareholders. A shareholder under Moroccan law is also allowed to have the information 
that is listed by s. 141 upon his or her request as s. 146 of the JSC Act 1996 provides that each 
shareholder has a right to have all the information that is listed in s. 141 at any time.705 If a 
shareholder is prevented from gaining that information either entirely or partly, s. 148 of JSC 
Act 1996 in Morocco grants that shareholder a right to petition the Presiding judge of the 
Commercial Court to issue an order that obligates the company to give the petitioner 
shareholder all the required information.706 Under English law a shareholder is given a variety 
of rights which ensure that he obtains the necessary information regarding his or her company. 
For instance, under s. 431 of the Companies Act 2006 a member of an unquoted company has 
a right to be provided, on demand and without charge, with a copy of (a) the company’s last 
annual accounts, (b) the last directors’ report, and (c) the auditor’s report on those accounts 
(including the statement on that report).707 In addition to that a shareholder under s. 310 of the 
Companies Act 2006 has a right to receive notice of any general meeting, and to inspect 
minutes of general meeting (ss. 248-355-358 CA 2006).708 In this regard, s. 740 of the Hong 
Kong Companies Ordinance 2012 (Cap 622) confers either shareholders holding at least 2.5% 
of the voting rights, or at least 5 shareholders of the company a right to apply to the court for 
an order requiring the company to disclose its records or documents. The court under s. 740 (2) 
has a discretion to order inspection of a company's records or documents if it is satisfied that 
the application is made in good faith and the inspection is for a proper purpose. Moreover if 
the court issues such an order a shareholder or group of shareholders are allowed to make 
                                                 
705 A shareholder is allowed by s. 147 of the JSC 1996 to take a copy of those documents as he or she might need 
to consult a professional person regarding one or some issues, moreover s. 157 of the JSC Act 1996 grants a 
shareholder a right to delegate a proxy to practice the right that is given by ss. 141-145-146, for more details see 
Chapter Four (4.3.1.1), at 131-132. 
706 With such an order, the court issues a daily fine for the delay in granting the shareholder the listed information.  
Moreover, s. 392 of the JSC Act imposed a fine on the controllers of the company from 8000 to 40000 Moroccan 
Dirham if they do not comply with the above sections. For more details, see Chapter Four (4.3.1.1), at 131-132. 
707 See Chapter Three (3.1), at 66. 
708 See Chapter Three (3.1), at 66. 
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copies of the records or documents.709 In this context, the claimant shareholders in the recent 
case of Artan Investments Ltd & Ors v The Bank of East Asia Ltd & Ors710 succeeded in 
convincing the court that the claim was in good faith and it is for a proper purpose therefore 
the court issued an order requiring the company to disclose its records and related documents. 
The above section confers the minority shareholders with quite broad right of access to 
company records which is considered as a power weapon for minority shareholders to seek 
discovery and inspection of records and documents of companies therefore it should be adopted 
in Libya. 
In short, the shareholders’ right to obtain documents and have information about the company 
under Libyan law is not well organised as shareholders have only limited access to some non-
important documents (the minutes of the shareholders meetings and their decisions) with no 
ability to have the financial statements, the minutes of the board of directors and its decisions. 
Therefore, a shareholder under Libyan company law should have a right of access to all 
important information such as that provided by s. 141 of the JSC and a shareholder should be 
allowed to obtain this information upon their request with the ability to have a copy of those 
documents to consult an expert or grants a shareholder a right to delegate a proxy to exercise 
the right. Furthermore, enhancing the role of minority shareholders in Libya regarding this right 
necessitates the adoption of s. 740 of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012 which grants 
minority shareholders a right to apply to the court for an order requiring the company to 
disclose its records or documents if the claimant satisfy that court that the application is made 
in good faith and the inspection is for a proper purpose. Moreover the Libyan legislature needs 
to the adopt the policy of s. 392 of the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco by which the Libyan courts 
                                                 
709 S. 740 (3) of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, 2012.  
710 [2015] HKCU 1268. 
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would be able to issue a daily fine on the controllers of the company for the delay in granting 
the claimant shareholder the records or the related documents. 
5.2.2 Minority shareholder’s right to convene general meetings or to include specific items 
on the agenda 
Shareholders in their general assembly711 are the supreme body of the company where most of 
the company’s decisions are taken. Attending those meetings allows minority shareholders to 
participate in appointing and removing directors, appoint the members of the supervisors 
‘committee, decide the compensation for directors, and make decisions on the liability of 
directors and member of the supervisors’ committee.712 That is to say, via such meetings 
shareholders will exercise their rights to vote and consequently have an opportunity of taking 
part in running the affairs of the company by questioning the directors regarding their 
management of the company’s business.713 Thus the shareholders' meeting plays a critical role 
in the company's life.  
In this manner s. 154 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 authorises the board of 
directors to summon the general meeting and publication of such notice shall be given at least 
15 days before the meeting is held. As regards the minority shareholder, s. 155 provides that 
the board of directors is obliged to call the general meeting whenever shareholders owning not 
less than 10% of the company’s capital request the general meeting to be convened. In their 
request the minority shareholders have to list any point that needs to be discussed in that 
meeting. However, if the board of directors has not called the general meeting to be convened 
it is the job of the supervisors’ committee to make such an invitation. If neither the board of 
                                                 
711 S. 153 of the Business Activities Act 2010 provides two types of general meeting; the ordinary general meeting 
and special general meeting. 
712 See L Segato, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the United States: Parmalat as 
a Case Study’ (2006) 26(2) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 373, at 391. 
713 S Ghumidh, Bahraini Commercial Companies Law, Provisions and Explanations (1st edn, University of 
Bahrain, Bahrain 2014), at 232. 
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directors nor the supervisors ‘committee have called the general meeting to take place the 
president of the primary court upon a request from those shareholders will convene the general 
meeting to be held and the court in its order has to determine the chairman of that meeting.  By 
such rights the minority shareholders have not only a chance to have a general meeting upon 
their request, but also impose their points on the majority shareholders as this general meeting 
will discuss the requested points by the minority shareholders.714 Having discussed in chapter 
four that, s.116 of JSC Act in Morocco enables a shareholder or groups of shareholder who 
hold at least 10% of the shares or lees than this percentage in the case of urgency to go to the 
court to appoint a judicial proxy to invite the general assembly to be convened.715 In England, 
shareholders with at least 10% of the voting rights (5% if no shareholders’ meeting has been 
held for more than 12 months) have a right to call a general meeting (s. 303 CA 2006). 
Furthermore, s. 306 of the Companies Act 2006 confers each shareholder a right to ask the 
court to call a general meeting. 
Section 155 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 (like s. 116 of the JSC Act in Morocco 
and s. 303 CA 2006) has not been immune from criticism as it is not always easy in practice to 
muster 10% of shareholders in the company with large number of shareholders. However, it 
was seen that s. 166 of JSC 1996 in Morocco disregarded this percentage in the case of urgency, 
and s. 303 of Companies Act 2006 reduced this percentage to 5% if no shareholders’ meeting 
has not been held for more than 12 months), whereas Libyan Law has not adopted such 
exceptions. Additionally, having seen that under s. 306 of Companies Act 2006 that each 
shareholder has a right to ask the court to call a general meeting, therefore, such rule needs to 
be adopted in Libya. Although this right is not widely used in England, however, having such 
                                                 
714 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 112. 
715  S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished 
dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 13. 
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a statutory right would make the controllers of the company more cautious and it enables an 
individual shareholder to ask the court to call a meeting where the 10% level could not be 
obtained.  In Egypt, s. 61 of the Egyptian Companies 1981716 grants a number of shareholders 
representing at least 5% of the company’s capital a right to ask the board of directors to invite 
the general assembly, however their request has to be based upon serious reasons, and it is 
within the discretionary power of that board to accept their request or not. It undoubtedly 
appears that that board of directors is not the right organ to examine the shareholders’ request, 
as in most cases such a request would be rejected. Therefore, the English and Moroccan 
position that allows the judicial authority to interfere and order a general assembly to take place 
is recommended. However, the Egyptian position of granting only 5% of the shareholders this 
right is suggested for both Libyan and Moroccan jurisdictions. It has to be pointed out here that 
s. 519 of the  former Libyan Commercial Code 1953 allows a number of shareholders 
representing at least 20% of the capital to practise this right so such a percentage was reduced 
and it is recommended for the Libyan legislature to reduce this percentage again to 5% of 
company’s capital.717 To prevent nonsense claims the courts have to ascertain that the board of 
director or the supervisory boards were not willing to invite the general meeting to such an 
event and the number of claimant shareholders forms the required percent of the company’s 
capital unless it is proved that it is an urgent case.718  
Since the above provision establishes only the right of calling the general meeting with no 
mention to whether a shareholder would be able to cancel or at least delay the next general 
meeting, having illustrated in chapter four that the Moroccan courts have adopted a principle 
by which the judge of the Commercial Court as an urgent judge is allowed to delay the general 
                                                 
716 Act No 159, 1981. 
717 The Commercial Code, 1953.  
718 See the decision of the Commercial Court of Casablanca, case No 89/449, issued on 18/08/1998 (2000) 82 
Journal of Moroccan Courts 209, at 213. 
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meeting wherever it seems that there are justifiable reasons.719 Therefore, such a principle 
needs to be adopted by Libyan laws and shareholders should have a right to invite and cancel 
or at least delay the next general meetings. 
In addition to the minority right to summon the general meeting in some circumstances they 
need to discuss specific points at those meetings, so that it is significant for those shareholders 
to partake in the management of the company and to have their viewpoints considered. In this 
regard, s. 154 of Business Activities Act 2010 allows a number of shareholders representing at 
least 10% of the company’s capital to ask the board of directors to list some points on the 
agenda of the general meeting. This request has to be submitted at least 5 days before the date 
of the meeting. The chairman of the general meeting has to mention these points at the 
beginning of the meeting and the consent of the majority of the present shareholders is required 
to discuss these points. We saw in chapter four that s. 117 of the Moroccan JSC Act 1996 gives 
a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 5% of the capital (or 2% if the 
company’s capital is five Millions Dirham) a right to ask for listing some specific items on the 
agenda of the general meeting. 720  It is apparent that following the Moroccan position of 
reducing the percent to 5% would offers a better chance to the minority shareholders to 
participate in the management of the company. The importance of this section is that it allows 
the minority shareholder to have their opinions considered and recommend some persons to 
hold positions in the board of the directors; consequently they would have some representations 
on that board.721 Furthermore, sub (6) of s. 163 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 
provides that the general meeting shall not consider any matters not listed on the agenda, 
                                                 
719 The Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca, decision No 1630, file No 83/1113, issued on 13/12/1983, in 
this case the court grounded its judgment on s. 149 of the Civil Procedural Law which allows the president of the 
Primary Court to work as an urgent judge in these circumstances, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders 
Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 271. 
720 For more details, see Chapter Four (4.3.1.2.), at 134-135-136. 
721 A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar 
Alafag Almagribia 2013), at 289. 
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however, if a number of shareholders representing 10% of the capital discover some prejudicial 
acts after the agenda has been prepared or during the meeting it is possible for the general 
meeting to discuss these points upon their request. Though, the Libyan legislature has not 
provided any guidance for determining the prejudicial actions therefore whenever the minority 
shareholders realise that some acts might affect their own interests or may affect the interests 
of the company as a whole they are allowed to ask the general meeting to discuss such points 
in the subject general meeting.722 Likewise, s.118 of the JSC 1996 in Morocco prevents the 
general meeting from discussing any point unless it was already added to that agenda, but it 
has not given the minority shareholders the chance to discuss any new actions. 
Briefly, the Libyan legislature attempts to protect the minority shareholders by giving them 
rights to call the general meeting and schedule any points on its agenda; by such rights they are 
able to play effectual role in the company’s decisions, in particular where the board of directors 
is under the control of the majority shareholders. However, such rights would not serve the 
minority shareholders who hold less than 10% of the voting rights therefore this percentage 
needs to be reduced to 5% either for the minority shareholder’s right to call the general meeting 
or to list some point on its agenda. Having seen that s. 306 of Companies Act 2006 allows each 
shareholder to ask the court to call a general meeting, therefore, such policy needs to be adopted 
in Libya. 
It was discussed in the previous chapter that the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco provides other 
supervision organs such as the statutory auditors and the appointed expert which are created to 
make sure that the majority shareholders are not abusing the interests of other shareholders, In 
Libya this role was given to the supervisors’ committee and the external auditor therefore, the 
                                                 
722 M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 23/ 
2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 113. 
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function of such organs in protecting the minority shareholders will be discussed in the next 
two sub-sections. 
5.2.3 The supervisors’ committee as a means of protection to minority shareholders  
Legislation contained in different statutes performs various kinds of oversight over companies 
to prevent any diversion from the company’s goals.723  To control the company’s activities in 
Libya s. 196 of the Business Activities Act 2010 provides that each joint stock company has a 
supervisors’ committee724 that is composed from three main persons; one of them needs to have 
a high accounting qualification and one has to hold a high law degree. Such a committee has 
to be held at least once every three months.725 The members of this committee should not be a 
relative of a fourth degree to the chairman or members of board of directors or general 
directors.726 The policy behind these conditions is to ensure that the members of this committee 
are independent members and they are not under the influence of the controllers of the 
company. However, as the same provision provides that it is the role of the general meeting to 
appoint the members of the supervisors’ committee and to fix their remuneration, there is a 
high possibility of having members who are in close relationship with them in disregarding the 
interests of minority shareholders.727 
To play an important role in preventing the controllers of the company from abusing their 
power and to ensure that managerial actions are not based on personal whims s. 200 of the 
                                                 
723 S Ghumidh, Bahraini Commercial Companies Law, Provisions and Explanations (1st edn, University of 
Bahrain, Bahrain 2014), at 275. 
724 However, it is possible for the commercial banks that are under the supervision of the Libyan Central Bank to 
provide in their Article of Association another tool of control instead of the supervisor’s committee. S. 196 of the 
Business Activities Act, 2010. 
725 S. 201 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
726 See s. 197 of the Business Activities Act to have more details regarding who is qualified to be appointed as a 
member of the Supervisors’ Committee. 
727 If the members of this committee were not appointed in the memorandum of association, promoters of the 
company may appoint those members to carry out their jobs until the constituent general meeting is held, s. 198 
of the Business Activities Act, 2010. See M Madi, and F Alzahwi, Commercial Companies in Libyan Law 
(University of AlJabal Algharbi, Libya 1997). 
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Business Activities Act 2010 establishes that the supervisors’ committee has to monitor the 
controllers of the company and make certain that there is no breach to the memorandum of 
association. Besides, it is the function of this committee to fulfil an important financial and 
technical control over the company to assure that the controllers of the company act within 
their authorised power. It is obligatory for the supervisors’ committees to attend meetings of 
the general assembly and the board of directors,728 also it is obligatory for this committee to 
summon the general meeting to be convened if the board of directors has not done this task. 
In addition to the indirect protection that is offered to the minority shareholders by the 
supervisors’ committee as described above, the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 provides 
some tools that give the minority shareholders the power to protect themselves directly via this 
organ. In this context, each shareholder can file a complaint with the supervisors’ committee 
concerning acts he deems censurable, and the committee has to take the complaint into account 
and mention to it in its report to the general meetings with its suggestions and recommendations 
regarding this issue.729 Furthermore, if a shareholder or group of shareholders representing 5% 
of the company’s capital complain to the above committee, it is compulsory for the committee 
to carry out without delay an urgent investigation and submit a report with its findings and 
recommendations to the general assembly. The supervisors’ committee might invite the general 
meeting to be convened if it seems that there are serious reasons to justify the complaint.730 It 
has to be mentioned here that there is a high possibility that members of supervisors’ 
committees are in close relationship with members of the board of directors so that they might 
not give such complaint any attention. Furthermore, even where the supervisors’ committees 
reports it to the general meeting such complaint would have no effect where the board of 
directors forms the majority of that general meeting. 
                                                 
728 S. 202 of the Business Activities Act, 2010.  
729 S. 205 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
730 S. 205 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
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As regards to the board of directors’ decisions, s. 181 of the Business Activities Act 2010 grants 
the supervisors’ committees a right to file the nullity action if such decisions harm the interests 
of the company within three months from the issuing date of the subject decision. Such action 
is more effective than action taken by minority shareholder as the supervisors’ committee has 
the power to see and examine the whole documents of the company and it is authorised to 
request the board of directors and the general assembly to provide the committee with any 
information or documents that relate to that complaint.731 Last but not least, in the case of 
dismissing the chairman or any member of the supervisors’ committee the general meeting has 
to rely on reasonable reasons, furthermore, s. 198 of Business Activities Act 2010 provides that 
the decision of dismissing members or chairman of the supervisors’ committee would not be 
valid unless it is approved by the primary court after hearing their opinions. 732  In these 
circumstances, it would not be easy for the controllers of the company to terminate the office 
of the member of the supervisor’s’ committee so that they have a suitable environment to make 
effective control over the company. 
5.2.4 The role of the external auditor under Libyan law 
There is no doubt that having internal supervisory mechanisms inside the company plays an 
important role in preventing the controllers of the company from any deviation. Having said 
that, the Moroccan legislature gives the statutory auditor sufficient power to ensure that the 
interests of the whole shareholders are considered. Likewise, s. 18 of the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 requires each company to have at least one external statutory auditor to 
exercise some sort of control over the controllers of the company. However, the role of such 
auditor under Libyan law is only to exercise financial review over the company’s financial 
                                                 
731 See M Madi, and F Alzahwi, Commercial Companies in Libyan Law (University of AlJabal Algharbi. Libya 
1997). See also M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the 
Law No 23/ 2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 107. 
732 The Business Activities 2010. 
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statements prior to submit them to the annual general meeting.733 In addition to that ss. 208-
209 require the external auditor to provide a report regarding the financial and accountant 
affairs of the company, and the board of directors is required to provide this auditor with the 
final financial statements in order to examine them.  
5.2.5 Evaluating the role of the supervisor’s committee and the external auditor  
It obviously appears that the external auditor under Libyan law does not offer the minority 
shareholders any real protection in particular if it is compared with the role of the statutory 
auditor in Moroccan law. However, it may well be argued that the role of the statutory auditor 
under Moroccan law is replicated by the supervisors’ committee under the Business Activities 
Act 2010, therefore it is worthless to give the same role to two different organs. For instance, 
s.166 of the JSC Act in Morocco allows the statutory auditors to observe on permanent basis 
the accounting documents of the company and check the accuracy of the information contain 
in the company’s financial reports. Likewise, s. 200 of the Business Activities Act 2010 in 
Libya establishes that the supervisors’ committee has to monitor the controllers of the company 
and make certain that there is no breach to the memorandum of association. It is also the 
function of this committee to fulfil an important financial and technical control over the 
company to ensure that the controllers of the company act within their authorised power. It is 
mandatory under s. 202 of the Business Activities Act 2010 for supervisors’ committees to 
attend the meetings of the general assembly and the board of directors.734 Furthermore, it is 
obligatory for this committee to summon the general meeting to be convened if the board of 
directors has not done that task. The same role is applied in Morocco by the statutory auditors, 
as the board of directors and the general meeting are required by s. 170 of the JSC 1996 to 
invite the statutory auditors to attend their meetings, similarly, s. 178 of the JSC 1996 
                                                 
733 S. 208 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
734 S. 202 of the Business Activities Act, 2010.  
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considered as void all decisions that were taken by these organs in the absence of the statutory 
auditor.735  If the general meeting has not appointed a statutory auditor, s. 165 of the JSC Act 
1996 in Morocco allows each shareholder to petition to the Presiding judge of the Commercial 
Court as a judge sitting in chambers to appoint the statutory auditor. Section 176 of the JSC 
Act in Morocco grants the statutory auditor a right in the case of urgency to invite the general 
meeting, consequently, if it is believed that the minority’s interests are being disregarded, a 
general meeting has to be called to inform such minority of this conduct. The minority 
shareholders need 10% of company’s capital to call a general meeting unless an urgent case 
was proved. Moreover, the statutory auditor by his observation role would always have a higher 
chance to discover any abusive conduct. A shareholder (or group of shareholders) who holds 
at least 5% of the capital is allowed by s. 164 of the JSC Act to complain about the statutory 
auditors to the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court as judge sitting in chambers to deal 
with matters of urgency. Such a petition has to be well founded and has to be submitted within 
30 days from the happening date of the conduct complained of. When the statutory auditor has 
made mistakes or it is seen that some obstacles were facing him, s. 179 allows the board of 
directors, the supervisory board, a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold at least 5% 
of the capital to petition the court to remove the statutory auditor and appoint another auditor. 
The minority shareholder is granted a right to petition to remove the statutory auditor in order 
to avoid the cases where the majority shareholders (or the general meeting, board of directors 
or the supervisory board) disregard the role of this organ or where it seems that the statutory 
auditor is working with the majority shareholders.736 Similarly, under s. 205 of the Business 
Activities Act 2010 each shareholder can file a complaint with the supervisors’ committee 
                                                 
735  In the same manner s. 106 of the Egyptian Companies Act 1981 obligates the statutory auditor or his 
representative to be present at those meetings as the attendance of the statutory auditor with their reports will 
enable each shareholder to see those reports in direct way and have questions about those reports. 
736 Issued on 11/06/2000, cited in H Zoair, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholder by the Judicial 
Authority’(unpublished dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2009), at 25. 
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concerning acts he deems censurable, and the committee has to take the complaint into account 
and mention to it in its report to the general meetings with its suggestions and recommendations 
regarding this issue. Furthermore, if a shareholder or group of shareholders representing 5% of 
the company’s capital complain to the above committee, it is compulsory for the committee to 
carry out without delay an urgent investigation and submit a report with its findings and 
recommendations to the general assembly. The supervisors’ committee might invite the general 
meeting to be convened if it seems that there are serious reason justify their complaint.737  What 
is more, (as will be discussed in the next section) s. 206 of the Business Activities Act 2010 
allows shareholders owning not less than 10% of company’s capital to file a complaint with 
the primary court if they noticed that the acts of the supervisors’ committee is deemed 
censurable or they violated their duties.   
It is apparent that the role of the statutory auditor under Moroccan law is fulfilled by the 
supervisors’ committee under the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010, nonetheless, it has to 
be pointed out here that s. 166 of JSC Act 1996 establishes clearly that it is the duty of the 
statutory auditor to make certain that all shareholders are treated equally. However, it is worthy 
to indicate that there is no mention to the principal of equal treatment in the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010, therefore it is recommended for the policy maker to establish a duty on 
the supervisors’ committee to ascertain that all shareholders are treated equally. In addition to 
the above discussed rights and organs which offer a sort of preventative approach to the 
minority shareholders, the Libyan law grants such shareholders a right to go to the court and 
ask for judicial protection therefore, it is the function of the second part of this chapter to 
examine the right of minority shareholders to start proceedings against the controllers of the 
company in order to obtain a sufficient remedy.  
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5.3 The function of judicial authority to protect the minority shareholder under Libyan 
law 
There is no doubt that the level of protection of minority shareholders would be increased once 
they are given specific rights that grant such a minority a chance to participate in the 
management of their company. By these rights the minority shareholders might impose some 
sort of supervision over the controllers of the company so that the power of those controllers 
is restricted. There is no doubt also that the abusive conduct of majority shareholders might be 
reduced by these rights, however, that majority still have enough control to further their own 
interests and ignore the interests of minority shareholders. Therefore minority shareholders 
under Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 are allowed to go to the judicial authority either to 
nullify conduct of the controllers of the company or to obtain an appropriate remedy.738 In this 
context, the first section would shed a light on the minority shareholders’ right to bring a 
complaint to the court, while the second sub-section examines the nullity action and its 
application under Libyan law. Whereas, the last two sub-sections discuss the other actions that 
can be brought by the minority shareholders to obtain the appropriate remedy such as the 
liability actions (the personal action and the company liability action) and the winding up 
petition. 
5.3.1 The minority shareholders’ right to bring a complaint to the court  
A company as a juristic entity can only act through its controllers who are the agents of that 
company; those controllers are under a duty to act as best as they can to further the interest of 
the company. Yet, those controllers might abuse their authority and pay no attention to the 
interests of other shareholders, therefore, s. 206 the Business Activities Act 2010 allows 
shareholders owning not less than 10% of company’s capital to file a complaint to the primary 
                                                 




court if they believed that the acts of the members of the board of directors or the supervisors’ 
committee are deemed censurable or they violated their duties. Such a right grants a self-
defence mechanism for shareholders which is much stronger and more effective as a number 
of shareholders representing 10% of the company’s capital are allowed to go to the primary 
court and complain about such conduct without any previous permission. So, this complaint is 
not restricted by the consent of the general assembly or the board of director.739 The court has 
to listen to the member of the board or the supervisors’ committee within eight days from the 
date when the complaint was brought.740 It is within the discretion of this court to carry out an 
investigation over the management of the company at the expense of those shareholders and 
the court might appoint an expert or experts to make such an investigation. Moreover, it is the 
right for those shareholders to ask the court to appoint an expert to have the investigation done 
properly.741 Ii is also within the power of the court to ask those shareholders to provide a 
financial guarantee if it deems that it is necessary. This condition was adopted to prevent a 
shareholder from bringing a vexatious complaint, however, it is argued that such costs would 
prevent a shareholder from initiating even a well-grounded complaint.  
If the court deems that the evidence produced constitutes a well-founded basis of suspicion, it 
is within the power of that court after hearing the members of the board and supervisors’ 
committees in chambers to order an investigation on the company’s management at the expense 
of the petitioning shareholders. The court may order whatever it thinks fit from the 
precautionary measures and call the general meeting to hold an urgent meeting in order to take 
the needed decisions.742 Furthermore, in the most serious cases where collusion is clearly 
                                                 
739 As will be discussed later it is difficult for a shareholder to start a liability action against the member of the 
board of the directors and the member of the supervisors’ committee as such action needs permission from the 
general meetings. 
740 S. 83 of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Act, 1953.  
741 S. 201 of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Act, 1953. 
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proved between the majority of the shareholders and the directors, who acted with the 
conscious tolerance, if not the incitement, of certain shareholders s. 207 grants the court a 
power to discharge the board of directors and the supervisors’’ committee and appoint a judicial 
administrator and determines the scope of job and time for which he will hold office. It is within 
the power of such a director (the appointed judicial administrator) to start a liability action 
against the board of directors and the supervisors’ committee, and prior to the end of his 
mission he has to invite the general meeting to be convened under his presidency in order to 
appoint new board of directors and new supervisors’ committee. Moreover, s. 207 indicates 
that it is within the remit of the appointed judicial administrator to suggest a winding up of the 
company if there were serious reasons. However, the winding up suggestion needs be 
considered by the general meeting to see whether to accept or refuse this suggestion. To avoid 
a malicious application, the court empowered with full discretion to accept or refuse such a 
petition, in so doing the court will hear members of the board and the supervisors’ committee 
to give them a chance to have their opinion regarding that conduct. However, it is reasonably 
argued that although giving the court a power to ask the petitioner to provide financial 
guarantee, would reduce the possibility of having malicious petitions, however, such a 
condition would form a financial barrier which makes this mode of protection less effective.743  
In the same way, it was illustrated in the previous chapter that s. 157 of the JSC Act 1996 in 
Morocco empowers a shareholder or group of shareholders holding 10% of the capital, to 
petition the Presiding judge of the Commercial Court to appoint an expert or experts to provide 
a report regarding one or more issues relating to the company’s business. The appointed expert 
would examine whether the decisions that relate to such issue serve the company’s interests or 
only the interest of the company’s controllers. Copies of the expert’s report have to go to the 
                                                 
743 See M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law 
NO 23/ 2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 110. 
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board of directors, the supervisory boards, the statutory auditors and the petitioner. However, 
and most importantly, under Moroccan law the remuneration of the expert or experts have to 
be paid by the company, unless it was proved that the petition was abusive and it aimed to harm 
the company.744 Having said above that the financial bar would prevent a shareholder from 
starting this claim under Libyan law, therefore the Moroccan policy of paying the cost of such 
petition by the company itself would eliminate this hurdle, at the same time, putting a condition 
that the company would not pay the malicious petition would reduce an action that only aim to 
disturb the company’s business.  
In both jurisdictions (Libya and Morocco), if the expert’s report shows that there is some 
misleading by the controllers of the company, minority shareholders are allowed to go to the 
court to ask the general meeting to make an urgent call, moreover, if the court found that such 
misconduct harmed the minority shareholders an order to remedy those shareholders might be 
issued.745 Nonetheless, the job of the appointed expert in Morocco is usually related to one or 
more specific issues and it is not for the whole activities of the company while there is no such 
a restriction under Libyan Law. Having argued above that it is not always easy to have 10% of 
shareholder, therefore it recommended that such a percentage level needs to be reduced.  
In terms of appointing a judicial administrator although s. 157 of the JSC 1996 Act does not 
empower the court to appoint judicial administrator such as s. 207 of the Business Activities 
Act 2010, however, having discussed earlier that many Moroccan scholars such as Abdoalwhed 
Hamdawi746 and Amina Gomirah747 believe that there is nothing preventing the Moroccan 
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Court from applying such principle as long as s.149 of the Moroccan Civil Procedural Act 1974 
grants the president judge of the primary courts this discretionary power.748 The petition of 
appointing an interim manager of the company which is available in Libya and Morocco is not 
replicated under English Law however the procedure of appointing a caretaker receiver can 
achieve the same result. In this regard, s.37 (1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981749  provides that 
“the High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a 
receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so”.750  
From what has been discussed above, it seems that there is much convergence in this area of 
law regarding the complaint of controllers’ conduct and the appointment of a judicial 
administrator, such a mechanism in the above systems would restrict the power of majority 
shareholders and bestow the minority shareholders opportunities to prevent or reduce the 
offensive acts of the controllers of the company at early stage, furthermore, such a petition 
would make members of supervisors’ committees in Libya  more observant as they fear of 
facing this kind of petition.  
5.3.2 The nullity action  
Under ss. 160-161 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010, a resolution passed by the 
general assembly can be rendered void if such a resolution is in contravention of the law, 
memorandum or articles of associations.751 The action to have a decision set aside can be 
initiated by the board of directors, supervisors’ committee, shareholders whose objection to the 
resolution has been put in the meeting’s minutes, or any shareholders who did not attend that 
meeting. In this regard, s. 159 of the Business Activities Act 2010 provides that a shareholder 
                                                 
748 See Chapter Four (4.4.4), at 161-162-163. 
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shall not vote for himself or for whomsoever he presents in matters which he has a direct or 
indirect interests and which conflict with the company’s interests. The same section provides 
that any resolution passed in contravention of this rule is to be nullified if it is proved that such 
resolution harms the company and there is evidence that the vote of the interested shareholders 
was necessary to issue that resolution. The action to have the decision declared void must be 
filed within 60 days from the date when the decision was taken.752 It is within the power of the 
court to issue an order which suspends the implementation of the subject resolution if it is 
requested by the petitioner and it is proved that there are serious reasons for such a delay in 
implementation. 
Under these conditions minority shareholders would avoid such kind of action since they would 
find a difficulty in proving that the resolution was against the law or the company’s 
constitutions. Furthermore, the decisions that the court can make in relation to the nullity action 
are limited to either confirming the resolution or nullifying it. What is more, s. 161 allows the 
president of the primary court to ask the shareholder who filed the nullity action to provide 
appropriate financial guarantee in order to remedy any damage that might happened, such a 
condition would put up extra bar that discourages a shareholder from using such kind of costly 
action. 
In terms of the board of directors’ decisions, s. 181 of the Business Activities Act 2010 
establishes that the president of the board of directors and its members are not entitled to vote 
on matters which they have a direct interest or which have interests for their relatives of a fourth 
degree or for whomsoever they represent if such a decision in contrary to the interests of the 
company. The above section gives a member of the board who did not attend the meeting or 
who voted against the decision and the supervisors’ committees a right to file the nullity action 
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if such decisions harm the interests of the company within three months from the issuing date 
of the subject decision. The above section establishes that any complaint has to be effective as 
the supervisors’ committee has granted the power to see and examine the whole documents of 
the company and it is authorised to ask the board of directors and the general meeting to provide 
the committee with any information or documents that relate to that complaint.753  In the same 
manner, s. 338 of the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco has adopted the nullity action as a way of 
protecting the interest of the minority shareholders and the interests of the company as a whole, 
however, under Moroccan law each shareholder has a right to bring this action while the nullity 
action under Libyan law can only be initiated by the board of directors, supervisors’ committee, 
shareholders who did not attend the meeting or who voted against that decision. Moreover, in 
Morocco, a shareholder has a right to bring this claim if the principle of equal treatment to all 
shareholders was breached whereas under Libyan law the court may overrule a resolution 
merely when it is proved that such a resolution is contrary to the law or to the articles or 
memorandum of association.754 In this context, it could be reasonably argued that majority 
shareholders could issue some decisions which is not contrary to the law or the company’s 
constitution however, such decisions breach the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. 
Therefore, Libyan law should give each shareholder a right to bring an action to nullify a 
resolution that may harm the interest of those shareholders even if that decision was not 
contrary to the law or the company’s constitution. 
Having pointed out earlier that the minority shareholders would not find easy access to obtain 
the required information which proves that the subject resolution is contrary to the law or to 
the articles or memorandum of association, therefore, it is suggested that instead of asking the 
minority shareholders to prove that the conduct was so, the burden of proof should be moved 
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to the majority shareholders whereby they have to convince the court that a decision is not 
against the law nor the articles or memorandum of association, and it has not breach the equal 
treatment principle. In this regard, it is suggested that majority decisions that may affect the 
interests of other shareholders have to be issued with their justifications which would assist the 
court in considering whether the decision was abusive or not. In terms of the cost of such an 
action, the Egyptian position is highly recommended where the cost of such claims has to be 
paid by the company itself if the minority action was based on serious reasons.755  Yet the 
nullity action is not always the most suitable remedy as in some cases the minority shareholders 
would ask the controllers to reimburse their losses therefore they would rather bring the liability 
action. 
5.3.3 The liability actions  
Two different actions are provided by the Libya legislature in favour of the shareholders against 
the controllers of the company; these are the company liability action and the shareholder’s 
individual action, so the Business Activities Act 2010 does not recognize the derivative action 
that was adopted in Morocco and England. The aim of the company liability action is to cover 
the company’s damage, whereas the personal action is meant to cover shareholder’s direct 
damage.756  
5.3.3.1 The company liability action 
The directors as controllers of the company are responsible for their actions towards the 
company and its shareholders, therefore if those controllers harmed the company by their acts 
or omission it is the right for the company to sue them in order to obtain a relief. In this regard, 
s. 184 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 provides that “it is within the general 
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meeting’s power to pass a resolution to bring an action of liability by the company against the 
board members, and if such a decision was taken by the majority whose represent at least 20% 
of the company’s capital the board members are directly dismissed”. Under the above section 
the company is granted a power to withdraw its action or make conciliation by a resolution 
passed by the general meeting as long as a number of shareholders representing 20% of the 
capital have not voted against such a decision.757 It should be pointed out here that s. 184 of 
the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 has only mentioned to the company right to litigate 
against the board of directors without providing grounds of such action such as actual or 
proposed acts or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by 
directors of the company. Therefore, it is recommended for the Libyan legislature to adopt such 
grounds as those grounds introduce great guidance to those who are involving in such actions 
particularly judges and minority shareholders 
It seems from that above section that the general principle under Libyan law is that the company 
liability action against the board members can only be brought by a resolution passed by the 
general assembly of the subject company. Consequently, an individual shareholder or group of 
minority shareholders have no chance to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company 
against the wrongdoer directors unless the company itself via its general meeting has passed 
such a resolution. The minority shareholders can merely invite the general meeting to take 
place by applying s. 155 of the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010; under this section the 
board of director is obliged to call a general meeting if a number of shareholders owning not 
less than 10% of the company’s capital request the general meeting to be convened. The 
minority shareholders in their request can ask for a resolution to start an action against the 
board of directors, if neither the board of directors nor the supervisors ‘committee have called 
the general meeting to take place, the president of the primary court upon a request from those 
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shareholders will convene the general meeting to be held and will determine the chairman of 
that meeting.758 In these circumstances, s. 159 provides that members of the board of directors 
are not allowed to vote on a resolution that relates to their liability. However, it is well known 
that the members of the board are usually appointed by the majority shareholders of that 
company who would not give the consent of the general meeting therefore such directors are 
rarely being sued. So that the application of majority rule would prevent the general meeting 
from passing a resolution that allows a minority shareholder to start litigation on behalf of his 
company.759 In contrast, we saw in chapters three and four that under the English and Moroccan 
laws an individual shareholder or group of shareholders are allowed to litigate on behalf of 
their company whenever the interests of their company were affected by the conduct of its 
controllers. Although the aim of this action is to remedy the company as a legal entity and not 
the claimant shareholder, however a shareholder by such a mechanism would make the member 
of the board of directors more careful towards their company. In addition to that a shareholder 
by such an action would remedy a wrong done to the company and subsequently protect his 
own investment.760 Under s. 353 of the JSC Act 1996 in Morocco each shareholder is allowed 
to start a derivative action against; the controller of the company, the general director of the 
company and the delegated general director or the member of the two tier boards in order to 
get a remedy.761 Likewise, the minority shareholders in England under the Companies Act 2006 
(ss. 260-264), have a right to commence a derivative action on behalf of companies on widened 
grounds of conduct and the court is empowered with free discretion to deal with such kind of 
actions.762  The minority shareholders under ss. 260-264 of the Companies Act 2006 can found 
their action on actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default breach of duty 
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or breach of trust by directors of the company. Thus, the scope of derivative claim has been 
expanded to include the breach of duty of skill and care.763 Although a shareholder is allowed 
to start a derivative action under English law however it is the decision of the court to grant 
permission to continue the derivative claim, or refuse the application.764 Such permission is 
dependent on various factors such as the existence of a prima facie case and whether that claim 
was in the interests of the company as whole or not and the good faith of claimant, taking into 
account in particular to the matters identified in s. 172(1)(a-f), of the Companies Act 2006. 
Moreover, if the wrongdoings are ratified by a valid resolution the court has to accept this 
ratification and refuse permission to continue the action. In this regard, it is claimed that the 
Companies Act 2006 presents a long and cumbersome two stage procedure to obtain 
permission to continue a derivative action which makes such a way of protection ineffective 
and unusable.765 By the same token, s. 220 of the Tunisian Companies Act 2000 allows a 
shareholder or group of shareholders representing 5% of the capital to start this action if the 
company is private company and 3% in the case of public companies.766 Such a remedy ought 
to be adopted in Libya as in some cases the aggrieved shareholder is not willing to exit from 
the company; rather he prefers to stay and get his remedy or recover the lost assets of the 
company. 
It apparently seems that the Libya legislature has prevented the minority shareholders from 
having a significant tool by which an individual shareholder or group of shareholders could 
litigate against the controllers of their company. Therefore, a shareholder would not be able to 
obtain a remedy whenever a wrong was done to the company, consequently he or she is not 
                                                 
763 S. 263 (1) (2) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
764 S. 263 (3) (4) of the Companies Act, 2006. Having seen that the Companies Act, 2006 has changed the common 
law rules where the controlling shareholders was the organ that used to grant permission to sue on behalf of the 
company and continue the derivative claim. 
765 The Law Commission Shareholder Remedies (Law Com 1997) para 6-4. 
766 The Tunisian Companies Act, 2000, s. 220 (4). This Act was amended in 2009 by the Act No 16 2009. See for 




able to protect his or her own investment. This unrestricted power might harm not only the 
interests of minority shareholders but also the company as a whole. The Libyan style of a 
company liability action is inefficient in comparison with its counterparts in England and 
Morocco as a minority shareholder would not be able to sue the controllers of the company 
when the conduct of those controllers only harms the interests of such a company. Based on 
these considerations, it is necessary for the Libyan legislature to adopt a practical and modern 
model of a derivative action such as found in other comparative jurisdictions, so that each 
shareholder or group of shareholders becomes able to sue the controllers of the company and 
protect their own interests. Having seen that the Companies Act 2006 presents a long and 
cumbersome two stage procedure to obtain permission to continue a derivative action which 
makes such way of protection ineffective and unusable, it seems that the Moroccan style of 
derivative action is more workable and more appropriate therefore it is recommended to be 
adopted in Libya. However, if there is a fairness of adopting the Moroccan position the English 
style could be adopted with some adjustments in its procedures in order to prevent many 
vexatious claims from being seen by the court, as the court is considered an independent 
external organ that has no interest to stop such claim as long as it is desirable to be brought. In 
addition to that, the Libyan policy makers are advised to overcome the “clean hands” condition 
which is considered one of the major problems in the English law, as it was the main reason 
for refusing many cases.767 There are many other lessons which can be taken from the English 
law experience regarding the derivative claim, for instance, the new English law position 
regarding pure negligence as a sufficient ground of starting a derivative action which overcame 
the common law position is recommended.768 Furthermore it is also recommended for the 
Libyan legislature to adopt the policy that is adopted by the Companies Act 2006 where the 
                                                 
767 A Keay and J Loughrey ‘Derivative Proceedings in A Brave New World for Company Management and 
Shareholders’ [2010] Journal of Business Law 151. 
768 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). 
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Act does not require the claimant to prove that the acts or omission have been already 
committed as long as it is proved that it is proposed for the future. Besides, in order to obtain 
permission to continue a derivative claim a shareholder under English laws is no longer 
required to prove fraud on minority and that the wrongdoers were in control of company.  
In terms of the subject of types of directors, Libyan law has not mentioned de jure directors, de 
facto directors769 and the shadow directors,770 so it is arguable that the term “director” should 
include all these kind of directors. It was seen that a derivative action in England can be taken 
against the company’s directors or any involved third party, while the company liability action 
in Libya could only be taken against the board members. Having shown that some shareholders 
have sufficient power to control the company without being member of its board, therefore the 
wording of s. 353 of JSC 1996 in Morocco and 260 of the Companies Act 2006 is more 
appropriate as it not only includes the members of the board but also the controllers of the 
company even if they are not members of the company board. In terms of the costs of such 
litigation which forms a big obstacle that prevents many shareholders from using the derivative 
action, the indemnity cost order which applied under English law would overcome such bar. 
To remove this bar the principle adopted in Egypt is recommended where the cost of such 
claims has to be paid by the company if it is proved by the minority shareholder that the action 
was based on serious reasons.771 In addition to the company liability action the Business 
Activities Act 2010 grants each shareholder a right to start litigation to protect his own interest, 
as the conduct of the controllers of the company might not harm the company’s interests rather 
infringe the personal rights and interest of other shareholder. 
 
                                                 
769 S. 250 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
770 S. 260 (5) (c) of the Companies Act, 2006, see J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). 
771 S. 76 of the Egyptian Companies Act, 1981. 
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5.3.3.2 The shareholder’s individual action (the personal action) 
The majority shareholders with their unlimited power are able to take abusive decisions which 
not only harm the interest of their company but also damage the interests and rights of an 
individual shareholder.772 In this context, the controllers of the company might prevent some 
shareholders from receiving their entitled dividends or preventing a shareholder from practising 
his pre-emption right where new shares are issued.773 Such an aggrieved shareholder has to be 
given a tool to protect his own interests, therefore, it is established by s. 186 of the Business 
Activities Act 2010 that a company’s right to sue its controllers does not affect the right to 
reimburse for damage done to an individual shareholder. So that an individual shareholder or 
group of shareholders have a right to bring a personal action against the board members to 
remedy damages that have affected the personal interests of those shareholders. However, it is 
also established by the same section that the claimant shareholder has to prove that the conduct 
of the board members of the company has directly harmed the interests of such a shareholder. 
Furthermore, the claimant shareholder has to prove that this damage was a result of fraud or 
negligence of the board members.  
In this regard, if the shareholder was illegitimately excluded from a share of the profits, he or 
she has a right to start this action. However, as s. 186 required the direct damage for the 
aggrieved shareholder to start this action, therefore, a shareholder who is indirectly affected by 
a wrong done to the company due to a breach of duty owed to it would not be allowed to bring 
such an action to recover a reflective loss from a corporate injury, as this kind of damage has 
                                                 
772 Such kind of rights and interests derive from the statutory legislations, the company’s constitutions or from the 
legitimate expectations of each shareholder. For instance, the shareholder’s right to share of the company’s profits, 
or to receive a copy of the company’s annual account and his right of being a member of a company which is run 
lawfully, therefore, a shareholder is allowed to sue the controllers of the company if his personal right to attend 
general meeting and vote or to receive dividends was infringed. 
773 I Alsagair, Monitoring the Controllers of the Joint Stock Company under Libyan and Moroccan Laws (1st edn, 




to be recovered by the company itself. That is to say, the no reflective loss principle which is 
applied by English law is also applicable under Libyan Law, so that, if the director’s conduct 
damaged the interests of the company and a shareholder showed that such conduct has 
indirectly affected his personal interests, that shareholder would not be able to start a personal 
action and those directors could only be held liable by the liability action under s.184.  
The above principle would restrict the minority shareholders’ right to use the personal action 
particularly in small private companies where the loss of such entity is considered a personal 
loss to each shareholder.774 Furthermore, s. 186 of the Business Activities Act 2010 puts 
another condition on the claimant shareholders as he needs to prove that the damage was a 
result of fraud or negligence of the company’s directors. Under the above conditions it would 
very difficult to see many individual actions coming before the courts. In contrast, s. 353 of the 
JSC Act in Morocco enables each shareholder or group of shareholders to bring a personal 
claim to protect their own interest and has not adopted the “no reflective loss” principle. 
Furthermore, the claimant shareholder is not required to prove that such damage was a result 
of fraud or negligence of the board members, therefore the Moroccan system of personal action 
needs to be adopted in Libya. What is more, the personal action under Libyan law can only be 
brought against the company’s board members as s. 186 has not referred to de jure directors, 
de facto directors and the shadow directors, while under English and Moroccan laws this action 
can be brought against any involved shareholders who have sufficient power to control the 
company without being member of its board. Therefore, the wording of the section needs to be 
amended and the term “directors” should be replaced by the term “controllers” in order to 
include any complicit shareholders or directors who have sufficient power to control the 
company without being a member of its board. Briefly, the rule introduced by the Business 
Activities Act 2010 regarding the personal action cannot be considered a decisive remedy 
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principally since it is difficult to meet the conditions of negligent and fraud in addition to the 
no reflective loss bar. The difficulty of proving the direct damage inflicted on the minority 
shareholders presents a substantial obstacle to success in a personal claim against the 
controlling shareholder.  
5.3.4 The winding up remedy 
The winding up is the process of putting an end to the life of a company and the giving up of 
its business. This extreme action should not take place unless it becomes apparent to some 
shareholders that trust and confidence among the company members is no longer existent. In 
this manner, s. 30 of the Business Activities Act 2010 allows each shareholders to go to the 
court and ask for the winding up of a company in the cases where the other shareholders breach 
their duties, there are continues disagreements between the shareholders or where the court 
finds serious reasons justifying such a dissolution. This right is a public policy right so that any 
agreement that restricts this right is void. Moreover neither the general assembly nor the board 
of director could prevent a shareholder form using this right.775 It is within the power of the 
court to examine to what extent the existing disagreement is serious enough to wind up the 
subject company. However, s. 30 of the Business Activities Act 2010 has not provided any 
guidance and criteria to the court in dealing with such a petition in order to simplify its 
application, therefore, it is the job of the court to examine to what extent that the existing 
disagreement is serious enough to destroy the relationship among the shareholders.776 In this 
context, the French Supreme Court has discussed the issue and stated that general disagreement 
is not a sufficient reason to wind up the company, particularly when the financial state of the 
                                                 
775 M Tibar, The Theory of Shareholders' Rights in Joint Stock Companies; Comparative Study Between Libya, 
Egypt and France (Part 2, Matbahat Alwahda Alarbia, Alzawya, Libya 1998), at 1004. 
776 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority Shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan Law’ (Ph.D 
thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 1997), at 832. 
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subject company has not reached the deadlock point. 777  In England, having said that s. 
122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 enables a shareholder to pursued an action where there 
is a breakdown in the relationship or the trust and confidence between shareholders and it seems 
that it is just and equitable to wind up the company. However, it is within the discretion of the 
court to examine whether it is just and equitable to have the company wound up or refuse such 
a request. In this regard s. 125(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that if the court of the 
opinion that the petitioner has another remedy to pursue or the petitioner was acting 
inappropriately in seeking such a remedy the petition should be refused. The aims adopting of 
putting such a condition is to ensure that such an extreme remedy would not be ordered unless 
there are sufficient reasons. By the same token, s. 1056 of the Contracts and Obligations Act 
1913778 in Morocco grants the court a power to wind up the company if it is proved that there 
are significant disagreements amongst shareholders, or it appears to the court that the contract 
terms are being breached.779 The Moroccan courts considered that the reasons for winding up 
the company that are provided by s. 1056 are only examples therefore, by way of analogy the 
court has a discretion to wind up a company for other reasons as long as its decision was based 
on serious grounds.780 In the same manner, Libyan courts are invited to take the same position 
as the court is given a discretion power to wind up the company where the other shareholders 
breach their duties, there are continues disagreements between the shareholders or where the 
court finds serious reasons justifying such a dissolution. What can be seen here is that, the 
Moroccan and Libyan laws grant the court a wider ground to wind up the company where 
shareholders breach their duties, such a ground was not adopted by s. 122(1)(g) of Insolvency 
Act 1986 in England where a shareholder has to prove that there is a breakdown in the 
                                                 
777 Cass. Com 11/05/1960, Dalloz 1960 Som. St 31, cited in S Belmris, ‘The Protection of Minority Shareholders’ 
Rights in Joint Stock Companies’ (unpublished dissertation, High Judicial Institute, Rabat 2011), at 65. 
778 Issued on 12 August 1913 and was amended in 22 September 2011. 
779 See Chapter Four (4.3.3), at 158-159. 
780 See Chapter Four (4.3.3), at 158-159. 
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relationship or the trust and confidence between shareholders. However, it may well be argued 
that the winding up remedy is an extremist remedy therefore, it should only be granted in 
limited cases.  
Last of all, the buy-out relief which becomes the most important relief under the unfair 
prejudice remedy under English law needs to be implemented by the Libyan regime. Such a 
remedy is applied in Morocco under s. 1057 of Obligations and Contracts Act781 on the Civil 
Companies and Partnerships and by s. 221 of the JSC Act 1996 only in the case of conversion. 
This remedy was also adopted in Tunisia in 2009 where s. 290 of the Law No 16 which adjusted 
the Companies Act 2000782 allows a shareholder or group of shareholders in a non-listed 
company who hold a percentage which does not exceed 5% of the capital to sell out their shares 
and leave the company.783 Having criticised s. 209 of the Tunisian Companies Act 2000 as it 
grants this remedy only to a shareholder or group of shareholders who hold a percent does not 
exceed 5% of the capital, therefore it does not provide any protection to the minority 
shareholder who holds more than this percentage. Therefore, the Libyan legislature is advised 
to grant the buy-out relief to any shareholder regardless of its percentages of shares. Such a 
remedy would ensure that minority shareholders under Libyan company law have always the 
right to leave and sell their shares at fair value. The English law experience regarding the buy-
out remedy is recommended where the court will generally apply the pro rata formula if the 
company was a ‘quasi-partnership’,784 and will not discount the value of the shares on the 
ground that they are a minority shareholdings, even the market would apply such a discount. 
However, in some circumstances although the case of quasi-partnership is not existed, yet, the 
surrounding facts and the principles of justice require that the valuation of the petitioner shares 
                                                 
781 Issued on 12 August 1913 and was amended in 22 September 2011. 
782 Issued on 16 March 2009. 
783 See Chapter Four (4.4.4), at 163. 
784 See CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v DemarcoAlmeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
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should be made on pro rate basis rather than applying the discount basis and vice versa.785 In 
this regard, Robin Hollington QC in Re Blue Index Ltd affirmed that in valuing a petitioner 
shareholder's shares the fundamental principle was that it would be prejudicial to treat a 
wronged petitioner as a willing seller and discount the price accordingly, it would substantially 
defeat the purpose of this remedy if the wrongdoer majority shareholders were routinely 
rewarded by a discount for a minority shareholding.786 Also in determining the suitable time of 
share valuation the English law position is highly recommended where the Court of Appeal in 
Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone787 has provided comprehensive a view on the appropriate 
time of shares valuation, and it made clear principle by which the proper time of valuation is 
the date of sale, however if it appears to the court that there is more appropriate date to value 
the share the court has the power to do so. For instance in Re BC&G Care Homes Ltd: Crowley 
v Bessell788 the valuation date applied by the court was before the claimant was excluded from 
management, therefore no minority discount was applied. In short, the adoption of the buy-out 
remedy would increase the level of protection in Libya and prevents the shareholders the cost 
and lengthy litigation which also has negative effect on the company and its business. 
5.4 Conclusion   
The protection of minority shareholders under the Libyan regime was discussed in relation to 
two main points. The first part dealt with rights and instruments that aim to prevent or reduce 
the possibility of abusive conduct by majority shareholders, (the preventative approach), while 
the second part focused on shareholder’s right to ask the judicial authority to protect the 
minority shareholders (the remedial route). Under the preventative approach a shareholder 
under the current Libyan law is only allowed seeing some documents relate to the general 
                                                 
785 See Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch).  
786 [2014] EWHC 2860 (Ch), at 26. 
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meetings and the minutes and decisions of such meetings. Though such a shareholder has no 
authorised access to the documents that relate to the board of directors or the supervisors’ 
committee and their minutes. The minority shareholders are given a right to call the general 
meeting and schedule any points on its agenda; by such rights they are able to play effectual 
role in the company’s decisions, in particular where the board of directors is under the control 
of the majority shareholders. However, such a right would not serve the minority shareholders 
who hold less than 10% of the voting rights. In addition to these rights, the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 provides other supervision organs (the supervisors’ committee and the 
external auditor) which are created to ensure that the majority shareholders are not abusing the 
interests of other shareholders. 
On the other hand, under the remedial approach, once the company’s controllers committed 
wrongdoings toward the company or other shareholders the Libyan law does not offer a proper 
legal remedy that allows the aggrieved minority shareholders to bring a direct action against 
the wrongdoers in order to recover the damages suffered by such abusive conduct. Minority 
shareholders in Libya are not granted a right to bring the unfair prejudice petition that is 
applied under English law, or the simple procedure actions (derivative and personal actions) 
that are adopted in Morocco. The only action that could be brought by the aggrieved 
shareholder is the complicated personal action, where the aggrieved shareholder has to 
establish that he or she was directly affected by the conduct of the company’s controllers, 
furthermore, such a shareholder has to give an evidence of the fraud or negligence perpetrated 
by the board members. Additionally, the “no reflective loss” principle which restricts the 
personal action in England is also adopted by the Libyan law in addition to other conditions, 
so that it would not be easy to start a personal action under the current Libyan law. Whereas 
minority shareholders under the Moroccan law is allowed to bring the personal claim without 
the no reflective loss principle and claimant shareholder is not required to give an evidence of 
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the fraud or negligence perpetrated by the board members. These barriers and conditions that 
are adopted by the Libyan law need to be removed or eliminated so that minority shareholder 
can bring a personal action under flexible and accessible criteria. In England, although English 
law adopts the no reflective losses principle however, a shareholder is granted a right to petition 
under s. 994 if the affairs of the company are being or have been conducted in a manner which 
is unfairly prejudicial to the member’s interests.  
In terms of the derivative claim, having seen that under the comparative jurisdictions (England 
and Morocco), a shareholder is granted a right to litigate on behalf of the company by the 
derivative action. however, the Libyan shareholder protection regime does not recognise such 
a claim, an action of liability against company directors under s. 184 of the Business Activities 
Act 2010 can only be brought be the company itself via its general meeting, so that the minority 
would not be able to bring the company liability action against the board members unless they 
succeeded in passing a resolution by the general meeting. Beside the above obstacles, the 
wording of Libyan section has only mentioned to the action against the board members while 
it was seen that offensive conduct might be committed by non-member of the board of 
directors. Therefore, the wording of s. 184 should be amended to include as defendants all 
controllers of the company, even they are not members of the board of directors. The above 
conditions would not make the litigation an attractive solution for the minority shareholder as 
both the company liability action and the personal actions under Libyan law would not offer 
an effectual recovery to the oppressed minority shareholders. Under such complicated 
conditions to bring either the company liability action or the personal action, it seems that the 
minority shareholders can only file a complaint with the supervisory committee or by reporting 
alleged irregularities in the management of the directors to the tribunal because of 
management's statements about the financial situation of the company.  
212 
 
To sum up, this comparison has revealed the deficiencies of the Libyan rules of protecting 
minority shareholders and it apparently shows that the rules governing this protection are 
somewhat insufficient and complicated. The Libyan legal system lacks effective protections 
and remedies for minority shareholders when an abusive act has been perpetrated. The Business 
Activities Act 2010 in comparison with its equivalents in England and Morocco fails to offer 
a contemporary regime which provides sufficient statutory devices, remedies and recognition 
of specific rights for the minority shareholders. Therefore, some other rules need to be adopted 















Chapter 6   Conclusion, recommendations and future work 
6.1 Introduction 
As a result of the adoption of the socialist policy by the Gaddafi regime the Libyan government 
from the late 1970s until the beginning of 2000s became the major controller of the Libyan 
economic system.789 However, it was clearly seen in the last decade of the Gaddafi era that the 
Libyan economic system was being transitioned from a socialist policy into a free-market 
economy.790 After the fall of this regime in August 2011, a comprehensive review of economic 
legislation became a key task for the future Libyan legislatures so as to adopt effective rules 
that complete such a transition and contribute to the development of the commercial 
environment in Libya. In so doing, new rules need to be adopted which offer a level of 
protection to all investors who wish to set up their business in Libya. One group of investors 
who need this protection are minority shareholders as result of the application of the majority 
rule principle. In this regard, it is argued that having a robust system of minority shareholder 
protection is considered to be the starting-point for having a solid corporate governance regime 
and consequently a strong economic environment.791  
Based on these considerations, this research set out to determine to what extent does the Libyan 
shareholder protection regime offer equivalent protection to that found in comparable corporate 
law systems, such as England and Morocco, taking into account the fact that a country such as 
Morocco may be a rival for inward investment. In pursuit of this aim, the thesis considers the 
protection of minority shareholders in the above comparative jurisdictions, which leads us to 
examine how these systems deal with this issue and to what extent they have had success in 
                                                 
789 See M Tibar, ‘The Abusive Conduct of Minority Shareholders in Joint Stock Companies, Study in the Law No 
23/ 2010’ (2012) 1 Journal of Legal Sciences 92, at 93. 
790 See footnote 14. 
791 A Almarini, ‘The Power of Majority shareholders within Joint Stock Companies under Moroccan law’ (Ph.D 
Thesis, Mohammed V University, Rabat 1997), at 376-393. 
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adopting sufficient mechanisms that may offer a fair level of protection to minority 
shareholders in Libya. In so doing, the English and Moroccan systems were critically evaluated 
in order to extrapolate lessons that can be adopted by the Libyan law makers in the forthcoming 
reforms. Yet, a political point of view might be raised here: to what extent in country such as 
Libya, where governance in the state itself is a problem, is able to provide a good system of 
corporate governance and consequently minority shareholder protection? This view brings us 
back to the “law in the books” doctrine, where it is affirmed that law researchers are only 
advising law makers to make changes in the substantive law whilst leaving the issue of 
implementation to other studies that might be carried out by other researchers. Therefore, it is 
recognised by the author of this thesis that under these circumstances where the governance of 
the state is a fundamental problem it is critical that the legal institutions (such as the legislature 
and the courts) can operate effectively. However, it could be fairly argued that such 
circumstances will settle down one day and researchers and policy makers should not put off 
their task until that happens. So this study provides suggestions and recommendations to reform 
the current law of minority shareholder protection. In this regard, this thesis has managed to 
find out the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Libyan system of minority shareholder 
protection, consequently it was able to answer its main research question by stating that the 
Libyan shareholder protection regime does not offer a sufficient level of protection equivalent 
to that found in the English and Moroccan corporate law systems. It illustrates that the Libyan 
rules on minority shareholder protection are incomplete, insufficient and in some cases too 
complicated, thus the Libyan system of minority shareholder protection should be reformed in 
order to enhance the level of confidence among investors. This concluding chapter provides a 
summary of the main findings of the thesis which are followed by recommendations and 
proposals of possible amendments and reform. Last, but not least, some suggestions for follow 
up studies are also included. 
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6.2 Summary of the thesis’s findings  
This study embarked on a comparative route to examine to what extent the Libyan shareholder 
protection regime offers a sufficient level of protection similar to that found in the selected 
comparative jurisdictions. Applying such a comparative methodology enables the author to 
conclude that minority shareholders have very weak protection under Libyan corporate law in 
contrast with the English and Moroccan regimes. The main body of the thesis was divided into 
four chapters in addition to the introduction. Chapter two was focused upon the current 
problems where the majority shareholders misuse their unrestricted power to further their own 
interests and ignore the interests of other shareholders and the interests of the company as a 
whole. Such kind of conduct would consequently have negative effects on the minority 
shareholders, the company itself and national economy.792 It showed that minority shareholders 
are facing various forms of exploitation by the company’s controllers (either the directors or 
the majority shareholders), therefore, the law must provide sufficient mechanisms to prevent 
such conduct and protect minority shareholders.793 Section two of the second chapter illustrated 
that protection of minority shareholders would not only bring benefits to shareholders 
themselves, but also to the company and the state’s economy as well.794 Lastly this chapter 
discussed two main forms of protecting the minority shareholders, which are described as the 
preventative and remedial approaches. In this manner, corporate law should provide minority 
shareholders with rights and means that enable them to exercise some sort of control over the 
controllers of the company in order to reduce the abusive conduct of the majority shareholders. 
However, in the case where minority shareholders are being, or have been, subject to neglect, 
or oppression caused by the controllers of the company (majority rule and the managerial 
                                                 
792 See Chapter Two (2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
793 See Chapter Two (2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
794 See Chapter Two (2.3). 
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power), this system should provide sufficient means and mechanisms by which appropriate 
remedies can be obtained.795 
Having identified these theoretical issues in Chapter two, this thesis explained in chapters three 
and four how the English and Moroccan laws restrict the power of those controllers and how 
minority shareholders are able to obtain an appropriate remedy in the case of misconduct. 
Chapter three started with a historical background regarding the common law system and 
explained to what extent the position in England law was changed after the Companies Act 
2006. To evaluate the new rules under this Act it was a necessary to compare this regime with 
the common law rules where it was clarified that the minority shareholders were facing many 
difficulties in the common law rule (Foss v Harbottle796 and its exceptions) as such rules were 
so complicated.797 Therefore a new statutory derivative claim was adopted in the Companies 
Act 2006, where minority shareholders have a right to bring such an action to remedy a broad 
scope of misconduct and not only fraud.798 The English court under this Act is given a power 
to grant permission to permit a claim to proceed as part of a filtering system to ensure the 
desirability of the derivative claim. Most importantly, in terms of litigation costs, the minority 
shareholders in English law have the ability to apply for an indemnity order which asks the 
company to indemnify the claimant against his costs.799 Nevertheless, it was concluded that the 
Companies Act 2006 has not made major changes to the common law rules of derivative claim, 
as the adoption of two stages procedures in addition to the obstacles of ratification and litigation 
costs remain a considerable hurdle that prevents a minority shareholder from using the 
derivative claim.800 Such hurdles would not make the derivative claim as a first option to the 
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796 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
797 See Chapter Three (3.1). 
798 SS. 260-264 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
799 See for example Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), Kiani v Cooper [2010] EWHC 577 
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800 For more details, see chapter Three (3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). 
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abused minority shareholders particularly in light of the availability of the unfair prejudice 
remedy.801 Furthermore, it was seen that the common law derivative claim was not completely 
abolished by the Companies Act 2006 as recent decisions have affirmed that Part 11 of the 
Companies Act 2006 did not apply to double derivative actions.802 Therefore the common law 
rules of derivative actions continued to apply to double derivative claims. To avoid such 
uncertainty and to stop the complexity of the common law derivative claim reappearing it was 
suggested that Parliament should take the other common law countries’ position where the 
scope of the statutory derivative action is extended to include the double derivative actions.803 
Besides the derivative claim, a minority shareholder under English law is allowed to bring a 
personal claim to protect their own interest.804 Yet the principles of internal irregularity 805 and 
“no reflective loss” restrict such kind of action.806 Therefore, neither the statutory derivative 
claim nor the personal action have become the most preferred action for the minority 
shareholder in particular with the availability of the unfair prejudice remedy which prevail over 
those actions in terms of popularity. Although O’Neill v Phillips807 has restricted the scope of 
the unfair prejudice remedy, however, it remains the favoured remedy with its easier 
requirements to meet and with its effectiveness to remedy a broad scope of wrongs. In other 
words, the complex procedures in derivative and personal actions and the extremist result of 
the winding-up remedy makes the unfair prejudice remedy the most practical remedy that a 
                                                 
801 See Chapter Three (3.3.4). 
802 See for example Bhullar v Bhullar & Ors [2015] EWHC 1943 (Ch), Abouraya v Sigmund & Ors [2014] EWHC 
277 (Ch) and Universal Project Management v Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348 (Ch). 
803 In Australia See s. 236 of the Corporations Act 2001, in Canada see ss. 238 and 239(1) of the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act 1985, in New Zealand See s. 165(1)(a) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993.    
In Singapore see s. 216A (1) of the Companies Act (Cap. 50, Statutes of Singapore), in Hong Kong see 
Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas [2008] HKCU 1381 cited in J Bailey and J Mugerwa, ‘Multiple 
derivative actions in company law: can you or can’t you?’ (2013) 34 (10) Company Lawyer 302, at 304. 
804 See Chapter Three (3.2). 
805 See Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, and Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
806 See Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1982] Ch 204, and Gardner v Parker [2004] 2 BCLC 554. 
For the exceptions of the no reflective rule principle see Giles v Rhind [2002] 4 All ER 977, Rehman v Jones Lang 
La Salle [2013] EWHC 1339 (QB) and Malhotra v Malhotra [2014] EWHC 113 (Comm) [2015] 1 BCLC 428. 
807 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
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shareholder can pursue to obtain a remedy.808 In addition to above mentioned remedies, a 
minority shareholder under English law is granted a right to go to the court to request an order 
to wind up the company if it is just and equitable that the company be wound up, however it 
seems that there is a reluctance to apply this extreme remedy as the court prefers to order a 
minority shareholder to be bought out, rather than a company being wound up.809 Under these 
circumstances, the unfair prejudice remedy has developed in English law and become the most 
prevalent remedy for minority shareholder. 810  Besides the examination of the remedial 
approach (derivative and personal actions, unfair prejudice remedy and winding up remedy) of 
minority shareholder under English law, it was briefly mentioned at the beginning of the 
English chapter that a shareholders under the Companies Act 2006 have certain statutory rights 
which offer a type of precautionary protection to the minority shareholder. These rights 
comprise for example: shareholder’s right to ask the court to call a general meeting,811 the right 
to inspect minutes of general meetings.812 In addition, shareholders with at least 10% of the 
voting rights (or 5% if no shareholders’ meeting has been held for more than 12 months) have 
a right to call a general meeting.813 Also shareholders with 10% of the voting rights have a right 
to have the company’s annual accounts audited.814 In brief, the examination of the English 
regime of minority shareholder protection with its long experience and knowledge has 
proffered beneficial lessons that can be taken up by the Libyan policy makers in any upcoming 
reform.  
                                                 
808 See Chapter Three (3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). 
809 See Chapter Three (3.5). 
810 Having seen in this study that the recent minority shareholder actions show that there have been a considerable 
number of cases dealing with unfair prejudice remedy whereas there have been relatively reported instances of 
derivative claims beating trial. 
811 S. 306 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
812 SS. 248-355 and 358 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
813 S. 303 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
814 S. 476 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
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Having said that the aim of this work is to provide a basis for suggestions on how to improve 
minority shareholders protection in Libyan based on the English and Moroccan experience, 
therefore, after the consideration of such a protection under the English law, chapter four 
examined the protection of minority shareholders under Moroccan laws. Under this jurisdiction 
minority shareholders are given specific rights that allow them to participate in the management 
of the company, furthermore a supervisory organ inside the company was created to ensure 
that the interests of the company and all shareholders are being taken into account in the 
company’s decisions. The minority shareholders under the Moroccan law have a right to call a 
general meeting and schedule any point on its agenda and prevent the controllers from 
discussing any issue which was not listed in that schedule.815 In addition to these rights, the 
statutory auditor and the appointed judicial administrator are playing a supervision role over 
the controllers of the company, yet, the minority shareholders with less 10% of the capital 
would not be able to use this method.816  Although the law No 20.05 that was issued on 
23/05/2008 and which amended the JSC (17-95) has strengthened the minority protection 
regime where it reduced the 10% holding of the capital that was required to complain about the 
statutory auditor to 5%,817 however, such a percentage figure is still that same regarding the 
appointment of an expert and calling a general meeting to be held. 
On the other hand, under the remedial mechanism minority shareholders have a right to litigate 
against the controllers of the company either by the nullity action818 where the subject conduct 
would be rendered void or by liability actions (personal and derivative claims)819 where an 
appropriate remedy could be obtained. No previous permission from the company is required 
to start such proceedings and any agreement that prevents a shareholder from using such 
                                                 
815 SS .116-117-118 of JSC Act, 1996. 
816 See s. 157 and ss.159 to 179 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
817 S. 179 of the JSC Act, 1996 after the amendment by the Law No 20.05 which was issued on 23/05/2008. 
818 SS. 337 to 348 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
819 See ss. 352-353-354 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
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actions or put some restrictions on the shareholder’s right to use these actions is deemed 
void.820 Furthermore, under the Moroccan rules of personal claim it was noted that the “no 
reflective loss” principle which restricts the personal action in England and Libya is not 
applied.821 A shareholder under Moroccan law is also allowed to present a petition in order to 
wind up the company whenever it seems that there are significant disagreements amongst the 
shareholders, or it appears to the court that the contract terms are being breached.822 To avoid 
the winding up result it was seen823 that the provisional manager petition (which was applied 
by the French courts) is adopted in Morocco which has increased the level of protection.  
Identifying these mechanisms and tools under English and Moroccan laws gave a wide 
understanding of how minority shareholders are being protected under other comparable 
jurisdictions. Such an evaluation made it possible for this thesis to develop its own arguments 
in chapters five where the Libyan regime of minority shareholder protection was considered in 
comparison with the level of protection that offered by the above systems. The protection of 
minority shareholders under Libyan regime was discussed in two main sections, the first 
section described the rights and instruments that aim to prevent or reduce the possibility of 
abusive conduct by majority shareholders, (the preventative approach), while the second part 
focused on the shareholder’s right to ask the judicial authority to protect the minority 
shareholders (the remedial route). Under the first approach, it was seen that minority 
shareholders are only allowed to see some documents relating to the general meetings, minutes 
and decisions of such meetings. So minority shareholders are not authorised to access all the 
documents that relate to the board of directors or the supervisors’ committee and their 
                                                 
820 See ss. 352-353-354 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
821 See ss. 352-353-354 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
822 S. 1056 of the Contracts and Obligations Act, 1913. 
823 The Court of Appeal in Agadir Decision No 1487 issued on 25/06/1992. See also A Gomirah, The Abusive 
Conduct of Shareholders in the Joint Stock Company (1st edn, Matbat Alomnia, Rabat 2011), at 211. 
221 
 
minutes.824 To enhance their role in the management of the company minority shareholders are 
given a right to call for a general meeting and schedule any points on its agenda; by this right 
they are able to play effectual role in the company’s decisions, in particular where the board of 
directors is under the controller of the majority shareholders. Nonetheless, this right would not 
serve the minority shareholders who hold less than 10% of the voting rights.825  
Besides these rights, the Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 provides for other supervisory 
organs (the supervisors’ committee and the external auditor) which are created to play some 
sort of control over the company and to make sure that the majority shareholders are not 
abusing the interests of other shareholders.826 However, even with the availability of these 
rights and supervision tools, majority shareholders still have the power to further their own 
interest and misuse the interests of other shareholders. Therefore, it is the function of law to 
provide aggrieved minority shareholders with a proper legal remedy that allows them to bring 
a direct action against the wrongdoers in order to recover the damages suffered by such abusive 
conduct. Ruefully, minority shareholders under the current Libyan law would not be able to 
sue the controllers of their company as they are not granted a right to bring the unfair prejudice 
petition that is applied under English law, or the simple procedure actions (derivative and 
personal actions) that are adopted in Morocco. The only action that could be brought by the 
oppressed minority shareholders is the overly-complicated individual action, where such a 
shareholder has to establish that he or she was directly affected by the conduct of the company’s 
controllers, besides, the claimant shareholder needs to give an evidence of the fraud or 
negligence perpetrated by the board members.827 It seems that the “no reflective loss” principle, 
which restricts the personal action under England law, is applicable by the Libyan law. In 
                                                 
824 SS. 223-224 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
825 SS. 154-155-163 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
826 See ss. 196 to 211 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
827 S. 186 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
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contrast, having seen that minority shareholders under the Moroccan law is allowed to use the 
personal claim without the no reflective loss principle and claimant shareholder is not required 
to give an evidence of the fraud or negligence perpetrated by the board members.828 In England, 
although English law adopts the no reflective loss principle however, a shareholder is granted 
a right to petition under s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 if the affairs of the company are 
being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the member’s 
interests.829 Under the above barriers and conditions that are applied by s. 186 of the Libyan 
Business Activities Act 2010 minority shareholders would not be able to commence a personal 
action against those who harm their personal rights and interests. Thus such a law needs to be 
eliminated so that the minority shareholder can bring a personal action under flexible and 
accessible criteria.  
In terms of the derivative action, minority shareholders in the above comparative jurisdictions 
(England and Morocco), are granted a right to start proceedings on behalf of the company 
against those who mismanage the affairs of such a company. However, the Libyan shareholder 
protection regime does not provide minority shareholders with this claim, so that an action of 
liability against company directors under s. 184 of the Business Activities Act 2010 can only 
be commenced be the company itself via its general meeting. In other words, under the current 
Libyan law the minority shareholder is not allowed to start the company liability action against 
the board members unless they succeed in passing a resolution by the general meeting. Such a 
condition would prevent a company liability action from being heard by the court as the 
majority shareholders are usually the controllers of the company or in a good relationship with 
those controllers, therefore, they will not pass this kind of resolution. Together with the above 
obstacle s. 184 of the Business Activities Act 2010 has only provided for the action against the 
                                                 
828 S. 353 of the JSC Act, 1996. 
829 S. 994 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
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board members while it was seen that offensive conduct might be committed by non-members 
of the board of directors. Therefore, the wording of this section should be amended to include 
the all controllers of the company even they are not members of the board of directors.  
Under the above conditions either for the company liability action or the personal claim it 
would not be easy for the minority shareholders to litigate against the wrongdoer controllers in 
order to recover the damages suffered either by the company or by those shareholders. Such 
obstacles with the absence of the derivative claim would not make such litigation an attractive 
solution for the aggrieved minority shareholder. Under these complicated conditions, the 
minority shareholders can only file a complaint with the supervisory committee or by reporting 
alleged irregularities in the management of the directors to the tribunal because of 
management's statements about the financial situation of the company, as well as the auditing 
the firm's financial controls and reports, were completely false and misleading.830 
The comparison conducted by this thesis obviously revealed that the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 in contrast to its equivalents in England and Morocco fails to offer a 
contemporary system of minority shareholder protection which provides sufficient statutory 
devices, grounds, remedies and recognition of specific rights that protect the interests of 
minority shareholders. The Libyan rules are insufficient, ineffective and in some cases overly-
complicated. To enhance the level of protection under such a jurisdiction the current rules of 
minority shareholder protection need to be adjusted and some other rules need to be adopted in 
order to guarantee that the level of protection of minority shareholders complies with 
international standards and produces a competitive business environment. In this regard, 
minority shareholders have to be granted sufficient rights and tools by which they would be 
able to participate in the management of their company and protect their interests. Besides, 
                                                 
830 See s. 206 of the Business Activities Act, 2010. 
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these rules should grant aggrieved minority shareholders a right to start litigation either to 
remedy damage affecting his personal interests or the interests of the company.  
6.3 Contribution and recommendations 
The consideration of the level of minority shareholder protection under Libyan laws was based 
on the hypothesis that the Libyan law of minority shareholder protection should be assessed 
and reformed, if found to be unsatisfactory, according to the level of protection that is found in 
the other comparable jurisdictions. Examining such protective rights and tools illustrates that 
the Libyan shareholder protection regime suffers from major inadequacies and weaknesses; 
this fact becomes even clearer when this system is compared to other comparative jurisdictions. 
Therefore, this thesis will fill a gap in the very limited body of Libyan literature of corporate 
governance. Furthermore, to my knowledge this work provides the first study that has 
examined the level of minority shareholder protection in the Closed Joint Stock Companies 
under Libyan laws in comparison with the English and Moroccan laws. Consequently, the 
outcomes of this thesis are important for academic researchers, lawyers, policymakers and most 
importantly the law makers in Libya. In this manner, having stated in the introduction of this 
thesis that the Libyan Ministry of Economic Affairs in the interim government that formed by 
the General National Congress has decided to form a committee to adjust the Business 
Activities Act 2010 which regulates companies and partnerships in Libya. Furthermore, I was 
consulted by this committee to make suggestions regarding some topics in the proposed Libyan 
company law.831 This comparison granted the researcher a chance to extrapolate lessons that 
can be adopted by the Libyan law makers in the upcoming reforms. Therefore, it is hoped that 
the following recommendations along with the previous suggestions that are given in chapter 
                                                 
831 On December 2014 I received a phone call from Muhammed Abadwai and Alhabeeb Ajboda Professors of 
Private Law at Tripoli University who are members of the above committee, they asked about the position in the 
Companies Act 2006 regarding some issues, furthermore, they posted to me a draft of the new proposal companies 
law in order to extrapolate lessons from the English Law. 
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four will be taken into account. Such proposals would establish a strong level of protection to 
the minority shareholders and would make the Libyan regime of minority shareholder 
protection more in tune with the majority of other jurisdictions.  
1. A shareholder’s right to obtain documents and have information about the company under 
Libyan law is not well organized, as a shareholder ss. 223-224 of the Business Activities Act 
2010 has only limited access to some non-important documents (the minutes of the shareholder 
meetings and their decisions) with no ability to have financial statements, the minutes of the 
board of directors and its decisions. Therefore, a shareholder should have a right to access the 
company's important documents such as that provided by s. 141 of the JSC 1996 in Morocco. 
Furthermore, a shareholder should be allowed to obtain this information upon their request 
with the ability to have a copy of those documents as he or she might need to consult a 
professional person regarding one or more issues. In this regard, the Libyan legislature is 
advised to the adopt the policy that is taken by s. 740 of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 
2012 (Cap 622) where shareholders holding at least 2.5% of the voting rights, (or at least 5 
shareholders of the company) are given a right to apply to the court for an order requiring the 
company to disclose its records or documents. The court under s. 740 (2) has a discretion to 
order inspection of a company's records or documents if it is satisfied that the application is 
made in good faith and the inspection is for a proper purpose. If the court issues such an order 
a shareholder or group of shareholders are allowed to make copies of the records or 
documents.832 This policy can be enhanced by the rule that was adopted by s. 392 of the JSC 
Act 1996 in Morocco where the courts are be able to issue a daily fine on the controllers of the 
company for the delay in granting the claimant shareholder the records or the related 
documents. 
                                                 
832 S. 740 (3) of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, 2012.  
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2. Although minority shareholders owning 10% of the voting rights under s. 155 of the Libyan 
Business Activities Act 2010 are able to ask the board of directors to call a general meeting 
and list the points that need to be discussed in that meeting, however, minority shareholders 
with less that this figure would not be able to exercise such right. Having seen that s. 166 of 
JSC 1996 in Morocco disregarded this percentage in the case of urgency, and similarly, s. 303 
of UK Companies Act 2006 reduced this percent to 5% if no shareholders’ meeting has not 
been held for more than 12 months). Further, under s. 306 of Companies Act 2006 each 
shareholder has a right to ask the court to call a general meeting. The Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 has not adopted such an exception, therefore, this figure has to be reduced 
at least to 5% and to any shareholder in the case of urgency. 833  Furthermore, individual 
shareholders should have a right to ask the court to call a general meeting.834 By such right a 
minority shareholder should not only be given a chance to call a meeting, but also to delay or 
stop a next meeting.835 The same percentage needs to be reduced in s. 206 of the Business 
Activities Act 2010 where shareholders owning not less than 10% of company’s capital are 
allowed to file a complaint to the primary court if the acts of the members of the board of 
directors or the supervisors’ committee are deemed censurable or it is alleged they violated 
their duties. 
3. In terms of the role of the judicial authority in protecting the minority shareholders, under 
ss. 160-161 of the Business Activities Act 2010, the nullity action can only be initiated by the 
board of directors, supervisors’ committee and shareholders who did not attend the meeting or 
who voted against that decision.836 Under this law minority shareholders need to prove that the 
                                                 
833 See for example s. 303 of the Companies Act, 2006. Also s, 61 of the Egyptian Companies Act, 1981 and s. 
166 of the Moroccan JSC Act, 1996.  
834 See s. 306 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
835 See The Commercial Court of Appeal in Casablanca, decision No 1630, file No 83/1113, issued on 13/12/1983, 
in this case the court grounded its judgment on s. 149 of the Civil Procedural Law which allows the president of 
the Primary Court to work as an urgent judge in these circumstances, cited in A Hamdawi, Majority Shareholders 
Abuses in the Joint Stock Company, Comparative Study (1st edn, Dar Alafag Almagribia, Rabat 2013), at 271. 
836 See Chapter Five (5.3.2). 
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subject resolution was against the law or the company’s constitutions. Furthermore, s. 161 
allows the president of the primary court to ask the shareholder who filed the nullity action to 
provide appropriate financial guarantee in order to remedy any damage that might happened, 
such a condition would put up an extra bar that discourages a shareholder from using such kind 
of action. This position needs to be adjusted and the Moroccan position that is applied by s. 
338 of the JSC Act 1996 is recommended wherein each shareholder has a right to bring a nullity 
action even those shareholders who have not voted against the decision or who had not attended 
the general meeting. Such a law would give a shareholder a chance to reconsider his position 
regarding that decision as it would not appear to that shareholder at the issuing date whether a 
decision is abusive or not. Moreover, a shareholder should be granted a right to bring an action 
to nullify a resolution that may harm the interest of such a shareholder even that decision was 
not in contravention of the law or the company’s constitutions.837 So that it should be enough 
for a shareholder to prove that the subject decision breaches the principle of equal treatment to 
some shareholders or it furthers the interests of some shareholders rather than the interests of 
the company. 838  Most significantly, having seen that the financial bar would prevent a 
shareholder from starting this claim, thus, the principle that is adopted in Egypt is 
recommended whereby the cost of minority shareholders’ claims has to be paid by the company 
if it is proved that such an action was based on serious reasons.839 To prevent vexatious actions 
that are proceeded with only to disturb the business of the company or to harm the interests of 
majority shareholders, the court should be given a discretion to penalize in costs the claimant 
whenever it is proved that the subject action was based on malicious reasons. 
                                                 
837 The Supreme Court of Morocco, Decision no 620 issued on 07/06/2006, file no 209/03/2003, issued on 
07/06/2006, (2008) (68) The Journal of Supreme Court 118, at 121. 
838 Ibid. 
839 S. 76 of the Egyptian Companies Act, 1981.  
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4. Having come up with a conclusion that under current Libyan law minority shareholders 
would not be able to sue the controllers of the company either by the complicated personal 
claim or by the company liability action, therefore the rules that regulate these actions need to 
be reformed. In terms of the company liability action, under s. 184 of the Libyan Business 
Activities Act 2010 an individual shareholder or group of minority shareholders have no chance 
to bring an action on behalf of the company against the wrongdoer directors as the company 
liability action against the board members could only be started by the company itself via a 
resolution passed by the company’s general meeting. This law needs to be changed so that each 
shareholder should have a right to start a derivative claim against the controllers of the company 
( as in s. 260 of the UK Companies Act 2006 and s. 353 of the Moroccan JSC Act 1996) 
whether those controllers are board members or not.840  Moreover, the company liability action 
under the current Libyan law can only be brought against the company’s board member as s. 
184 has not mentioned de jure directors, de facto directors and the shadow directors, while 
under English and Moroccan laws this action can be brought against any wrongdoing 
shareholders who have sufficient power to control the company without being a member of its 
board. Therefore, the wording of the section needs to be amended and the term “directors” 
should be replaced by the term “controllers” in order to include any wrongdoing shareholders 
or directors who have sufficient power to control the company without being member of its 
board. Besides, the policy employed by s. 354 of the Moroccan JSC Act 1996 needs to be 
adopted in Libya which allows a shareholders or group of shareholders on behalf of the 
company to start a derivative action without any previous permission either by the board or the 
general meeting, and neither the board of directors nor the general meeting should have the 
power to ratify their conduct in order to stop or withdraw the proceeding action against the 
                                                 
840 See also s. 102 of the Egyptian Companies Act (No 159, 1981) which grants a shareholder the right to start 
such action against the controllers of the company without any permission from the general meeting.   
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company even by a special resolution. Some other lessons should be taken from the English 
law experience regarding the derivative claim, for instance, minority shareholders should have 
a right to base their action on an actual or proposed act, omission involving negligence, default, 
breach of duty, or breach of trust by directors of the company.841  It is also recommended for 
the Libyan legislature to adopt the new English law position regarding pure negligence as a 
sufficient ground of starting a derivative action.842 In terms of litigation costs, it was seen that 
such costs form a big obstacle that prevents many shareholders from using the derivative action, 
therefore, minority shareholders should have a right to apply for an indemnity order whenever 
it is proved that the subject action is not vexatious action and it is made in good faith and the 
for a proper purpose.843  
5. Regarding the personal action, in order to start a personal action under the current rule (s. 
186 of the Business Activities Act 2010) a minority shareholder needs to evidence that the 
damage has directly harmed the interests of such shareholder, moreover he or she needs to 
prove that such damage was a result of fraud or negligence of the board members. Under the 
above conditions it would be very difficult to see individual actions coming before the courts, 
therefore these restrictions need to be removed and the Moroccan position is recommended 
where s. 353 of the JSC Act 1996 enables each shareholder or group of shareholders to bring a 
personal claim to protect their own interest without any further complication such as the “no 
reflective loss” principle. Under Moroccan law the claimant shareholder is not required to 
prove that such damage was a result of fraud or negligence of the board members. Above and 
beyond, the personal action under s. 186 of   Libyan Business Activities Act 2010 can only be 
brought against the company’s board members, whereas under English and Moroccan laws this 
                                                 
841 See s. 263 of the Companies Act, 2006. 
842 J Birds and others, Annotated Companies Legislation (3rd  edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). 
843 To clarify these criteria law makers need to provide guidance to the court which provides examples for the 
terms of vexatious actions and a proper purpose. 
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action can be brought against any complicit shareholders who have sufficient power to control 
the company without being members of its board. Consequently, the wording of the section 
needs to be amended and the term “directors” should be substituted by the term “controllers” 
in order to include any wrongdoing shareholders who have sufficient power to control the 
company without being members of its board.  
6. Under the English law, we showed that the above restrictions on personal and derivative 
claims have encouraged minority shareholders to use alternative methods to obtain their 
remedies. Under such a remedy a shareholder is granted a right to petition under s. 994 of the 
Companies Act 2006 if the affairs of the company are being or have been conducted in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the member’s interests. The petitioner shareholder 
could ask the court for various orders: regulate the conduct, require the company to refrain 
from action, authorise the member to bring a derivative action and finally the court is authorised 
to issue an order which ask the other members or the company itself to purchase the minority 
shareholder’s shares. The unfair prejudice remedy is considered the key distinctive feature of 
the English system of minority shareholder protection and it is highly recommended to be 
adopted by Libyan law makers. 
7. Last but not least, the buy-out remedy which has become the most important relief under the 
unfair prejudice remedy under English law has to be adopted by the Libyan corporate law 
regime. This a remedy is applied in Morocco under s. 1057 of Obligations and Contracts Act844 
in the Civil Companies and Partnerships and by s. 221 of the JSC Act 1996 only in the case of 
conversion. Such a relief was also adopted in Tunisia in 2009 where s. 290 of the Law No 16 
which adjusted the Companies Act 2000845 allows a shareholders or group of shareholders in a 
non-listed company who hold a percentage which does not exceed 5% of the capital to sell out 
                                                 
844 Issued on 12 August 1913 and was amended in 22 September 2011. 
845 Issued on 16 March 2009. 
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their shares and leave the company.846 Although s. 209 of the Tunisian Companies Act 2000 
adopts the buy-out relief, however such a remedy was only given to a shareholder or group of 
shareholders who hold a small percentage (not exceeding 5% of the capital), so it does not offer 
any protection to the minority shareholder who holds more than this figure. Therefore, the 
Libyan legislature is advised to grant the buy-out relief to any shareholder regardless of its 
percentages of shares. Such a remedy would ensure that minority shareholders under Libya 
company law have always a right to leave and sell their shares at fair value. The English law 
experience regarding the buy-out relief is recommended where the court will generally apply 
the pro rata formula if the company was a ‘quasi-partnership’,847 and will not discount the value 
of the shares on the ground that they are a minority shareholdings, even the market would apply 
such discount. However, in some circumstances although a case of quasi-partnership is not 
existing, yet, the surrounding facts and the principles of justice require that the valuation of the 
petitioner shares should be made on pro rata basis rather than applying the discount basis and 
vice versa.848 Also in determining the suitable time of share valuation the flexible English law 
position is highly recommended where the Court of Appeal in Profinance Trust SA v 
Gladstone849 has provided comprehensive a view on the appropriate time regarding share 
valuation, and it made clear the principle by which the proper time of valuation is the date of 
sale, however if it appears to the court that there is more appropriate date to value the share the 
court has the power to do so.850 Briefly, the adoption of the buy-out remedy would increase the 
level of protection in Libya and would prevent the shareholders from incurring the cost and 
lengthy litigation with its negative effect on the company and its reputation. 
                                                 
846 See Chapter Five (5.3.4), at 209-210. 
847 See CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v DemarcoAlmeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108. 
848 See Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch). See also Robin Hollington QC in Re Blue Index Ltd [2014] 
EWHC 2860 (Ch), at 26.  
849 [2002] 1 BCLC 141, see also Re Sunrise Radio Ltd [2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch). 
850 For instance in Re BC&G Care Homes Ltd: Crowley v Bessell [2015] EWHC 1518 (Ch), the valuation date 




6.4 Areas of further research  
This work as a Ph.D thesis is restricted in its scope and time, therefore such limitations need to 
be acknowledged regarding the current research. Taking these considerations into account this 
study focuses on the most pressing issue that the author felt needed to be addressed, which is 
the level of minority shareholder protection that is provided by Libyan corporate law system 
and what can be done to enhance this level. In so doing the thesis examined the minority 
shareholder protection regime under the English and Moroccan jurisdictions in order to 
extrapolate lessons that can be adopted by the Libyan law makers in the upcoming reforms. 
After considering this issue it seems to the researcher that the protection of minority 
shareholder in the Closed Joint Stock Company in Libya forms only one part of having a good 
corporate governance system, therefore, the research that this thesis has carried out could be 
taken further by other following up studies which focus upon particular topics related to the 
corporate governance in Libya. First and foremost, due to the current political circumstances 
in Libya this research is based only on the doctrinal approach via examining primary and 
secondary resources such as laws, regulations, books and journal articles; hence when things 
settle down in Libya empirical studies of minority shareholders protection have to be carried 
out in order to have a complete picture regarding the topic. These empirical studies would 
investigate the doctrine of minority shareholder protection in practice which no doubt would 
add more value to the area. Besides, having stated that this thesis focuses on Closed Joint Stock 
Companies therefore, the protection of minority shareholders in the Public Joint Stock 
Companies needs to be undertaken, taking into account the late establishment of Libyan Stock 
Market which is established in 2007. Most of the 13 listed companies in the Libyan Stock 
Market are state owned companies therefore, such studies have to address the conflict between 
the State as controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.  
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On the other hand, as many of the non-listed small companies in Libya and MENA countries 
are family owned enterprises, so it would be worthwhile to examine the governance of the 
family owned firms. Such studies should consider the following issues: the composition and 
independence of the board of directors in these firms, the role of the board of directors in 
protecting the minority shareholder and the duties of the board of directors’ and the 
enforcement of these duties. Furthermore, in such countries, companies have strong, culturally 
based, characteristics which determine a particular type of hierarchical structure and often a 
tendency for a relatively short life cycle of two to three generations.851 Such a life cycle model 
tends to indicate stress points at which family disputes and potential minority shareholder 
action may occur if not properly managed e.g. on succession and at cousins confederation 
stages. Therefore, there is a need to study the corporate governance problems associated with 
the life cycle in a sample of family dominated firms which examines the legal dimensions of 
modelling the life cycles of family firms and the governance aspects of small to medium sized 
enterprises. Additionally, when a conflict arises between the minority shareholders and the 
controllers of the company an alternative solution, such as arbitration, has to be considered, as 
it would be better to avoid litigation among the family members of such firms. In these kinds 
of firm the concepts of de facto and shadow directors are very common wherein the controller 
of the company is a person who is not a member of the board of directors and minority 
shareholders cannot bring an action against such controller. To that regard, further studies 
should be undertaken which examine the responsibilities of the de facto and shadow directors 
in the context of family owned enterprises and how minority shareholders could start an action 
against those controllers.  
                                                 
851 P Lawton ‘Berle and Means, Corporate Governance and Chinese Family Firm’ (1996) 6 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 348, at 348.  
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Having stated that creating an effectual system of protection for the minority shareholder 
emanates from several sources, such as the ethics of shareholders and directors, the provisions 
of the law, the judicial system, internal control systems, and voluntary adoption of effectual 
codes of corporate governance therefore, this study suggests that follow up studies should 
consider these issues in order to provide a complete perspective of the whole problem. Last but 
not least, the protection of minority shareholders should not disturb the day to day business of 
the company; thus it is worthwhile to have further research which identifies this potential 
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